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Kolesnichenko Opposes United Germany in NATO

PM0604085090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Tomas Kolesnichenko article under the rubric "Viewpoint": "But If You Take a Common Sense View..."]

[Text] Not so long ago, when the subject turned to events taking place on our continent, the question: "Whom does this benefit?" would often receive the answer: "Common sense."

But how do these words sound against the background of the recent fundamental changes in Europe? A London newspaper, apropos of the recent end of our cosmonauts' flight after many months, remarked: "They have returned to a different Earth." It is even more important that they have returned to a different Europe.

This applies above all to the most important change in Europe since the day that World War II ended—the German unification process which has begun. Among the many problems connected with the status of the future single German state, I would single out the topic of whether that state is to be integrated into NATO, or into a common (possibly new) European security structure. So far as Bonn is concerned, Chancellor Kohl, the "father" of the future Germany, claims that its place is in NATO only. The same view is held in Washington and in the capitals of the other NATO member countries. The other day, even the Pentagon referred (albeit only anonymously, as yet) to "the desire of East European countries" that Germany remain in NATO.

The insurmountable desire to incorporate a united Germany in the military and political bloc is explained with complete seriousness in the West chiefly in terms of the problem of... "keeping an eye on it in the future." (It is both funny and sad that even in Bonn they think the same). In this connection, the American observer Bernard Treinor [name as transliterated] claims that "NATO's role is changing, and this alliance is turning into a potential supervisor of a united Germany."

But, first, it is not clear why this newly fledged "supervisor" is donning the protective clothing of the NATO bloc, when questions of Germany's observance of the postwar conditions are the prerogative of all the victor states. Moreover, the threat of the rise of a "Fourth Reich" is extremely hypothetical. But the NATO threat (especially if the plans for a united Germany to join this bloc are realized) will patently increase. You do not need to be a military man to envisage how much the echelonment and the depth of the Soviet defense will decrease (I would advise one or two Western observers to talk to our military men on this topic).

The indications from NATO headquarters are that they are by no means preparing to beat swords into plowshares. For instance, NATO "does not intend to give up nuclear weapons" (of course, "in order to forestall any war?!") and is not even "studying the possibility" of a 50 percent reduction in its nuclear arms.

Moreover, "on the historical plane" the NATO bloc, its leaders believe, "must—and will—exist," whereas, in their opinion, "the future of the Warsaw Pact is unclear." Hence the "profound" premise: The USSR must leave Europe, whilst the United States must stay there practically forever. Here is what the French paper LE MONDE had to say on this subject: "Europe is the center of world politics. The sole surviving superpower (?!) must have a presence there."

If the term "superpower" is being used, then the question arises: What has actually changed with regard to the USSR? Why is the United States the one remaining "superpower"? Yes, fundamental changes have taken place in Europe. The whole world situation has changed. Some people have consequently gained, while others have lost. But surely it is not possible to speak of a radical change in the military-strategic balance on our continent and throughout the world? Count "their" nuclear warheads and "ours," and find the answer yourself.

Therefore, it seems to me, it is now important not to engage in a trial of strength again, not to seek purely military advantages in a changing world, but to show the utmost responsibility in our attitudes toward these changes. I personally cannot understand the euphoria of those who openly link their plans with "the sole superpower," meaning the United States, trying frankly to ignore the interests of the Soviet Union. Indeed, if anything lacks common sense, it is above all a policy calculated to help those in our society who think that we should not "give way," but should continue to participate actively in the arms race.

To be fair, I will observe that my remarks are now aimed less at the leaders of Western countries than at those who, for the sake of a few extra points on the "scale" of power, are prepared to forgo common sense.

It remains to note that in my perception a European future which includes the reality of a united Germany cannot be some kind of concentration camp in which a "potential supervisor" is necessary. Even Konrad Adenauer once said that "the German question can be resolved only under the European roof."

Europe must and will live under a common roof, in a home whose construction cannot now be stopped.

FRG Seeking 'To Discredit' GDR Leftists

PM0504100390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 3 Apr 90 Second Edition p 3

[N. Nikolayev article: "Four Million Suspects. FRG Experts Preparing Large-Scale Operations To Discredit Left-Wing Forces in GDR"]

[Text] The passions aroused by West German politicians' "victory" at the recent GDR elections have still not subsided, but representatives of official FRG departments have already embarked on an analysis of possible difficulties at the initial stage of a united Germany's existence. They are, in fact, drafting the system of an administrative-legal regime which is intended to be introduced on the territory of today's GDR immediately after reunification.

The eastern districts of a united Germany could produce "a dangerous concentration of population groups with an overt or covert antidemocratic potential," which would have a destabilizing effect on the development of the sociopolitical and economic situation in the country. The number of malcontents or persons disaffected by a social system which would be new for them could be in excess of 4 million. These are the conclusions of a confidential study "On Social Composition and Antidemocratic Elements in East Germany" recently conducted by experts from the West German Foreign Ministry, the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), and the Federal Department for the Protection of the Constitution.

Even though the report is still being worked on and has not yet been made public, there are nonetheless grounds to speak of active preparations in the FRG for the implementation of large-scale actions to discredit and isolate left-wing forces in the GDR. One is, to say the least, amazed by the obviously provocative desire of West German experts to categorize almost one-fourth of a sovereign state's population as "antidemocratic forces" at a single stroke of the pen. Furthermore, the authors of the study take it upon themselves to assert that "antidemocratic groups" in the GDR would be made up mainly of former party, trade union, and youth organization figures with organizational abilities and ambitions, staffers of state security organs, officials of abolished ministries and departments, members of newly formed left-wing parties, and persons who would have suffered material damage as a result of Germany's unification.

In the opinion of the report's compilers, a special danger will develop when "antidemocratic groups" of the GDR population establish close contacts with existing "antidemocratic forces" in the FRG. It is alleged in passing that joint actions by these forces "could be guided from abroad." This is the passage where the specific handwriting of the West German special services is probably most noticeable.

This presentation of the question is evidence of the far-reaching goals pursued by FRG departments, with one such goal possibly being to prepare public opinion in support of the idea of applying against GDR citizens the notorious West German "Resolution on Radical Elements in State Service," better known as the "Berufsverbot" Law [prohibiting communists from working in certain professions]. It is an open secret that it is used in the FRG to discriminate against members of progressive organizations, including communists, and keep them out of state institutions. Thousands of FRG citizens are annually classed as "inferior" on the basis of this discriminatory legislative act. It is obvious that millions of East Germans would be caught by its provisions in a united Germany. The West German experts' study can—with perfect justification—be perceived as a plan for the final stage of a thoroughly worked out "Blitzkrieg" against the left-wing movement in the GDR.

Conditions for the completion of the "Blitzkrieg" have been created persistently and consistently over the last few months. This is confirmed if only by the fact that Western diplomatic circles rated most highly the effectiveness of FRG actions which exerted considerable influence on the development of events in the GDR and produced a major international reverberation. People recall in particular the clamor made by FRG mass media over statements by Schalk-Golodkowski, an SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] functionary who defected and accused his former colleagues of having committed every mortal sin. It was hardly an accident that many of his fabrications actually predetermined the nature of charges against E. Honecker, E. Mielke, and other former GDR leaders. It is well known that they were accused of "corruption," "usurpation of power," and "state treason." In the course of the investigation, however, the GDR Prosecutor's Office was forced to drop virtually all charges. Allegations that Honecker had embezzled 75 million marks proved to be disinformation. The myth about the "state treason" committed by him was dispelled. Under Article 96 of the GDR Criminal Code, this category of actions includes attempts to seize power and overthrow the socialist system by force, and complicity in the annexation or absorption of the GDR or parts of its territory by another state. The weekly DER SPIEGEL ironically remarked that these accusations should have been leveled not against Honecker but against some completely different persons. The veil of lies is lifting, but too late.

As a matter of fact, the entire campaign struggle in the GDR was waged under the very powerful influence of West German politicians and the FRG mass media. The subversive work against left-wing forces was so active that Egon Bahr, member of the West German SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] Presidium and Board, described it as "psychological terrorism a la Goebbels." For example, just before the GDR elections, the West German newspaper BILD published a provocative report claiming that its editorial office had in its possession the confidential minutes of a PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism] Board sitting which, in the newspaper's words, "graphically displayed the genuine face" of the party's present leader G. Gysi. The document, according to BILD, had been distributed among PDS Bezirk committees in order to "brief them on successful actions to conceal data concerning staffers and agents of the former GDR Ministry of State Security so as to hamper their exposure in a united Germany." The minutes, according to the newspaper's claim, also spoke of the PDS leadership's intention to blow up the Central Investigations Bureau archives in Salzgitter (FRG) with the help of Soviet specialists. That same newspaper attempted to discredit H. Modrow, one of the main PDS candidates. The material published by BILD groundlessly asserted that the GDR Government headed by

Modrow had granted unjustifiably high pensions and benefits to resigning ministers.

The present political crisis in the GDR associated with the presentation of demands to investigate which People's Chamber deputies had links with the GDR Ministry of State Security threatens to completely disorganize power in the country. According to some data, West German special services were involved in instigating the debate on this question in the GDR.

Diplomats Briefed on USSR Customs Practice

PM0504142790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general headline: "Official Reports"]

[Text] A meeting was held 3 April between V.K. Boyarov, chief of the USSR Council of Ministers Main Administration of State Customs Control, and the heads of diplomatic missions accredited in Moscow. The foreign diplomats were briefed on the main concepts of present-day Soviet customs policy, which is aimed at safeguarding state interests and ensuring a balanced consumer market in the country. They were also told about the practical measures being taken to expand ties between the USSR Main Administration of State Customs Control and customs organs in foreign countries and to associate the USSR with international treaties and agreements in the customs sphere.

The meeting was organized by the USSR Foreign Ministry State Protocol Administration.

United States & Canada

Further Coverage of Shevardnadze's U.S. Visit

PRAVDA on First Day Talks

PM0504215390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Conversations in Washington"]

[Text] Washington, 5 Apr—Talks between USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker began here with a one-on-one conversation lasting more than three hours.

In general they reviewed the whole spectrum of Soviet-U.S. relations at the closing stage of the preparations for the next summit meeting and outlined the fundamental questions, mainly in the arms limitation sphere, which must be finalized with a view to ensuring its maximum success. A detailed examination of these problems will be conducted during the talks over the next few days, involving experts from both sides.

E.A. Shevardnadze and J. Baker exchanged information on the domestic political situations in both their countries, particularly as regards their effect on the development of Soviet-U.S. relations. The USSR foreign minister once again confirmed the desire on the part of the Soviet leadership, which is firmly committed to the policy of perestroyka and democratization, to settle questions arising with regard to Lithuania by means of peaceful, constructive dialogue.

The beginning of the Washington meeting between the leaders of the USSR and U.S. foreign policy departments proved businesslike and substantive.

E.A. Shevardnadze received prominent American senators at their request—G. Mitchell, leader of the Democratic majority, and R. Doyle, leader of the Republican minority.

Expressing interest in further developing Soviet-U.S. relations, the senators explained some features of the reaction in the U.S. Congress to the situation in Lithuania and expressed support for the Soviet leadership's intentions to settle the question through dialogue.

E.A. Shevardnadze for his part indicated the multifaceted nature of the problem and pointed out some aspects which are not always taken into consideration by everyone when analyzing it. The USSR foreign minister stressed the idea that what has been achieved over the last few years in Soviet-U.S. relations is so wide-ranging and significant that it must be treated carefully by both sides with wisdom and restraint.

In the opinion of the participants, the conversation was constructive and useful.

TASS Round-up of Events

LD0604082690 Moscow TASS in English 0808 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Text] Washington April 6 TASS—The beginning of talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, which opened on Thursday, coincided with the announcement that the meeting of Soviet and American presidents has been scheduled for May 30 to June 3. The talks, which continued late into the evening, focused on preparations for the summit.

The ministers analysed the progress of negotiations on a treaty to slash stocks of strategic offensive weapons. They also exchanged views on talks following conclusion of such a treaty, in order to further ensure strategic stability. The sides sought solutions for yet unresolved problems linked with the reduction of conventional armaments in Europe, the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons and the elaboration of an "open skies" regime. Also discussed were problems of nuclear tests and non-proliferation of missiles and missile technologies.

The ministers discussed in detail regional problems related to the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, Mozambique, South Africa, Cambodia and the Korean peninsula. Some new ideas were advanced to relax tension and help resolve existing conflicts. They analysed various external aspects of German unity and its compliance with the all-European process.

Although, as had been expected, there were some differences in approaches to certain problems, such, for instance, as the military-political status of a united Germany and the expediency of a peace treaty, the discussion was definitely useful for preparing the "two plus four" mechanism and for putting it into action, the Soviet side noted. The discussion of humanitarian problems and human rights showed again that mutual accusations are now things of the past. All the arising problems are being solved in a businesslike atmosphere and in the interests of both sides.

Transnational subjects, a relatively new aspect of the Soviet-American dialogue, have also been tackled. The sides discussed problems of ecology and of combating terrorism and drug trafficking, liquidating the consequences of natural calamities and certain other pressing issues of global importance.

Presidential Summit Dates Announced

LD0604063990 Moscow TASS in English 0632 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Text] Washington April 6 TASS—The main event of the second day of the Washington talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker was an announcement that Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush will hold their next summit from May 30 to June 3.

Bush told reporters he was glad that the date was set. It is very important that the two sides hold talks, he noted. Dialogue is very important.

Much work remains to be done, Baker told reporters. "We have very little time: only seven weeks," Shevardnadze said. "We have got down to practical preparations for the summit."

In the context of this practical preparation, the two ministers concentrated on arms control on Thursday. They also discussed regional problems, bilateral relations, including trade and economic ties, humanitarian and transnational issues.

Dealing with the discussion by the ministers of issues concerning a treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, a State Department spokesman said the ministers had a chance to discuss some important outstanding problems.

They again confirmed a desire to do as much as possible before the summit and during the remaining time before the end of the year, the spokesman noted. Both sides set out new ideas in various areas of arms control and new approaches to individual issues.

The sides will continue the disarmament talks today. Shevardnadze will meet President Bush, and the two ministers will hold a news conference.

The ABC TV company notes that a treaty on strategic weapons providing for deep cuts in ICBM arsenals is one of the most difficult problems at the talks.

Experts of the Soviet and American delegations admit that the treaty needs additional work and possibly will not be ready for signing at the Washington summit. However, both sides express confidence that the remaining problems can be settled during the summit.

A U.S. arms control expert expressed confidence that the treaty could be completed and signed by the end of the year.

In turn, a Soviet representative said that the remaining outstanding issues can be settled during the Washington summit.

At the same time both sides say that there is a good chance to complete drafting a Soviet-American treaty on chemical weapons by the end of May.

Shevardnadze, Baker Cited on Summit

LD0504211190 Moscow TASS in English 2054 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Washington April 6 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, on a working visit here, said that the Soviet Union and United States started practical preparations for the summit meeting between U.S. President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev several hours after the date of their summit was officially announced.

Shevardnadze and the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker stressed that they are satisfied with the beginning of talks and the constructive character of discussions on such an acute problem as arms control.

Shevardnadze and Baker answered journalists' questions after the first round of talks with the participation of experts ended at noon. The round was devoted to a discussion of the problem of arms control and disarmament.

"The date of the summit has been determined," Shevardnadze said. "Now we start practical preparations for it. At the first meeting we discussed the whole range of disarmament problems. The discussions were constructive and interesting."

Baker's words also testify to a businesslike character of talks and the wish to ensure that the summit leads to maximum results, particularly in such sphere as arms limitation. Much work is yet to be done, especially in the wake of the announced summit, scheduled to begin on May 30, Baker said. The direction of work has been determined and it will continue.

During the first round main problems requiring elaboration and ways to resolve them were determined. Experts continue their work and are to report their suggestions tonight or tomorrow morning.

Two more rounds of talks are scheduled for today—on regional problems and bilateral relations.

Bush Cited on Summit, Talks

LD0504201190 Moscow TASS in English 2001 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Washington April 5 TASS—U.S. President George Bush said today during a short interview with journalists that he was very glad that the date had been fixed for his summit meeting with Gorbachev. He pointed out that such conversations were important, that a dialogue was of much importance and that he would be glad to see Gorbachev in the United States.

Touching upon talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, which are continuing in Washington, the President said that the talks with Mr. Shevardnadze were going on rather well and that he was going to receive him on Friday. He pointed out that he was looking forward to this meeting.

Speaking again about the coming summit in Washington, Bush stressed that the American side wanted a dialogue and long discussions, and he was glad that everything had been fixed.

Committee Condemns U.S. Resolutions on Lithuania

LD0604132890 Moscow TASS in English 1239 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 6 TASS—The Soviet Parliament's international affairs committee has criticised the resolutions passed by the U.S. Senate and House Committee on Foreign Affairs on developments in Lithuania.

The American attempts to influence events will not promote an early settlement of the problem. It only adds tension to the confrontation between various groups, it was noted at the meeting.

The Congress of Soviet people's deputies and the Soviet president stated that the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet's decision on its withdrawal from the union was unlawful, deputies noted during the discussion.

As in any federal state, the USSR's legislation has priority over the legislation of a republic, which is part of the federation, and American legislators are well aware of that.

The right of Soviet republics to self-determination up to secession from the USSR, which is guaranteed by the country's Constitution, has been reaffirmed by the Third Congress of Soviet People's Deputies.

Committee members noted that all questions, linked with a union republic's secession from the USSR should be considered within the framework of the law passed by the Soviet parliament this week. All unlawful acts passed at the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet's session, should therefore be rescinded and the discussion of all problems on the only acceptable basis—within the framework of the Soviet constitutions—should begin.

Ultimatums and attempts to tell the Soviet Union how it should solve its domestic problems are tactless and infringe the sovereign rights of the Soviet people and its constitutional institutions of power, it was noted at the meeting.

The resolutions concerning a Soviet Union republic passed by the U.S. Senate and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, are regarded by the Soviet International Affairs Committee as interference into the Soviet state's internal affairs, contrary to international law norms and principles.

The step taken by the American Senate and the House Foreign Affairs Committee unfortunately runs counter to the recent tendency to broaden and deepen mutual understanding and cooperation between U.S. Congress and the USSR Supreme Soviet, between the United States and the Soviet Union, the committee stated.

Lithuanian Vice President Visits Canada

LD0504200390 Montreal International Service in English 1830 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] The vice president of Lithuania is paying a brief visit to Canada. Bronius Kuzmickas wants to convince the Canadian Government to recognize Lithuania's declaration of independence. He said in Ottawa yesterday that Western recognition of the Baltic republic is crucial and he said that Lithuania is grateful for U.S. support and for Washington's call for a peaceful solution to the crisis. Today he is holding talks with the newly formed parliamentary group for the Baltic peoples. It was formed by four Canadian parliamentarians who observed the recent Lithuanian elections. The Canadian Government has urged both Lithuanian and the Soviet Union to settle their differences through negotiations.

China

Commentator Bovin on Li Peng's Upcoming Visit

OW0504174090 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0600 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Commentary by IZVESTIYA observer Bovin; from the "Asian Affairs" program]

[Text] Dear listeners, MOSCOW NEWS weekly has published a commentary by the famous Soviet political observer Bovin, entitled: Greet Chinese Premier Li Peng's Visit to Moscow.

The commentary says: Li Peng, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and premier of China's State Council, will visit Moscow soon. This will be a major political event this year. The complicated and protracted course of improving the relations between the Soviet Union and China, two socialist powers, is continuing. The outlook for the 21st century will depend to a great extent on the stands and policies of the two countries and the scope of their cooperation. Enough topics exist for discussion and political consultation. Moscow and Beijing view events from different angles. They will undoubtedly discuss, first and foremost, Soviet-Chinese relations as a whole. It seems that the emphasis will be on expanding mutually beneficial economic cooperation. It is too bad that the impression continues that, as far as routine dialogue on this and many other issues as well as the contents and frequency of such dialogue are concerned, China and the Soviet Union are lagging behind the demand of the times and the pace of developments in political life. This impression is probably caused by the past inertia, which has not yet been completely eliminated. Another cause may be that each country is devoted to its own affairs and to solving its own difficulties and problems.

Bovin's commentary continues: China's reform started in 1979 in the economic sphere, focusing on the rural economy. Remarkable results have been achieved within a short time. However, political reform has been much slower. When the gap between the economic and political strength reaches a critical point, it will explode. The use of tanks by the authorities is irrefutable evidence of this. Since then, waves of outdated propaganda campaigns, such as the drive to emulate Lei Feng and the struggle against bourgeois liberalization, have been going on in China. The contents and tone of the propaganda materials remind us of the phenomena several decades ago. The idea appears to be that the gap between economic and political strength should be reduced not by accelerating democratization, but by partially restoring the method of guiding the economy through political orders.

In the Soviet Union, political reform is ahead of economic reform. The people are angry about inflation, the shortage of goods, and poor discipline. As a result, events similar to those in China have taken place. The danger of social tension has been aggravated and conflicts between nationalities have escalated. Fortunately, tanks have not appeared on Red Square, but military vehicles are seen on the streets in Tbilis, Yerevan, Baku, and Dushanbe.

Bovin's commentary continues: Needless to say, the state has the right and the responsibility to use force to answer violent acts that violate the Constitution. However, can such a means be used? If it can, we would be able to ride on tanks to take us directly to genuine socialism, not to mention the socialism we built with the labor reeducation camps. This is why we should always tell ourselves and others that the use of force can never make the people happy. The supreme value of socialism should be the freedom of man, his independence, and his demands for social justice and the right for living conditions suitable for man.

The talks in Moscow will probably be very courteous and full of compliments, because it is usually very painful to touch upon the truth. However, the solid foundation of trust and cooperation can be established only when the concepts and principles are straightened out, with differences on certain issues retained. This is true in international affairs.

I hope that the talks with Li Peng will promote our policy toward the Asia-Pacific region. Although we have great potential for participation in the Pacific (?civilization), the United States, Japan, and newly industrializing nations have an upper hand there. Nevertheless, based on understandable reasons, China should play the leading role there.

In conclusion, Bovin says: Therefore, what is important is to reach agreement with Beijing with regard to the principle of not competing with each other in the Asia-Pacific region, because neither side will benefit.

Li Peng's Comments at News Conference Reported

OW0504175190 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0100 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Chinese Premier Li Peng said at a news conference in Beijing Wednesday that he hopes his forthcoming visit to the USSR at the end of this month will be a success.

He said: China hopes to further develop relations with the Soviet Union in the political, economic, cultural, and scientific and technological areas.

Li Peng highly evaluated the visit which Soviet leader Gorbachev paid to China in May 1989, saying that the visit led to the normalization of Sino - Soviet relations, brought an end to the past, and opened the future.

Answering a reporter's question at the news conference, Li Peng said the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region adopted by China's National People's Congress on Wednesday will play a significant role in safeguarding long-term stability and prosperity in Hong Kong.

The Basic Law will serve as a mini-constitution for Hong Kong after it is returned to China in 1990.

The Chinese premier also called on the Taiwan regime to permit postal, telecommunications, and shipping ties as well as direct trade relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Li Peng said: This will be the first step toward reunifying China.

PRC Deputy Minister on Sino-Soviet Trade

PM0504110090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Savenkov report under the rubric: "Economic Barometer": "But Currency Is Better..."]

[Text] Beijing—China and the Soviet Union are discussing ways of switching from traditional barter trade to currency payments, which predominate on the international market, Li Lanqing, PRC deputy minister of foreign economic relations and trade, stated at a press conference given in the context of the National Peoples' Congress session which is currently taking place in Beijing.

Answering a question from IZVESTIYA's correspondent about the strong and weak aspects of bilateral foreign economic relations and their prospects, Li Lanqing named complementarity as the main trump card of Sino-Soviet relations. China needs Soviet goods. The Soviet Union needs Chinese goods. Why is this favorable factor not exploited to the full? In the deputy minister's view, there are two obstacles which are generated by the very nature of relations. First, barter trade is built on the basis of intergovernmental agreements, in which a system of noncash settlements operates. Precise lists exist of agreed products which the two sides must supply. But often one partner does not want to include those goods which are essential to the other partner because he prefers to sell them on the international market in exchange for much-coveted hard currency, of which the USSR and China do not have enough.

Second, as before, the main channel of trade is intergovernmental. Although in recent years other, more flexible forms of trade have appeared, in particular trade between regions, the difference in their proportional weight is too great.

Reflecting on the development of foreign economic relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, Li Lanqing noted that the recent changes in the economic structures of those countries and of China also make barter trade obsolete. And next year a switch to payments in currency is expected. These changes will obviously lower the volume of trade initially, but this loss will be short-lived. In the long term, the transition to a more progressive method can only stimulate trade...

The experts believe that this forecast applies in equal measure to Sino-Soviet trade as well. Incidentally, the following point of view has also been stated in the Chinese press. Barter lessens expenditure of currency resources; this is a plus. But, as a primitive form of trade (in particular, it is difficult to establish precisely the proportions of barter trade), it limits the deepening of trade relations. But haste is contraindicated. The volume of ready money, currency transactions must grow gradually. Let various forms of payments coexist.

Northeast Asia

Mongolia's Ochirbat Addresses Military Officers

LD0604133690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0930 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 6 Apr (TASS)—Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat, chairman of the presidium of the Mongolian People's Great Hural and chairman of the country's defense council, has met with the command of the Mongolian Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Public Security, the Political Directorate of the Mongolian People's Army, and officers of the Ulaanbaatar garrison. In his speech, he dwelt in detail on topical questions of the country's deepening process of restructuring and renewal, and stressed the need to strengthen discipline and order in the army.

The meeting was attended by Mongolian Defense Minister Lt Gen L. Molomjamts.

Mongolian Troop Withdrawal Talks Reported

LD0504162190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1305 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 5 Apr, (TASS)—Matters relating to preparations for the next stage in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic were discussed at a working conference held here today.

Taking part in it were V.I. Sitnikov, USSR ambassador to the Mongolian People's Repubic; Lieutenant General L.S. Mayorov, commander of the Soviet troops temporarily deployed in the Mongolian People's Republic; and representatives of the command of the Mongolian People's Army.

It was noted that all the measures relating to the Soviet troop withdrawal planned for 15 May are proceeding according to plan. On the completion of this stage, 75 percent of the personnel of the Soviet troops present here will be withdrawn from the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic. Only technical and operational services will remain, the tasks of which include the maintenance of complex engineering infrastructures and the training of national cadres. Military towns, economic installations, and housing built for the needs of Soviet troops will be returned gratis to the Mongolian People's Republic.

During the conference, the Mongolian side stressed that the Soviet troops who are in the republic in accordance with the treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance between the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic, had honorably fulfilled their international duty and had won the love and respect of the people.

Realities of MPR Work Assignments Revealed

PM0504140390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Special correspondents V. Ganshin and A. Nabatchikov dispatch under the rubric "The World and Us": "'Low-Prestige' Assignment"]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar-Moscow—Only yesterday we claimed (and many people sincerely believed) that selfless assistance to our class brethren abroad is the supreme expression of internationalism in practice. Giving your last crust, so to speak, sharing what was (and still is) in short supply in our own country, we believed: This is something that will never be forgotten. Therefore eyewitness stories about the ruthless squandering of our credits, neglect of the machinery and equipment supplied, and disrespect for Soviet specialists were viewed in certain quarters as attempts "to cast aspersions on fraternal ties," "to slander friends," and so forth.

We learn with bitterness now that those who saw this as an "affront to our state" were not spreading slander. No! The "taboo," as it were, which had been imposed on the subject of the effectiveness of Soviet cooperation with other socialist countries made it impossible to raise questions such as the profitability and expediency of the construction of specific projects, and it was regarded as unseemly to actually work out gains and losses. Today bans of this kind have been removed (who knows, incidentally, to what level criticism may rise?), and readers, viewers, and listeners are bombarded with reports about misunderstandings bordering on criminal neglect, mismanagement, and the incompetence of those who for many years were in the vanguard and were showered with awards.

...When one of us visited the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR] for the first time (this was almost seven years ago) he was struck by the vast numbers of Soviet civilians and military in the stores, in the streets—in short, everywhere. The train from Moscow to Ulaanbaatar was crammed with Soviet people. The same applied to aircraft taking off from Sheremetyevo-2. Even in the train from Darhan to the capital (a journey of some 200 km) I managed to meet three Russian specialists in the same compartment. Incidentally, the first amazement soon passed when I established that in Ulaanbaatar alone there are currently 50,000 Soviet citizens; that is to say, one in 10 inhabitants is a compatriot of ours.

Today, when new approaches and criteria are being applied to the mutual cooperation between our countries, the Mongolian side frequently accuses Soviet citizens who work in the MPR of violations of local legislation and disrespect for the country's rules and customs. It is true that all this exists. According to Mongolian Ministry of Public Security data, the number of traffic accidents in which Soviet specialists have been involved has doubled over the past three years, for instance. Over the same period 17 Mongolian citizens have been killed and 44 injured as a result of these accidents. These statistics which have been published for the first time to be judged by the public at large make it necessary to mention another point: Up to one-third of the drivers sent to Mongolia from the USSR have only class II and III licenses—that is to say, they are not authorized to transport people.

There have been cases of criminal proceedings against our compatriots for speculation, smuggling, and other law infringements.

Unquestionably, the conduct of Soviet specialists abroad, and specifically in Mogolia, is a topic in itself. However, I would like to return to an idea, mentioned earlier, which arose from my amazement: Why are there so many of our people in Mongolia? And I don't mean consultants whose presence is justified by Mongolia's special features, but construction industry workers, drivers, and so forth. At the same time, at the Ministry of Construction in the Southern Regions of the USSR, for instance, which implements the contractual assignment of Soviet specialists to Mongolia, there are 40,000 vacancies. And in Mongolia itself, according to the latest official statistics, almost 30,000 people are without a job.

It appears that only recently has attention focused on these incongruities. Moreover, the transition of many enterprises and associations to various forms of economic accountability has fostered the realization of an in itself simple fact: An organization cannot afford too many specialists—it is too costly an affair. What does this reveal? The people sent to such a "low-prestige" country as Mongolia (more about this later) are by no means the best. There are many examples of this.

The Mongolian side pins special hopes on our agricultural specialists. This is one of the country's priority sectors, a substantial part of the credits granted to Mongolia by the Soviet Union is being channeled into this sector. Frequently, alas, these hopes are not vindicated. Incidentally, it cannot be otherwise if the people who have been sent here, and are still being sent here, are by no means always competent: Frequently they are representatives of an apparatus which is being cut back in our country, people whose knowledge of production is an armchair knowledge based on conferences and accounts. The embassy provided us with the following statistic: One in six Soviet agrarian specialist group leaders or senior staffers does not have the qualifications corresponding to the post he occupies. Others, despite being willing, are unable to share their knowledge and experience because only one-fourth of those who are working in Mongolia have worked in similar climatic conditions in the USSR—in Buryatia, Irkutsk and Chita Oblasts, the Altay, or Kazakhstan. Others have arrived here from Moscow Oblast, the Ukraine, Belorussia, or Krasnodar Kray. Or even from the Caucasus, the Crimea, or Moldavia...

This is not the only reason, of course, for the low profitability of the Mongolia agricultural sector. Serious criticism is being leveled at the planners and economists in charge of technical and economic feasibility studies of the projects to be built. The projects are very expensive, and cost recoupment periods are very long. The main contractor often submits blueprints for production facilities whose construction costs will be recouped only over 100 or more years. Money is "sunk" into "palaces in the steppe" whose construction is not based on sound economic premises. An example of this kind of squandering of national resources is the "Sansar" feed production facility where the production of every tonne of feed produces a loss of 200 tugriks. A similar situation prevails at the "Harhiraa" production unit. The virgin land state farm "Halhaiin Gol" has produced losses running into millions over the 10 years of its existence.

To be fair, it must be said that our Mongolian friends sitting in the ministries were also at one time indifferent to the cost of specific projects and did not take steps to ensure their effective commissioning and profitability. After all, many holes in production were "patched up" with Soviet credits. Therefore expert assessments of technical and economic feasibility studies were assured a smooth passage, since they were carried out on the principle of "reciprocal pardon" of flaws without the necessary exactingness. Many designs were geared to large-scale production without taking account of prevailing conditions.

For many years the Soviet side kept proposing solutions to agricultural sector problems which were based on our own experience of collective farms and were in many respects geared to the establishment of agro-industrial complexes. This is not very suitable for Mongolian conditions, as practical experience has shown. At the same time it must be noted that the Mongolian leadership, ministries, and departments readily accepted such recommendations since they did not involve any extra effort on their part, flattered their ambitions, and created a semblance of sharp increases in agricultural production capacities.

Today the Mongolian side, dissatisfied with the fruits of cooperation in this sphere, is rightly seeking to combine low-cost traditional grazing methods of farming with industrial techniques. Stress is being laid on the establishment of small- and medium-size highly profitable and flexible enterprises. The time has come to move away from gigantomania. Alluring prospects are a good thing and they are meaningful to a herdsman if electricity replaces the candle in his yurt, a motorized pump replaces the water bucket, and his living conditions and contact with the world improve...

And finally, here is why Mongolia rates very low as an assignment among specialists working abroad.

Let us ask honestly whether a person working for a year or two in Mongolia can substantially improve his position. No, no, and no again. Especially if his wife does not find employment, and they have one or two children. Up to a certain point in time people put up with this because even relatively low wages in tugriks could be exchanged on arrival in the Soviet Union into "Vneshposyltorg" [foreign mail order] vouchers which made it possible to obtain goods in short supply. Why make a secret of it: Many people went abroad precisely for this reason. Especially since the situation on the local market as regards consumer goods was often even worse than in our country. However, the closure of the "Berezka" [foreign currency] stores hit hard the material interests of those working in the MPR.

This has forced the Soviet specialists to look to a local market whose potential is extremely limited and simply not designed for such heightened interest. As a result the gap between money circulation and the country's commodity resources has increased further, as has the amount of spare cash in the republic. According to the Mongolian press, the money surplus in the country has increased over the past five years by almost 200 million tugriks, with an annual increase of 44 million. If this trend persists, people here believe that it may lead to inflation in Mongolia.

In this way the closure of the "Vneshposyltorg" stores not only virtually canceled out the party and government resolution on improving work with cadres and providing better services for Soviet specialists working in Mongolia but also created difficulties in the implementation of a most urgent task in the republic—ensuring a better-stocked internal market...

Some people may say that specialists do not go to work abroad only to earn more money. This is arguable. After all, people do not give up an orderly life, a climate which they are used to, and leave friends and family just to admire the beauty of a foreign country. International experience indicates that specialists sent to work abroad have a right to expect material compensation for the deprivations which long-term foreign assignments inevitably entail. Unfortunately, this experience essentially does not apply to our compatriots.

On closer inspection it emerges that the system of collaboration between specialists and the client often lacks a legal basis. On arrival in the country many specialists are not even familiar with the contract stipulations. They are fortunate if on arrival at a specific enterprise or production facility they have a chance to see the contract. Although we have met a few such "lucky" individuals. Most people are merely told the title of their post and the length of their assignment.

Naturally, our specialists' lack of legal and social protection does not exactly strengthen their prestige among the Mongols. And how could it be otherwise if whole Soviet families live in shacks or public housing, although for many even such accommodation is unattainable. In Erdenet alone—a city with modern well-appointed residential quarters and high-rise blocks—almost 80 such families, some of them with several children, live in sublet accommodation. Two hundred others, working in Baga Nuur, are "existing" in various kinds of temporary housing and shacks as if they were not representatives of a major country but some kind of migrants or refugees.

In our opinion, the concept of modesty today in no way conflicts with a desire to live in normal conditions fit for human beings and to enjoy elementary amenities—hot water, electricity, and heat. Especially as voluntary asceticism is not appreciated by the local inhabitants. Moreover, colleagues from European socialist countries who demand the strict implementation of commitments (and I mean demand rather than request what they are entitled to under the contract) are much more respected in Mongolia than the Soviet specialists...

Is it possible to expect changes in questions connected with the effectiveness of our cooperation? To be honest, when we were compiling this report we heard not only optimistic views. Not everybody believes it will be possible, at least not in the near future, to overcome the main reason for the prevailing situation—the cost-based mechanism of investment policy.

As a rule, the considerable sums spent by the Mongolian side for the upkeep of our specialists are taken from the corresponding chapter of Soviet state credits. The upshot is that our state in effect pays for the services rendered to the other country. And pays very generously: The upkeep of a Soviet specialist is costing our country more than

13,000 rubles per year. It is not surprising that the consumers of these services show little interest in saving funds.

"Everything will fall into place," the USSR deputy trade representative in the MPR is convinced, "when the clients have to pay all expenditure from their own funds rather than including it in the prime cost of output or credit allocations as at present."

It is necessary for enterprises themselves to be accountable for the implementation of the specialists' recommendations and to settle their accounts directly with the Soviet departments who sent them.

Will the departments agree to this? No one is denying the need for change. But what will happen in practice? After all, it is the departments which have created a kind of "preferential" system for the allocation of appropriations (from the state rather than their own pockets, of course) to specific projects. Sometimes you get the impression that instead of the state determining the cooperation policy, it is main administrations and administrations which dictate the terms with a focus above all on their own departmental advantage and with no account of the general interest.

The problems which we have tried to address in this article are far from simple. Not just because of the highly complex economic and legal mechanism of Soviet-Mongolian relations, which, as is perfectly obvious today, must be reviewed and amended to bring it in line with the new conditions. But there is also another reason. It is concerned with wide-ranging moral and ethical issues involving interethnic relations which must be resolved. And the sooner the better; and the more frankly, the more reliable the solutions will be. This work must in no way detract from what has already been achieved. The industrial production potential created with our assistance in Mongolia is truly enormous. A high level has also been achieved in the development of mutual cooperation, and no critical reassessments can detract from or belitle the most important achievements of the joint labor of our countries and peoples.

South Korea, U.S. Agree on Reduction of Troops

PM0504133790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 5 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Troop Withdrawal"]

[Text] South Korea and the United States have reached agreement in principle on a three-stage withdrawal of U.S. troops deployed in the south of the Korean Peninsula, the YONHAP news agency reports.

According to an announcement of the South Korean Ministry of Defense this accord is enshrined in a report devoted to the assessment of the military strategic situation in East Asia which the G. Bush administration will submit this month to the U.S. Congress. During the first stage, 1991 through 1993, it is planned to withdraw 2,000 U.S. Air Force servicemen and around 5,000 ground force auxiliary personnel from South Korea. The second stage will run from 1994 through 1995, and the third stage is scheduled for the period from 1996 onward. The number of servicemen which are to be withdrawn during the last two stages is not specified. The report states that a decision on this will be adopted after another assessment of the situation in the region when the first troop withdrawal stage has been completed.

At present 43,000 U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea.

Frolov Meets With Visiting Journalists

Briefs South Korean Journalists

PM0604091190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Apr 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under general headline: "Official Reports"]

[Text] Journalists of South Korea's KBS television and radio broadcasting corporation were guests of PRAVDA yesterday. I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA, told them about the progress of perestroyka in the Soviet Union and about the newspaper's work, and answered numerous questions.

Receives Japanese Mediamen

PM0604090190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Apr 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under general headline: "Official Reports"]

[Text] A. Kunitoki, president-director of the newspaper SEKAI NIPPO, and H. Takebayashi, its editor, have visited the PRAVDA editorial office. Problems of the renewal of the CPSU and Soviet society were discussed in talks with I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Stop to CIA Activities Demanded in Philippines

HK0504003890 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Subversive activites in the Philippines by the Central Intelligence Agency should be stopped. This was declared by Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr in the Senate, as he expressed concern over CIA operations in the country. Pimentel also mentioned the arrest of CIA agents who were involved the aborted coup d'etat last December which sought to topple the Aquino government. Echoing reports by some senators, Pimentel identified one of these as Colonel Harold Magleo, a U.S. Army intelligence agent.

Secretary Manayenkov Meets Vietnam Party Aides

PM0604091590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Apr 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under general headline: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 4 April Yu.A. Manayenkov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, received a group of party workers of the CPV [Communist Party of Vietnam] headed by Ha Hoc Hoi, deputy head of the CPV Central Committee Ideology and Culture Department. The group is training at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences.

In the course of friendly and frank talks there was an exchange of information on the activities of the CPSU and the CPV in the sphere of ideological and party organizational work and in ensuring the tasks of perestroyka and renewal.

Near East & South Asia

Lukyanov Travels to Delhi for Official Visit

Visits Indian Parliament

PM0504135790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Friendly Visit"]

[Text] A.I. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, left Moscow for Delhi 3 April on an official visit at the invitation of the Indian leadership.

He was seen off at the airport by I.D. Laptev and R.N. Nishanov, chairmen of the USSR Supreme Soviet chambers, and by other officials.

The send-off party included A.S. Gonsalves, Indian ambassador to the USSR.

A.I. Lukyanov arrived in Delhi 4 April. He was met by Rabi Ray, speaker of the Indian Parliament's (lower) House of the People, and by other officials. The welcoming party included V.F. Isakov, USSR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to India.

The first day of the official visit to India at the invitation of the country's leadership by A.I. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, was devoted to familiarization with the activity of the Indian Parliament and to a discussion of questions of the further development of parliamentary ties and the strengthening of the whole range of bilateral Soviet-Indian relations.

The business part of the visit began with a trip to parliament—the republic's top legislative organ, consisting of two chambers: the upper Council of States and the lower House of the People. But, before that, in keeping with tradition, A.I. Lukyanov visited the Rajghat memorial. A wreath was laid there, on the site of the cremation of Mahatma Gandhi, leader of India's national liberation movement. Its ribbon bore the inscription: "To Mahatma Gandhi—founder of free India, father of the Indian nation." A.I. Lukyanov made an entry in the honored visitors book and planted a tree—an evergreen magnolia—in the memorial park.

In the parliament building A.I. Lukyanov had a meeting with Rabi Ray, speaker of the House of the People, who warmly greeted the Soviet guest and voiced the hope that his visit will serve to expand contacts between the two countries' parliamentarians and friendly relations between India and the Soviet Union.

We are watching attentively the changes now taking place in the Soviet Union, and the policy of glasnost and perestroyka is having a profound effect on us, R. Ray said. "We have learned and are learning from your experience," he said.

The speaker of the House of the People emphasized that Indian parliamentarians "are greatly impressed by the activity of M.S. Gorbachev, who is rightly considered the man of the century."

Speaking about the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet, A.I. Lukyanov drew attention to the fact that the very first decisions of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the Soviet parliament confirmed allegiance to the development of friendly Soviet-Indian relations. The basis of all this, he declared, is undoubtedly the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation between the USSR and India and the historic Delhi declaration on the principles of a nonviolent world free from nuclear weapons, which is of tremendous political, philosophical, and international significance.

A.I. Lukyanov and the USSR people's deputies who arrived with him—Yu.P. Platonov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Construction and Architecture Questions and first secretary of the USSR Architects Union Board; Yu.V. Skokov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Economic Reform Questions and general director of the "Kvant" Science-and-Production Association; V.I. Pokrovskiy, president of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences; and also Yu.M. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister—attended a sitting of the current session of parliament's House of the People. The visit to parliament ended with an inspection of the halls for sessions of the Council of States and joint sessions of both houses and the parliamentary library.

In the afternoon A.I. Lukyanov familiarized himself with the museum and archives of India's parliament and then had talks with Indian parliamentarians.

The chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet described how the tasks of renewing the Soviet state system and the USSR's federative setup, deepening democratization, and ensuring all-around socioeconomic development are being resolved in the process of the political, economic, and legal reform. A.I. Lukyanov answered questions put by the deputies participating in the meeting from various political parties, who showed keen interest in the progress of perestroyka in the USSR. The Indian parliamentarians voiced the hope that the new political thinking will help to strengthen friendship and cooperation between India and the Soviet Union for the good of the two countries' peoples and in the interests of world peace. The wish was also expressed that, inter alia, a Soviet-Indian group and an Indian-Soviet group be set up on a mutual basis in the two countries' top representative organs.

On the same day A.I. Lukyanov met with the collective of Soviet establishments in Delhi. After speaking about the results of the Third Extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet session, he answered numerous questions from the assembled people.

In the evening R. Ray, speaker of the Indian Parliament's House of the People, gave a dinner in honor of the USSR Supreme Soviet chairman and the persons accompanying him.

Meets With Prime Minister Singh

LD0504194990 Moscow TASS in English 1409 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] New Delhi April 5 TASS—Friendship and fruitful cooperation between the USSR and India meet the two countries' mutual interests and promote stronger peace and security in Asia, and the world as a whole. This was reaffirmed at today's meeting beween Indian Prime Minister Vishvanath Pratap Singh and visiting Soviet parliament Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov.

The sides exchanged opinions on Soviet-Indian relations and discussed international problems of mutual interest during the meeting.

"The friendly relations with the Sovie Union reflect not the policy of that or other government or party, but the will of the Indian people as a whole," Singh said, noting India's desire to develop and strengthen relations with the Soviet Union.

India is showing interest in Soviet perestroyka and wishes success to the Soviet people in renewing society, the prime minister said.

"The USSR and India have good prospects and possibilities to continue to build on potential of friendly relations in the most broad-ranging areas," Lukyanov said, "on the firm basis of the treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation between the USSR and India and also the Delhi declaration on the principles of a nuclear weapons free and non-violent world, which is a concrete manifestation of new political thinking."

Both sides expressed the desire to continue to cooperate internationally to strengthen universal peace and security and to develop positive tendencies in the Asia-Pacific region.

Lukyanov reaffirmed the Soviet stand concerning settlement of the situation around Kashmir.

Lukyanov and Singh stressed the importance of regular meetings between leaders of the two countries and other mutual contacts at different levels, including parliamentary.

Speaks With Vice President Sharma

LD0604041390 Moscow TASS in English 2024 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] New Delhi April 5 TASS—Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Anatoliy Lukyanov met today Indian Vice President Shankar Dayal Sharma. The meeting was held in a warm atmosphere typical of Soviet-Indian relations.

They stressed the necessity to safeguard and promote friendship and versatile cooperation between the two countries in the interest of their peoples and universal peace.

Speaking about sources of Indian-Soviet friendship, Sharma pointed out that its foundations were laid before the Great October Socialist Revolution, during India's fight for the national liberation.

India appreciates the Soviet assistance in laying foundations for the national industry, Sharma said. Our cooperation expands and this is promoted by regular exchanges of visits by the two countries' leaders.

It is very important that these relations are not restricted to the governmental level. Indian and Soviet peoples' friendship is an important factor which guarantees international peace and security, Indian vice president stressed.

Sharma called the 1986 Soviet-Indian Declaration on the Principles for Nuclear Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World an important landmark in the international policy. The document sets the aims for all the humanity and it is very important to reach them for its development, Sharma said.

Speaking about perestroyka in the Soviet Union, Lukyanov characterised it as a revolution in all spheres of life—political, economic, legal and cultural. "We want to use the experience of all democracies, including Indian," Lukyanov said.

Lukyanov and Sharma favoured the promotion of contacts between the two countries' parliaments and their active participation in resolving specific tasks of cooperation between India and the Soviet Union.

They pointed to the necessity of parliamentarians' joint actions to safeguard peace, security and stability on the earth, including in Asia-Pacific Region.

Sharma approved of Lukyanov's proposal to think over the meeting of parliamentarians of Asian and Pacific states and supported the idea of extending positive changes in international relations from Europe to Asia.

Lukyanov invited Sharma to visit the Soviet Union at any time convenient for the latter. Sharma accepted the invitation with gratitude.

In the evening, Sharma gave a luncheon [as received] in honour of the Soviet guests. Exchanging friendly toasts, Lukyanov and the Indian vice president confirmed the two countries' desire to promote their friendship and cooperation.

The luncheon was attended by members of the Indian Government, leaders of political parties, represented in the Indian parliament.

Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet continued today his acquaintance with the Indian capital. He visited the historic Red Fort where the flag of India's independence was flown more than forty years ago.

The Soviet guest visited Jawaharlal Nehru's Museum and contributed to the honorary visitors book. He wrote: "The name of Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Indian prime minister and architect of modern India, is close and dear to Soviet people."

Lukyanov also visited the Indira Gandhi Memorial and paid tribute to the outstanding daughter of the Indian people.

Lukyanov Interviewed on Meetings in India

LD0604042790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 5 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The visit to Delhi by Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov, USSR Supreme Soviet chairman, is devoted to the development of our traditional relations with India.

[Alekseyev, identified by screen caption] The USSR Supreme Soviet chairman today continued acquainting himself with the Indian capital. He visited the historic Red Fort, above which the flag of independent India was hoisted for the first time over four decades ago. The Soviet visitor familiarized himself with the house museum of Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister. Today he also visited the memorial to Indira Gandhi, where he paid a tribute of respect to the monument to the Indian people's outstanding daughter. [video shows Lukyanov shown viewing these sights]

The friendship and fruitful cooperation between the USSR and India not only accord with the mutual interests of the two countries, but also serve the cause of strengthening peace and security in Asia and the world as a whole. This was confirmed at their meeting today by Comrade Lukyanov and Vishwanath Pratap Singh, the Indian prime minister. In the course of a conversation which took place in a spirit of friendship and mutual commitment the sides exchanged views on a broad range of issues relating to Soviet-Indian relations and discussed international problems of mutual interest.

Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov was received today by Sharma, the Indian vice president. [video shows Lukyanov being received by Singh and then by Sharma]

Afterwards the USSR Supreme Soviet chairman gave an interview to the Vremya program. [video shows interview]

[Lukyanov] This visit to India, the first visit by the USSR Supreme Soviet chairman, is by no means accidental, not just because it is the first visit in 10 years—it was 10 years ago that the Supreme Soviet chairman or rather the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium was in India—but also because we in the Supreme Soviet and in the Presidential Council considered that this first visit should be precisely to a great Asian country and a country which is our old friend and understands us well and that it should be a continuation of the visit that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev made here, to India.

Second, India is after all a great and unique democracy. It does have something to teach our democracy, which is being renewed. It is our own Soviet democracy with its own traditions, but it is also being renewed. I think, therefore, it is a mutually useful visit, and in today's conversations with the Indian vice president and in yesterday's conversations with parliamentarians we returned each time to the fact that these are very useful exchanges. Moreover, they are exchanges not only at the level of parliaments as a whole but also exchanges at the level of commission, committees, and individual groups of parliamentarians. There is also our cooperation in the Interparliamentary Union. It is, therefore, a big and useful undertaking that the delegations will very energetically pursue.

Jimmy Carter, Yasir 'Arafat Meet in Paris

PM0604140990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Unnamed own correspondent dispatch: "Meeting Between Y. 'Arafat and J. Carter"]

[Text] Paris—Y. 'Arafat has met in Paris with former U.S President J. Carter, who is performing a special mission with the support of the White House incumbent aimed at helping resolve the Near East problem. Both politicians were received by French President F. Mitterrand.

According to Y. 'Arafat, this was a historic meeting which attests to the desire of the United States, France, and the whole world community to solve the situation and boost the negotiation process. For his part J. Carter expressed the hope that the barriers to peace in the Near East will be overcome.

Observers point out that the meeting between Y. 'Arafat and J. Carter took place with active participation from France, which is making a significant contribution to the settlement process and advocates the speediest convocation of an international conference on the Near East. Last May Y. 'Arafat spoke to F. Mitterrand in Paris for the first time. Officials point out that France is playing a constructive role in the quest for ways to peace.

Acting as an intermediary, J. Carter is holding a series of meetings with the leaders of countries involved in the Near East conflict. He has already visited Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Israel and has briefed the U.S. President on the results of the talks. Let us recall that it was J. Carter who initiated the Camp David peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, which was concluded in 1978.

Despite the difficulties, contacts between the United States and the State of Palestine are continuing, in particular via the U.S. Embassy in Tunis. Last week Y. 'Arafat had a conversation in Tunis with former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State R. Murphy. The State Department recently confirmed that the PLO is keeping its pledge to "renounce terrorism," which is a requisite condition for the continuation of dialogue.

Soviet Plans for New Mideast Initiatives Noted

PM2703104790 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 24 Mar 90 pp 1-2

[Unattributed report: "Soviet Sources Tells AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: Moscow's Initiative in Middle East Depends on Results of Baker Plan"]

[Excerpt] Informed Soviet sources have emphasized to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that Moscow is determined to increase its activities with a view to contributing to finding a solution to the Middle East issue, especially is the present deadlock continues.

The sources were commenting on the statement made by Yuliy Vorontsov the day before yesterday in which he said that the Soviet Union would shortly present new initiatives and proposals to help achieve peace in the Middle East.

The sources said that these initiatives depend on the results of the consultations being conducted by the Soviet Union with Syria, Jordan, and the PLO as well as the results of U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's plan and the response to that plan by the Israeli government that will resume power after the end of the current crisis. [passage omitted]

Article Views Arab Concerns, Foreign Relations

PM0504122990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 4 Apr 90 p 3

[Reprint of AL-AHRAM article by Ihsan Bakr followed by own correspondent A. Shumilin dispatch under the "Polemics" rubric: "Friendship on Shifting Sands? Verbal Criticism of the USSR's Near East Policy Has Recently Grown Into Overt Hostility in Several Arab Countries"]

[Text] **Egypt's AL-AHRAM described the transformations in the USSR and East Europe as winds of "tragic" changes.**

The whole world is changing around us--ideas, policy, and the correlation of forces. The world of the sixties in which we felt quite good has become a thing of the past. The winds of change are blowing everywhere—in the Soviet Union, the Arabs' "true friend," and in the East European countries, the "strategic reserve" for many Arab countries. Soviet Jews' immigration to the occupied territories may substantially change the balance of forces in the region if we do not realize this danger in a timely fashion. Yes, we are entering the nineties—a decade which requires new solutions. The Arab League is trying to analyze the extent to which Arab countries are affected by the changes in the world—Moscow's new policy, the end of the "cold war," the collapse of the Communist regimes in East Europe, the impending proclamation of a united Europe, and the results of the Malta talks between the leaders of the USSR and the United States.

In a few days' time the first conference of its kind will be held in the Tunisian capital involving politicians, scientists, and philosophers from the Arab countries, who will discuss the problems of the Arab region and reveal the dangers threatening our countries. The main topic of discussion will be the processes taking place in East Europe since they may have a direct effect on the outcome of the Arab-Israeli confrontation.

Israeli Foreign Minister M. Arens signed an agreement in Prague 9 February on the restoration of diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia. This country, following in Hungary's wake, is sending its diplomatic missions back to Israel after a 23-year break. While this event was being celebrated in Prague, Czechoslovakia's deputy prime minister told Y. Shamir during his visit to Israel that "his country had decided to stop exporting weapons and, notably, stop selling them to Arab states." But Czechoslovakia's new President Havel is willing to assume the role of mediator in establishing dialogue between Israel and the PLO. This is the Czechoslovakia which supplied Egypt with weapons in Nasser's time!

But the most significant changes have taken place in the USSR. A representative of its consular mission in Israel said recently that his country "considers the situation where it has no diplomatic relations with Israel to be an abnormal one." But, the Soviet diplomat added, until Israel changes its policy on questions of a Near East settlement, Moscow is afraid to restore full diplomatic relations in case this looks like support for Israel's position.

There have certainly been substantial changes in Soviet policy. The USSR's stance on the question of Palestine has also certainly changed. Let us face the truth: The time for anti-imperialist and anticolonialist slogans has passed, the time when Israel was dubbed the appendage of imperialism. It is time for a reconciliation between the

Kremlin and Tel Aviv. The Soviet leadership is now giving Palestinians and Arabs the following advice: Show more flexibility, strive to settle problems by political means.

In other words, the Soviet Union is no longer a reliable strategic helpmate for the Palestinians or the Arabs as a whole. It is time for the Arab capitals, which have gotten accustomed to relying on their "Soviet friend," to review their stakes. After all, it would be no exaggeration to say that to date Israel stands to gain the most from changes in East Europe. [Bakr article ends]

"Let us think in new terms"—this is what our own correspondent suggests.

Cairo-Algiers—I must admit that it was no coincidence that I chose the article in AL-AHRAM from a host of articles on this subject in the Arab press. First, it is quite neutral toward the USSR; second, in shying away from specific facts and generalizing them, the author has expressed the views and assessments of changes in the USSR and East Europe that prevail today both among the public and in many Arab countries' political circles. Well, the time has come to explain ourselves, to try and recover our former mutual understanding with our Arab friends. I will try to express my own opinion, which may not coincide on some points with our officials' stance.

People in various Arab countries are commenting that, over the last two or three months, verbal criticism of the USSR's policy in the Near East has developed into hostility and this hostility is already becoming vocal. Here is just one example: At the beginning of March there was a mass demonstration outside the Soviet Embassy in Algiers beneath blatantly anti-Soviet slogans. If you overlook the "touch" that some slogans personally abused individual Soviet leaders, the essence of the slogans boiled down to a protest against the Soviet leadership's actions in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan ("the suppression of Islamic sentiments there"), against the exodus of Soviet Jews to Israel, and against the USSR's contacts with Israel. The embassy did of course protest, perceiving these events as an attempt to interfere in our country's internal affairs. Explanations were also given but, if truth be said, the local newspapers did not pay attention to them. The essence of the explanations was that attempts to overthrow the legitimate authorities on USSR territory, along with pogroms and the murder of people of any nationality or creed whatsoever would continue to be resolutely suppressed in the future: The blood of Muslims, Christians, and Jews is still human blood.

The author of the article in AL-AHRAM is only partially right when he claims that the world is changing around the Arabs whose patterns of thought still follow the lines of the sixties. Let us not go to extremes: There are not that many radicals who still think along the lines of the sixties, the lines of the "cold war." Two opposing trends are clearly distinguishable in public life in the Arab countries today: On the one hand, realistic circles are trying to raise their countries to the level of contemporary civilization (onrushes of democracy in Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt are an example of that); on the other hand, traditionalist circles are calling for a return to the past which can allegedly provide the solution to acute social and economic problems. The significantly stepped up influence of religion—Islam—on all aspects of life is a phenomenon common to the Arab world. Whether the authorities like it or not, politicized extremist Islam is already breaking out onto the streets—we can see this now. Refined, moderate Islam, which is a factor of domestic political life here, introduces a new vision of the world and its future development: In the near future, Islamic politicians claim that social and ideological contradictions will be backburnered and the main line of confrontation will be between the "Christian North" and the "Muslim South."

Here the non-Muslim republics of the USSR are at best treated as the "Christian North" and at worst are described simply as atheists.

It is, so to speak, but a step from this interpretation of the modern world to the idea of a "compact" between the superpowers—the USSR and the United States—at the expense of the "Third World." There is scope for diverse political speculation. To put it mildly, the new political thinking which is spreading across the world and is based on rejection of military struggle and confrontation, priority of political means for resolving any conflicts, and dominance of universal human values, is not always correctly understood. And yet the fruitfulness of this thinking is obvious: Seats of tension are being eliminated in Europe, Southern Africa, and Central America. A Near East settlement can only be achieved by political means. Is it really so amazing that the Soviet Union is urging its friends in the Arab world, without abandoning the just aims of their struggle, to show more realism and flexibility, and switch from military confrontation with Israel to political struggle. In this respect the USSR fully supported the political realism manifested by the PLO leadership over the last few years, and was one of the first to recognize the proclamation of the State of Palestine in 1988, confirming that it should be set up alongside the state of Israel on the lands liberated from the occupation. The Soviet Union still abides by its opinion, believing that the way to peace in the Near East lies through the convocation of an international peace conference.

However, by no means all Arab countries have shown such enthusiasm for the PLO's political initiatives. Some considered them a concession to Israel, almost treachery.

Well, the Arab world is politically dissimilar. It so happened that, back in the sixties and seventies, revolutionary slogans were enough for people to be classed as "friends" of the USSR and immediately obtain military hardware and economic aid—often for free. Some "Soviet friends" in the Arab countries recalled that it was only, supposedly, thanks to them that the USSR has a chance to safeguard its strategic interests in this region.

Obviously, this view was also shared by our foreign policy staffs, who fully approved of the actions of "Soviet friends" (who often presented these staff officers with accomplished facts) and resolutely condemned everything that they condemned. This brought about the one-sided restricted nature of our political potential in the Near East.

Suspicion set in in the mid-seventies. It was then that our "main friend"—Egypt—under President al-Sadat suddenly effected a 180-degree turn in relations with us. It was then that all—and I stress, all—Arab countries in the Near East restored the relations they had previously broken off with the United States, while Egypt itself concluded a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. That was the time when people who rejected the largely positive political changes in the region and the actions of our recent "friends," that is even more bellicose radicals, became our "friends." As a result, detached from the political settlement processes in the region and becoming increasingly radical, our policy promoted the following stereotype among our "friends": "If you want peace, turn to the United States; if you want to fight, turn to the USSR."

No, esteemed Ihsan Bakr, we are not breaking with our friends in the Near East—especially since we have never betrayed our true friends—but with that stereotype. Moreover, not only in the Near East but also in Europe, from whence Soviet troops are being withdrawn, and in other regions of the world. This break with a dangerous stereotype is only described as weakness by people who are indeed still thinking in the categories of the sixties. Filling the vacuum of military force wityh political forces requires as much boldness and intellect as relying on combat hardware for the solution of political questions. I do not think that it would be all that bad if the new governments in East Europe, who have come to power on the wave of democratization and pacifism, were to begin pursuing a balanced line of settlement and finding friends in the Near East not only among those who use their military output.

It goes without saying that, given the continuing military confrontation with Israel, the Arab armies' combat potential must be retained. That is not the issue. The issue is that banking on military might alone by both sides is futile.

But the problems must be resolved: The occupied Arab territories must be returned and a Palestinian state set up there. How? By political means.

It can hardly be otherwise in our time. Only a peaceful, well-considered, balanced policy on the Near East from the participants in the conflict and the world community can bear fruit. But can the USSR, a great power, have such a policy while it has no contacts with one of the parties to the conflict—Israel? And do contacts, and even the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, signify approval for the latter's policy?

The processes of democratization in the USSR and in East European countries have been won through suffering on the part of the peoples who are reaching a new level of civilization which presupposes observance of human rights. In this context, we can share the Arab countries' concern over the settlement of Soviet Jews leaving the USSR for Israel on the illegally occupied Arab lands. The problem exists, although no more than 1.5 percent of former Soviet citizens live on this territory today.

I think that the host of problems which overshadow Soviet-Arab relations today will disappear as the Arab-Israeli conflict dies down. There is new hope of this—hope generated by political realism. Everyone will stand to gain from peace.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Gorbachev Congratulates Zimbabwe's Mugabe

PM0604090390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[M. Gorbachev undated message congratulating R. Mugabe on reelection as president of Zimbabwe]

[Text] To Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe, president of the Republic of Zimbabwe

Esteemed Comrade Mugabe!

Accept my sincere congratulations on your election as president of the Republic of Zimbabwe.

I am convinced that the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation that exist between the USSR and Zimbabwe will strengthen and develop for the good of our countries and peoples.

I wish you, comrade president, strong health and successes in your activity in this responsible post.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev

CPSU Delegation's Visit to Zambia Summarized

PM0504083190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Announcements"]

[Text] A delegation of CPSU party officials headed by Yu.F. Azarov, secretary of Krasnodar CPSU Kraykom [Kray Party Committee], was in Zambia 26 March through 2 April at the invitation of the United National Independence Party [UNIP]. The delegation was received by UNIP Secretary General G. Zulu. A protocol was signed on CPSU-UNIP cooperation for 1990-1992.

The delegation returned to Moscow.

Bovin Ponders Reforms in South Africa

PM0404154190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Aleksandr Bovin "Political Observer's Opinion": "RSA: Are Changes Drawing Near?"]

[Text] One of the leading trends in world development at the end of the 20th century is the decline and removal from the historical scene of right-wing and left-wing authoritarian dictatorial regimes and the establishment of democratic forms of state and public life. Our perestroyka, the changes in East Europe, and the elections in Chile and Nicaragua fit into this trend. It also includes events in the Republic of South Africa [RSA].

Opening the parliamentary session 2 February as president, Frederik de Klerk announced the legalization of the African National Congress [ANC] and the Pan-Africanist Congress, along with the abolition of restrictions on the activity of 33 opposition groups. The president expressed willingness to enter into talks with the black majority. A second sensation followed 11 February—Nelson Mandela was released after spending more than 27 years in jail.

The RSA president is not starting from scratch. More than 10 years ago then Prime Minister P. Botha said: The whites must "either adapt or die." The process of white adaptation to modern notions of racial equality has already gained definite momentum. Many of the most loathsome manifestations of racism have been eliminated. A middle class of black entrepreneurs with a good lifestyle, inclined to appeasement and compromise, has formed.

But the supporting structures of apartheid are still there. The population registration law which classifies people by race is still in force. As are the law establishing a fixed place of abode for various racial groups and the land laws which reserve 87 percent of the RSA's land for the whites, who total 14 percent of the population. Lastly, blacks still have no political rights at all and are barred from political power in the RSA.

All this means that there is still a chance of a social explosion. Thus it is still necessary to make the choice: "Either adapt or die." The president's statement illustrates that he intends to continue to speed up the reform movement. A fundamentally new step is being outlined—government talks with representatives of the black majority on the republic's future constitutional system.

F. de Clerk defined his position as follows: "We must put an end to white supremacy, but we are not prepared to exchange it for black supremacy." In practice the proposed partial separation of power (each ethnic group settles its own questions) does not depart very much from classic apartheid. But even this limited, truncated form of adaptation has produced panic and indignation among those whites who are to the right of common sense. RSA "ultras" (the Afrikaaner Resistance Movement, the Conservative Party, the Boer State Party, and so on) revile the president, threatening to forcibly "restore legality and law and order." The "ultras" are ready to divide the country as a last resort—even if the Afrikaaners get the smaller half, it will be their land, their home, where they will not have to share power with anyone. So the president is having to operate on two fronts and hold talks with "his own" people and with the "others."

The "others" took F. de Clerk's statement better than "his own" people did. But they are still not ready for full-fledged talks. As preliminary conditions the opposition is demanding that the state of emergency be waived and all political prisoners released.

Toward the end of March an accord was reached on beginning preliminary talks 11 April. F. de Clerk planned to meet with leaders of the African tribes which are not connected with the ANC about a week before these talks. However, the police shooting at the black demonstration in the settlement of Sebokeng [as transliterated] made it necessary for the ANC to postpone the talks.

This postponement is a matter of tactics. Strategy necessitates talks, and they will be held. Moreover, it is not only clashes between whites and blacks but also clashes within the black majority that will affect the course and outcome of the talks.

The point is that the black majority is by no means uniform, it is experiencing a long period of "disorder and instability."

The ANC, the South African Communist Party [SACP], the United Democratic Front, and the South African Trade Union Congress advocate the creation of a nonracial democratic society. Interim, provisional compromise options are not ruled out. There is express willingness to put a stop to the armed struggle and begin the quest for a peaceful solution. Admittedly, unlike leaders like O. Tambo or N. Mandela, the young generation—active participants in the ANC guerilla organization—are insisting on continuing the armed struggle. Some ANC supporters (Archbishop D. Tutu, Reverend A. Boesak, and others) are confused by what they see as the ANC's excessively close cooperation with the communists.

The Pan-Africanist Congress, the Pan-Africanist Movement, and the Azanian People's Organization are at the other pole of the black majority—radical, sometimes extremist elements are concentrated there. They oppose compromise and favor continuing the armed struggle "to a victorious conclusion," that is, until the whites capitulate. Turning racist slogans inside out, black radicals proclaim the slogan of "Africa for the Africans."

The "Inkatha" movement headed by Zulu leader Buthelezi is somewhat on its own. He supports the ANC line of talks and is prepared to take part in them. But in the eyes of the Africans he is compromised by his long and unprincipled cooperation with the racists. Over the last few years more people have died in bloody clashes between ANC and "Inkatha" supporters than in the struggle against apartheid.

Here is another curious detail. At the beginning of March in the tribal homeland of Ciskei army officers lead by Brigade General Dzhos Gkozo [as transliterated] deposed President Lennox Sebe. The officers demanded that the "independent" tribal homeland be broken up and Ciskei reintegrated into the RSA. The military government of Transkei holds a similar position. These facts indicate that the system of apartheid is an artificial formation, does not withstand the test of time, and is breaking down from within.

Assessing the current situation in the RSA, Joe Slovo, general secretary of the SACP, said: "We have entered a new phase in history. The changes that have taken place, whose significance must not be overestimated, are the result of an unprecedented crisis in the apartheid regime brought about by pressure from both outside and within the RSA itself. The authorities in Pretoria realize that they can no longer govern the country by the former methods. We are closer to a peaceful political settlement of the situation than ever before. However, we must not lapse into excessive euphoria at this prospect." The movement forward, the movement toward democracy, freedom, and equality, will certainly be difficult, uneven, and protracted. But it has begun and is continuing. It may be delayed. But it cannot be halted.

Lastly. The RSA is probably the only or virtually the only state in the world (it is, incidentally, perhaps the most developed and the richest state in Africa) where Soviet interests are not represented. Sporadic contacts on individual questions do not change the overall picture. Naturally we cannot have dealings with racists. But racism and apartheid are in their death throes. The RSA is entering the world of tomorrow.... It is reassuring that people in Moscow have noted this. The first step has been taken: USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze had a meeting in Windhoek with RSA President F. de Klerk. I hope that it was not the last step....

East Europe

GDR Parliament Elections, Changes Reported

LD0504193190 Moscow TASS in English 1900 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Berlin, 5 Apr TASS—The GDR news agency ADN reports:

Christian Democratic Union (CDU) leader Lothar de Maiziere was asked by the first freely elected parliament of the GDR here on Thursday to form a government. As expected, the leader of the strongest parliamentary group which won 163 mandates in the March 18 elections was proposed as prime minister. Sixty-two members of parliament voted against de Maiziere and 31 abstained. The premier will be elected at the second session of parliament next Thursday.

Earlier, deputies in a second ballot elected Sabine Bergmann-Pohl the first woman parliamentary president by a vote of 214-171. The 43 year-old doctor beat Social Democratic candidate Reinhard Hoeppner.

The run-off was necessary because none of the five candidates for the office managed to poll the absolute majority.

Deputies elected Hoeppner, Kaete Niederkirchner (Party of Democratic Socialism, PDS), Stefan Gottschall (German Social Union, DSU), Juergen Schmieder (Liberals), Wolfgang Ullmann (Alliance '90-Greens), and Dieter Helm (Farmers' Party/Women's League, DBD/DFD) parliamentary vice presidents.

The people's chamber also adopted amendments to the Constitution, resolutions on provisional parliamentary procedures, on forming parliamentary groups and on setting up temporary commissions.

In a unanimous vote the house scrapped the State Council and the post of its chairman. Until a presidential office is installed, its functions are exercized by the parliamentary presidium.

With the deletion of the preamble the aim of developing an advanced socialist society was abolished.

The term of office of the chairman and the members of the Council of Ministers, which was five years to date, was redefined and is valid only for the duration of the current legislative period which is to last an indefinite period of time.

Parliament also resolved that it would have seven groups—CDU, SPD, PDS, DSU, Liberals, Alliance '90-Greens and Farmers' Party-Women's League. The four members of parliament of the Democratic Awakening and one of the United Left do not join any of the groups.

Parliament voted by a large majority to set up an ad-hoc parliamentary commission to look into alleged activities by members of parliament for the now defunct state security service Stasi.

The first meeting of the Volkskammer which emerged from the first free and secret elections in the GDR on March 18 opened on Thursday morning. Of the 400 members of parliament of 12 parties and election alliances, 387 do the job for the first time.

Attending the first meeting were 390 of the members of parliament, who are now professionals.

SPD, DSU Settle Election Campaign 'Quarrel'

LD0504210190 Hamburg DPA in German 1955 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Excerpts] East Berlin (DPA)—The GDR SPD [Social Democratic Party] and the ultraconservative DSU [German Social Union] have settled their election campaign quarrel. After joint talks between delegations from both parties, acting SPD Chairman Markus Meckel said in East Berlin this evening that the DSU Executive had distanced itself from the unfair election campaign by some of its members. Meckel said that the DSU is not an extreme right-wing organization. For his part, DSU Chairman Hans-Wilhelm Ebeling confirmed that the SPD is a democratic party which has nothing to do with the old, communist SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany]. [passage omitted]

Ebeling said that he rejects the SPD being put in the same class as the SED. If that had occurred during the election campaign then he regrets it, and would apologize. Both parties had made good progress during their talks.

Meckel stressed that he had gained the impression on several points of content during the talks that one could talk to the DSU about differences. There had been no "insurmountable" differences on constitutional issues, for example, or on the path to German unity. The DSU also aims for a new constitution on the basis of the Basic Law at the end of a process of unification. Mackel termed the joint working groups meetings, which begin tomorrow, as an important step for further coalition talks.

GDR Takes First Steps Toward 'Grand Coalition'

PM0504132590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Apr 90 Second Edition p 4

[Correspondent May Podklyuchnikov commentary under the rubric "Topic of the Day": "GDR: 'Grand Coalition'"]

[Text] Berlin—The GDR's SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] has turned around: It has agreed to be a member of the "grand coalition," which includes all three parties of the "Alliance for Germany" right-wing bloc and the Union of Free Democrats. As of yesterday the information talks on this subject which the SPD leaders had been holding with the Christian Democratic Union leadership, acquired a new quality—they became coalition negotiations.

Hitherto the stumbling block in the way of creating a "grand coalition" had been the strained relations between the SPD (GDR) and the DSU [German Social Union], which the Social Democrats had been accusing of being a branch of the West German Christian Social Union and being noted for extreme reactionariness. Before the elections to the Volkskammer the "exchange of fire" between the two parties was particularly fierce, and the DSU did not disdain not very parliamentary methods. After the elections the SPD leaders declared that there could be no question of a coalition including the DSU. Then they began saying that the DSU should apologize. In the end, the SPD itself turned around and changed its position without waiting for an apology.

The "grand coalition" in the GDR is called upon to play an important role on the way to the unification of the two German states. It alone commands the qualified two-thirds majority in the Volkskammer necessary for a change in the Constitution opening up the way first to a financial, economic, and social union between the GDR and the FRG and then also to all subsequent unification steps. Movement toward unification would have come to a standstill without the turn-around that the SPD leadership has now made.

During the coalition negotiations that began yesterday it was decided to create five commissions. It is also proposed to create ministries analogous to those that exist in the FRG.

The distribution of ministerial posts is a subject of the coalition negotiations. The DSU—by no means the biggest member of the bloc of right-wing parties—aspires to a great deal. It is interested in the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Economics, Education, Science, and Culture. Here its claims come up against the interests of the SPD, which would like to obtain the Ministries of Labor, Social Affairs, and Foreign Affairs and also to assume responsibility for the police, education, science and research, culture, and the disbandment of the Ministry of State Security. As for the DSU, in the SPD's opinion there must be no ministerial posts left for it.

Explaining the change in their position, the SPD leaders point out that only a strong government underpinned by a broad base will be able to protect the interests of the GDR population and counter Bonn's plans, which jeopardize them. Particularly those that provide for an exchange of the two states' currencies that will be extremely disadvantageous to the GDR when it switches to the FRG monetary system.

The "grand coalition" is taking its first steps. Time will show the degree to which its participants will take the fundamental interests of GDR citizens into account in their actions.

Jaruzelski To Visit Soviet Union 11-14 Apr

LD0504162990 Moscow TASS in English 1357 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 5 TASS—It has been officially announced that Polish President Wojciech Jaruzelski will pay an official visit to the Soviet Union on April 11-14, 1990 at the invitation of the Soviet president.

News Conference on Lithuania Held in Warsaw

AU3003143190 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 28 Mar 90 p 7

[PAP report: "The USSR Embassy"]

[Text] "The aims of the Lithuanian leadership can be deemed dangerous. They can impact negatively on the perestroyka process in the Soviet Union as well as in Lithuania and the republics adjacent to it." That was one of the passages contained in the statement that the USSR Embassy in Warsaw presented at a news conference for Polish and foreign journalists given on 27 March by senior officials of the embassy.

According to embassy representatives, the country's Constitution is still binding on Lithuanian territory. The Lithuanian Parliament did not possess the legal authority to annul the 1940 USSR Supreme Soviet resolution on Lithuania's admission to the Soviet Union or to remove Lithuania from the jurisdiction of the USSR Constitution.

Embassy representatives said: "The Soviet Union supports every nation's right to independence and self-determination. However, such processes should occur in accordance with the Constitution and with respect for the law and the interests of all the peoples of the Soviet Union being preserved. The Lithuanian leadership has failed to appreciate this. The situation in Lithuania is becoming graver. Some inhabitants of the republic are becoming increasingly active in expressing opposition to the decisions made by the Lithuanian Parliament; decisions that they consider to have been made without their direct participation."

Aleksandr Oskin, first secretary at the embassy, said: "There is a stormy political debate going on in Lithuania. We are concerned about some of the tendencies present in the debate. We see there being a danger of an escalation of the situation in Lithuania, whose leadership has embarked on a course that can have unpredictable consequences."

Asked about the growing Soviet military presence in Lithuania, Embassy Counselor M. Senkevich said that it was connected with military exercises that had been planned earlier. He said that the Lithuanian leadership had met representatives of the military and had been briefed on further exercises of this kind.

Polish Tribute Marks Katyn 50th Anniversary

LD0504084590 Warsaw PAP in English 2202 GMT 4 Apr 90

[By PAP special correspondent Marek Pawlowski]

[Text] Katyn, April 4—Relatives and members of families of those murdered in Katyn fifty years ago paid today tribute to Polish officers buried there and in other places, to prisoners of Kozielsk, Ostaszkow and Starobielsk.

A few days ago, the Soviet authorities removed an inscription from the wall near the graves in Katyn saying that German Nazis were responsible for the crime on Polish officers.

A special train brought members of families of those murdered there, representatives of the Polish authorities, officials of Poland's Council for the Protection of Struggles and Martyrdom, and priests.

They laid flowers at the symbolic graves, lit candles and placed red-and-white flags with names of those murdered. The roll of the dead was read.

A special mass was celebrated at the Katyn cross by Bishop Stanislaw Kedziora to mark the 50th anniversary of the crime.

In the wake of the mass, Polish Minister of State Piotr Nowina-Konopka addressed the gathering to say: "It is the right of Poland to be here. This is the right to being remembered. If we want to implement this right, we must come here. Our presence in Katyn today, on the 50th anniversary of the tragedy, offers a special reason to demand the testimony of truth in the name of the families, the nation and the state, on behalf of all those who are present here and of what we all together represent. We demand the truth about Katyn and about other places, so far unknown." "We have come here, Deputy Defence Minister Bronislaw Komorowski said "to draw from the source of faith and strength, because belief in that that the truth will win, that human memory will survive all times, is being confirmed here."

More on Explosion Near Military Train in CSSR

LD0604014290 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1630 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Before the weather forecast, here is an item explaining in more detail our report yesterday, and repeated verbatim later, about the train which was delayed at Kysak station. Our editor Jaroslav Velir phoned this report:

[Begin Velic recording] According to information available so far, a paper explosive device [papierovy delobuch] was thrown from a military train carrying Soviet troops onto the track between Vitkovce and Chrast nad Hornadom [east Slovakia]. The device exploded near Anna Benkova and Maria Sedlakova, employees of the railway maintenance and hygiene station, who were measuring noise and dust levels on the track. After the incident, the military train was stopped during the morning at the railway station in Kysak until 1900 hours. Fortunately, neither of the women was injured, and as Michal Spak, head of the Kosice railway district, told me, while they are aware of the matter, they are not registering it as an emergency incident. [end recording]

Easter Peace March in CSSR Planned for 14 Apr

LD0504213790 Prague CTK in English 1336 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Prague April 5 (CTK)—Participants in the first Easter peace march in Czechoslovakia's history on March 14 will demand the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia by the end of 1990, Zdenek Kutina, representative of the Czechoslovak Peace Society, a co-organiser of the peace march, told journalists here Thursday.

Main organisers of the event are the Czechoslovak Information Centre of Peace Groups, the Student Professional Union and the Civic Forum Organisation at Milovice, where the march will culminate in front of a Soviet military base.

The number of Soviet soldiers deployed at Milovice is estimated at least at 10,000 excepting the number of the officers' relatives.

Participants in the Easter march will hand over to Soviet soldiers a petition calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia by the end of 1990, a halt to any military exercises of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory and guarantees that the Soviet soldiers and citizens will not interfere in the life of Czechoslovak citizens living close to the Soviet bases, etc.

Participants in the march will also point to the immense ecological damage caused by the Soviet soldiers in the Milovice surroundings, Zdenek Kutina said.

CSSR Economic, Political Changes Assessed

90UF0013A Moscow TRUD in Russian 27 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by TRUD special correspondents Yu. Vasilkov and N. Shevtsov, datelined Prague-Bratislava, March: "Czechoslovakia: Hopes and Reality"]

[Text]

The Economy Is Sending Signals

An old friend of ours from the Slovak newspaper PRACA exclaimed in response to our traditional "How are you?" when we met her: "It is quite easy to breathe and work now!" Some time later, when we found ourselves in the middle of a meeting in downtown Bratislava where a not-too-numerous crowd chanted "Shame to the communists!", we noticed that our friend was standing there with her head hanging.

In response to our question, she said: "I am ashamed!" She went on to explain: She is ashamed for the people, for the discord being fueled, for the "witch hunt" being organized. She, a communist, is ashamed, although she does understand that these attitudes are largely a response to the decades of monopolistic dictate by her party. However, the revolution that occurred in the country last fall was named the "gentle" revolution for the very reason that, as it seemed, it finally evened out opportunities and opened the way to genuine pluralism. However, it is apparent that this "gentleness" does not agree with some people...

One cannot shake off contradictory feelings after conversations and meetings in today's Czechoslovakia. On the one hand, in the course of reckoning there is no striving "to point fingers" for the mistakes and distortions of the recent past, and it would appear that the mushrooming parties and groups are making very moderate demands. There is no special controversy regarding the way Czechoslovakia should be in the future—strong, independent, open to the world. Still, you cannot but feel with alarm that some processes are developing under the surface that threaten the "velvet" path along which the movement toward a transformation has already proceeded.

As always, the economy is the first to send signals. Valtr Komarek, first deputy chairman of the CSSR Council of Ministers, to whom we talked in the lobby at an extraordinary trade union congress, noted that the fundamental inertia of the entire structure of the national economy, which has mostly depleted its reserves, is a factor. Czechoslovakia's industrial output is marked by excessive intensiveness in energy and metal; progressive technologies are implemented poorly; the service sphere is trailing. All of this has brought about Czechoslovak products that are largely unable to compete in the world market.

In daily life, the economic imbalance is manifested in a narrowing of the assortment of goods offered to the consumers. For a long time Czechoslovak customers were quite satisfied with the supply; likewise, visitors noted good selection and comparatively low prices in the stores here. However, the phenomenon we know under the bashful term "supply disruptions" is also becoming increasingly customary in Czechoslovak trade. Draconian customs-control measures introduced more than a year ago did not help. It turned out that the phenomena of an internal crisis in the country's economy were to blame for the store shelves of Czechoslovakia becoming barren rather, than the visitors from adjacent socialist countries.

After 17 November, which is considered to be the beginning of the "gentle" revolution, the issue of industrious foreigners devastating the shops of the CSSR arose in a new way. Crowds of "petty traders" purchasing everything in sight rushed in through the now open border with Austria. Besides, how can one resist the temptation if, as we were told in the government offices of Slovakia, the residents of Austria may purchase foodstuffs and manufactured goods in Czechoslovakia 17 times cheaper than in their own country! Dining in expensive restaurants and staying at luxury hotels costs next to nothing for the owners of schillings.

CSSR Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Dienstbier was forced to admit in an interview by the newspaper PRESSE that "the Austrians did not respond to the opening of the border in a very friendly manner." He said that they "come to our country and eat lots of steak for the same amount of money as a streetcar ticket in Vienna."

Belated customs restrictions with regard to the Western neighbors also had to be introduced. However, how is the stream of contraband to be stopped if the remaining border along the Danube is purely symbolic?! Industrious people do not have to run into the control of official crossings—any boat would take you to the opposite bank under cover of darkness!

In order to finish our discussion of the "foreign influence" on the Czechoslovak market, let us mention the huge "flea markets" which appeared recently and where Vietnamese workers and "tourists" from Soviet Transcaucasia are the main traders. One such "flea market" completely clogged up a pedestrian street in the very heart of Prague, a stone's throw away from St. Venceslaus Square. It appears that nobody wants to look at the pretty shops on both sides of the street whose selection is poor because on the pavement they are selling caviar which is in short supply, electronic watches, and all kinds of strange gadgets. You can also transact hard-currency business here quite openly...

The citizens of Prague wander through the "flea market" in a kind of trance. Until recently something like this was inconceivable, whereas now it is as if the jaws of a mysterious "maw" called "the world market" have opened. To be sure, the "flea market" amounts merely to its pitiful periphery. However, here as well the spirit of free trade intoxicates and gives hope...

It has become possible to travel abroad freely. We have noticed that our Czechoslovak acquaintances do not mind advertising for no special reason that they are going to "gallivant" to West Germany or Spain... A waiter at a nice restaurant in Bratislava communicated to us—likewise, it was neither here nor there—that he was going to get a job in Austria (it is just 60 kilometers away from here). Here, he makes only 2,000 korunas a month. Over there, even if he makes one-half of what the Austrians make he will be earning 10,000 schillings. Meanwhile, at the official rate they give more than three korunas per schilling...

Everything we have discussed here amounts to graphic manifestations of the feverish condition of the economy. The future holds no optimistic promise. A reform of prices and taxes is in store, which is a necessary prerequisite for the success of the economic reform as a whole.

Czechoslovak economists told us: "We must look for ways that will not shake up the economic well-being of our people too much."

This might be so, but what is to be done about, say, the Czechoslovak economy's export capability being dozens of times lower at present than in the developed countries? How long will it take to overcome such a gap?

Partners and Opponents

A funny face or the blue-and-red letter "V" (the commonly accepted designation of the slogan "We will overcome") are the symbols of the most popular civic movements, which are called "The Civic Forum" in Bohemia and "Public Against Violence" (VPN) in Slovakia. There is a difference and even rivalry between them: The Civic Forum is perhaps more influential, and wants to "pester" its Slovak "brother" by sending its emissaries to the east of the country. The VPN is inclined to a certain degree to restrict itself to Slovak issues. The existence of quite acute ethnic—Hungarian, Ukrainian, and Gypsy—problems is characteristic of Slovakia. The democratization of public life revealed these contradictions. An attempt to resolve them is absorbing much of the VPN's attention.

We discussed the tasks the Civic Forum sets for itself with the movement's press spokesman, Jana Ryslenkova. She is a mathematician by profession; she became involved in politics after 17 November. Incidentally, she protests when we refer to her current occupation as "politics."

"It is just a segment of people's lives which is of concern to me. I know that after 1968 the entire population was classified into 'the good ones' and 'the bad ones.' Presumably, 'the good ones' remained in the ranks of the communist party, and 'the bad ones' were expelled from it. However, in reality the exact opposite occurred. To be sure, it is not true that all post-1968 communists are bad people, but it is a fact that very many are. By 'bad' I mean self-seekers who easily go along with injustices, are duplicitous, and so on."

We asked: What guarantees does the Civic Forum have that the noble ideas of this movement will not likewise turn into their own diametrical opposite?

Jana Ryslenkova said: "First, the honesty and sincerity of our adherents provide such a guarantee. They will not allow a return to the past. Second, the Civic Forum is not trying by any means to eliminate other political forces in the country. On the contrary, the Civic Forum would consider the disappearance of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ] from the public arena a mistake. Political opponents are necessary as a counterweight that ensures the equilibrium of different forces. Let the people themselves decide who is better. Third, free speech and freedom of the press are the very foundation of democracy. This is more than just a guarantee."

Such is the reasoning. However, reality shows how difficult it can be to follow an ideal. In the Bratislava headquarters of the VPN, our interlocutors did not conceal that for them "the communists have ceased to be partners."

VPN press spokesman Kamil Prochazka told us: "They do not comply with the 'roundtable' agreements. This will bring about destabilization if we go on playing the democracy game..."

Later, we learned about a hard fight for the press. The parties that have sprung up in Slovakia—the Christian Democratic Party, the "Greens," the Democratic Party—demanded that their newspapers be given newsprint for press runs equal to those of the communist publications. However, where is the newsprint to be obtained? A simple answer is suggested: Take it away from established publications, such as the communist PRAVDA and the trade-union PRACA, that is, deprive some of the readers of their favorite newspapers which they have subscribed to or bought for many years. What kind of the freedom of the press is this?

In a word, the search for ways leading toward a civic society is not as simple as it might seem at first sight. Many people are recalling the tradition initiated by "the Prague Spring." Undoubtedly, the development of Czechoslovakia would have been more harmonious had the introduction of the allied troops in August 1968 not brought the initiated reforms to an end. The reforms now are being carried out in a much more dramatic environment...

The Time of Trials

Josef Hora, chief of the press center of the CPCZ Central Committee, stated in a conversation with us: "The Communist Party has reached the point of self-destruction. It is going through a profound moral, political, and intellectual crisis. The reason for this can be found in the pre-November leadership's complete loss of ability to understand the real situation in our society."

Naturally, the adversaries of the communist party are striving not to let this opportunity slip. Voices demanding that the party be outlawed are becoming increasingly loud. Extremists who have lost their heads are even suggesting that the most active communists be exiled from Prague and resettled in the barracks vacated by Soviet troops—that "communist ghettos" of sorts be created.

How are attacks of this nature to be treated? Petr Rosicky, department chief at the CPCZ Central Committee, is not inclined to exaggerate them.

He told us: "You see, irresponsible windbags are always there. The truth is that our party should fight courageously rather than complain about the loss of monopolistic power."

Sorting out party assets is the main problem concerning the department chief at present. We talked in the huge, previously bustling, Central Committee building, which is now empty. Rosicky's secretary complained about even the government phone being disconnected... The building will have to be vacated soon because it turned out that it is not party property, as will dozens of other structures erected with party funds.

How could this happen? We might say that this is what an attempt to speed up the construction of "real socialism" brought about. In 1971, the Government of Czechoslovakia declared all assets in the country "national property." This is why only nine buildings which are being commissioned now, after the law was repealed, remain at the disposal of the party.

At present the Central Committee has to count every koruna. The apparatus has been reduced by more than 80 percent; many offices, which used to live off party subsidies, have been liquidated. Now that the number of party dues has declined by almost one-third—this is by how much the ranks of the CPCZ have shrunk—primary organizations have been given the right to engage in economic activities. Petr Rosicky said that 23 enterprises in the consumer services sphere have been organized at the CPCZ Central Committee, including a car repair shop and a laundry. At least some of the laid-off employees of the apparatus could be given jobs at these enterprises.

Of course, political activities are the main point. A quite varied spectrum of left-wing forces has now arisen in the country. However, they believe that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is not breaking with the heritage of the past with sufficient resolve, and are reluctant to align themselves with it.

At the CPCZ Central Committee we were told: "We should be realistic and have no illusions. The forthcoming elections will probably be held on an anticommunist platform. Even the left-wing forces will take care to distance themselves from what the CPCZ used to stand for. However, if we manage to master new thinking and attract young intellectual forces to the party, we will survive."

Many trials have befallen the trade union movement as well. Now that the Communist Party and other political forces have left the enterprises, the trade unions remain the only direct representatives and advocates of the workers' interests. This is a particularly topical task given the economic reform now in progress. The appearance of a 100,000-strong army of unemployed is expected as soon as this year. Enterprises are already closing down vocational schools and discontinuing apprentice training. This creates a difficult situation for the young people who are embarking on their labor careers... The economists predict price increases and reduced social protection for the individual. Under the circumstances, would it suffice for the trade unions merely to proclaim that they are independent of political currents and forces?

If asked whether what is going on in Czechoslovakia amounts to abandoning socialism, we would answer: Let us not give in to the magic of words. Let us look at the essence of the phenomena. It appeared to us that the search for truth is on in Czechoslovakia. The harsh realities of life do not necessarily conform to beautiful hopes. Still, you would have to agree that the slogan of the "gentle" revolution—"love will change the world"—is beautiful...

CSSR, Bulgarian 'Anticommunism' Examined

PM0504133590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Apr 90 Second Edition p5

[Special correspondent A. Krushinskiy "Publicist's Notes": "Exclude the Word 'Revenge'"]

[Text] Prague, Sofia, Moscow—I came across an amusing anecdote in the Czechoslovak weekly ROHAC. A cartoonist had drawn a series of pictures depicting a dialogue between two drinking companions: "Why is it that I am haunted by one disaster after another?", one complains. "My son has smashed up the car, my daughter has taken to drink, the hen coop has been carried off in the wind, and now I seem to have picked up the flu!" "There are only two possible explanations for this," the other replies with a thoughtful air. "Either fate is to blame, or the Communists are."

This "mini comic strip" illustrates a typical phenomenon now found in Czechoslovakia and other East European countries: Alongside the multiparty system and "roundtable" discussions by political forces, enthusiastic environmental campaigns and yearning for the introduction of a market mechanism, opening of borders, and other aspects of renewing everyday life, outbursts of hatred for socialism, Communists, and their symbols are also, unfortunately, appearing.

The specter of anticommunism knows no pity: Wherever its shadow falls, human tragedies are played out and an atmosphere of fear is whipped up. The story of the suicide of Josef Cebis, director of a high school in the city of Ceska Trebova, is a case in point. It all started when his students lodged a complaint against him in the capital, with "Civic Forum." Then he was condemned by the pedagogical collective. Cebis wrote a statement announcing his resignation, which should have been the end of it. However, the city was visited by a team of television journalists, and a meeting was held in the high school assembly hall under the "eye" of their cameras. That same evening Cebis locked himself in his garage and left the car engine running...

However, the number of dramas with a fatal outcome attributable to the "genteel revolution" (as the people of Czechoslovakia call the changes taking place in their country) can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Most of them are simpler and more mundane.

...Once—it was in December 1989—I was visiting an old acquaintance, a lecturer at one of Prague's higher education establishments. As we came out of his house, a handsome young man appeared out of the darkness:

"Professor, I am from 'Civic Forum.' Would you be so kind as to sign this appeal to the Federal Assembly?"

"What, just like that, without even reading it?"

"What is there to read? It is just a demand saying 'Havel for president!'"

"Surely you can see I have a guest with me! I have to take him to his hotel!" With these words, my friend turned abruptly toward his Lada. This, however, was the extent of the professor's "rebellion." On the way he told me that he would eventually have to sign the paper: He could not get away from the fact that he had two daughters studying, and he certainly did not want to lose his job....

Under no circumstances do I want to claim that this kind of thing happens on direct instructions from the leaders of "Civic Forum." On the contrary, its leaders, Havel included, have publicly condemned recurrences of "witch hunts." But in real life it more often turns out as it did with a former Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCZ) regional committee secretary from the city of Melnik, whose story was told in the newspaper RUDE PRAVO: Relieved of his duties as secretary, he tried to find work in 13 places but came up against a refusal every time.

The author of one of the responses said that 20 years ago he had gone on a long, weary search for work himself: He was turned down 16 times because he had been expelled from the party for speaking out against troops from five Warsaw Pact countries entering Czechoslovakia. In this particular instance, the letter's implication is what is most worrying: "We are doing to you now what you did to us in the past." In my view, this phenomenon is made all the more dangerous because there really are quite a lot of people in Czechoslovakia bearing a grudge. According to the newspapers, between 1945 and 1989 half a million people emigrated from the country (chiefly for political reasons) and as many again were expelled from the party after the 1968 events. However, the CPCZ currently has 1 million members! What will happen if some start taking revenge for the past and others dream of taking revenge for the present? What a tangled, vicious circle of injustices the country could be drawn into then! As one V. Hombarcek once wrote in this connection: "I reject any calls for revenge and settling of scores! In civilized society there is not even room for the word 'revenge' in the dictionary."

Just as, say, a sliver of wood is most easily hidden in a forest, cases of settling scores are sometimes concealed by the needs of the campaign for personnel changes at enterprises, in government bodies, in ministries, and so forth. It goes without saying that it is impossible to avoid serious recertification in the course of introducing democratic institutions and making the transition to a market mechanism. But the criteria on which these changes are made are often far removed from professional criteria: Take the example of Petr Vosta, head of the gynecological department of a hospital in the city of Tabor. They wanted to replace him, accusing him of "political intolerance of the communist type." Everything would probably have gone ahead as expected had the women of Tabor not risen up in rebellion: What did they care if Vosta was party organization secretary, when he was "a surgeon with golden hands"!...

Let us stop and think, however: Is it not startling that violations of civil rights and the fueling of an atmosphere of fear are becoming "side effects" of the democratization processes? Even in Bulgaria, even though there is nothing in its history to aggravate the present situation like the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia or the 1956 events in Hungary. What is more, the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] purged itself of the group of usurpers strictly of its own free will and not under pressure from people power. Nevertheless, even here the specter of anticommunism is leaving visible traces in the form of inscriptions on walls: "The BCP is the mafia!" and "The Communist Party out!" In Sofia's Slaveykov Square, the slogan "Anticommunists, unite!" recently appeared alongside an appeal to subscribe to the newspaper DEMOKRATIYA (organ of the opposition Union of Democratic Forces). DEMOKRATIYA promises "political unemployment" for 1 million Bulgarian Communists.

The newspaper RABOTNICHESKO DELO must be given its due: It has not left these attacks unanswered. It recently printed an open letter to Zhelyu Zhelev, chairman of the Union of Democratic Forces. The letter was written by philosopher Dobrin Spasov, Zhelev's former university lecturer who later became chief editor of the journal FILOSOFSKA MISUL, only to resign that post... as a sign of protest against a crushing review of Zhelev's book imposed from above.

"In your university years," Spasov wrote, "I saw you as embodying the common sense and tenacity of the young Bulgarian peasant to whom the revolution had given an opportunity to develop and to manifest his abilities. You must agree that you are largely indebted to communist intellectuals and to the existence of a strong democratic trend in the BCP for your social survival in those years!"

This judgement by the Bulgarian philosopher contains an important idea about the roots of the democratization process now under way in East European countries. It is particularly important in light of the fact that statements by people you talk to—Marxists from East European countries—often reveal glimpses of a kind of "guilt complex" for the past: for the lawlessness once permitted, for the flourishing bureaucracy, for the ignorant economic policy which is the main cause of the present commodity shortage, and so forth. This phenomenon is, on the whole, natural: People with scruples typically agonize over mistakes and blunders to which they were party, albeit only indirectly. But this is also one of the causes of the passivity which holds many party members in its grip. This is often played on by reactionaries seeking to discredit them totally. Getting these people out of their state of shock and restoring their self-awareness is therefore one of the items on the agenda.

I would like to quote a recent address by CPCZ Chairman Ladislav Adamec to the city party conference in Ostrava. In the interests of historical truth, he said, we must draw a clear line between the former party leadership, with whom responsibility rests, and the thousands of ordinary party members who lived the same kind of life as the rest of the people, criticized (albeit in vain) the bureaucracy and double standards, and insisted on radical restructuring. "I believe that the theory of 'collective communist responsibility' is unjust and distorts reality," Adamec stressed.

But what is particularly surprising is this: According to the laws of logic, as the foundations of totalitarian rule are broken up, overheated emotions should cool down. In reality, however, the opposite is seen to be happening. "We will not tolerate a communist party under whatever name it tries to revive... We propose that the electoral law bans the nomination of candidates from the former communist aktiv for the first three convocations," the so-called "Timisoara Political Proclamation" aired at a rally in March said. Then, in the birthplace of the "genteel revolution," in Prague, the student weekly BULVAR published an article entitled "The Communist Pestilence is a Threat to the Entire Nation," which contained "pearls" like these: "It is a contagion to which it is very hard to find an effective antidote. It is comparable to AIDS. All of its carriers should be isolated somewhere in a secluded place together with all monuments to Lenin..."

As far as I am aware, the December rallies in Czechoslovakia did not see such extremist attacks. They came later: in the comparatively calm atmosphere when the CPCZ's dissociation from totalitarianism and the mistakes of the past was already common knowledge. It is in the present atmosphere, in which they are absolutely safe, that many of yesterday's conformists are going all out to be as vociferous as possible and arouse those around them.

This phenomenon is also remarked upon in Dobrin Spasov's letter, quoted above. "Although decent, democratically-minded people still predominate at your rallies at the moment," he wrote to Zhelev, "the relative proportion and aggressiveness of frenzied anticommunists is growing on a dangerous scale. Surely you cannot be glad that you can rely on anticommunist swine who would have scattered in cowardly fashion if it were not for the fact that the era of repression is past? Our own swine, who have nothing in common either with Soviet perestroyka, or with the long-standing Polish 'Solidarity' movement with its millions of supporters, or with the historic 'Prague Spring,' or with the East German drive for reunification? To whom are you closest? To your old Democratic and Communist friends or to the potential fascists, who have come to believe in Hitler's theory that he who rules the streets rules the country? They will not rule the country. But I would like to give you this warning: Even if they did somehow conquer, they would discard you like an obsolete 'missile launcher,' because they would not forgive you either your former BCP membership or your persistent commitment to Marxist historical materialism."

Indeed, the difficult tasks now facing East European countries cannot be resolved without Communists' participation and without proper, equal cooperation between all democratically oriented political forces. The whipping up of hatred and the calls for revenge and settlement of scores are fraught with a chain reaction of injustice and brutality, and will make the task of creating a humane, democratic, prospering society unattainable.

Role of Social Democracy in East Europe Viewed

PM0504094990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Marina Pavlova-Silvanskaya and Sergey Yastrzhembskiy "Viewpoint" article: "East Europe: Has Social Democracy's Time Come?"]

[Text] The explosive and sometimes snowballing changes that have shaken the edifice of the bureaucratic-edict system in the East European countries to its foundations initially took the headquarters and "brain centers" of many of the political forces participating in the shaping of international relations unawares. Admittedly, the confusion and emotional fluster did not last long. They were replaced by a quest for new approaches and a deeper elaboration of possible options for the development of the situation in the region. However, things are not restricted to modifying former directives. Today the intention of the forces of various ideological and political affiliations, including social democracy, to directly participate in moving the pieces on the East European "chessboard" is increasingly obvious.

Change of Emphasis

Let us note straightaway that the approaches of international social democracy and its leading organization—the Socialist International—to the situation in the region have undergone a notable evolution. Before the turbulent changes which transformed the political landscape of the GDR and the CSSR last fall, the essence of the Socialist International's position and that of the parties comprising it amounted to the following: support for perestroyka and the renewal processes in Budapest and Warsaw; recognition of their historic importance for improving the international situation; and a readiness to give practical help to the efforts to democratize society and create market mechanisms.

The close interest in reform processes in a number of countries of "real socialism" was motivated both by international interests and by purely pragmatic, party calculations on the part of the social democrats. And, I think, a major part was played at the time by the hope that new forms of social development could open up favorable prospects for the spread of social democratic ideas and practice in the East European countries. But the social democratic leaders persistently called for greater caution and for interference in the region's internal affairs to be avoided.

However, the decisive change of political regimes in Berlin, Prague, and Bucharest present social democracy with a need to virtually redesign from scratch its quite balanced East European policy. And it was by no means malevolence, but common sense and party interests that prompted social democrats to seek an appropriate response to such phenomena as the communists' loss of their monopoly of power, the formation of a multiparty system, and the beginning of the transformation of totalitarian and authoritarian societies. It is another matter that some people's interests sometimes outweighed their own calls for caution and restraint.

The search for new approaches is still continuing, and it seems that special "keys" are being chosen for each country. At the same time, in our view, certain trends already stand out quite clearly. Thus, certain social democratic circles—above all in West Germany—have called into question the expediency of maintaining any links with a number of former ruling parties. There has been a notable switch in favor of recognizing and establishing close relations with the social democratic-type formations which have emerged in all the Warsaw Pact countries. And, finally, social democrats have overtly exerted an active influence on domestic political processes in the GDR, and thereby on the German problem, too.

However, this amended policy could be a prologue to a new chapter in the history of social democracy only in the event of political formations of this or any similar orientation acquiring weight in East Europe. What are their chances like today?

Social Democracy's "Second Coming"

The current appearance of social democratic parties in this part of the world essentially constitutes a "second coming" by them in East Europe. But after their enforced 40-year absence from the local political scene their successors are starting virtually from scratch, and are still just marshaling their forces.

Almost all East European states have seen the emergence and simultaneous operation of several social democratic parties and groupings, which are still not very influential and are competing with each other. It is hard for ordinary voters to discern any fundamental differences in their programs.

None of the new parties has succeeded in utilizing the historic traditions of social democracy for its own benefit. Older-generation figures in Hungary who have returned from emigration or have restored their former membership have come into conflict with young people, which ended in the breakaway of the Independent Social Democratic Party. In Romania they have strengthened the population's suspicions that they intend, along with other "historical" parties, to turn history back to semi-feudal times.

The East German Social Democratic Party [SPD] seemed to make a better start than the others. Its close cooperation with its experienced political twin in the FRG offered it unusually favorable opportunities. However, as the 18 March elections showed, even this potential exception to the overall picture did not take place, which could backfire on the prestige of other social democratic formations in East Europe.

It should be noted, incidentally, that in the light of the history of international social democracy, the parties' current weakness is more a manifestation of a general rule: Social democrats play their cards most successfully in concentrated political systems and, on the contrary, they do worst when they have more political rivals.

For forces intending to act under the banners of democratic socialism and relying on workers, "white collar workers," and middle strata, East European societies represent socially rich pickings. Admittedly, in order to turn itself into a really influential political force, social democracy will have to struggle for former communist party voters and for the minds of people who are inclined, as a rule, to give preference to socialism over democracy rather than the other way around and who consider pragmatism in politics to be a major vice. Nonetheless, if you bear in mind the fact that social democrats and communists have a common past, politically active people who have already left or are continuing to leave the ranks of the former ruling parties could quite well find themselves at the ideological and political center of gravity. At the moment, however, public sentiment is such that, by opening the doors to former Communists, the parties have put themselves at risk.

The main means of ensuring the political self-determination of the resurgent social democracy in East Europe is to differentiate between "real socialism" and the former ruling parties and their successors, who are responsible for the profound crisis which has affected all aspects of society's life in this region. The enforced need to take account of the past sharply reduces the chances of those communist and workers parties which have been trying to maintain their prospects for the future by transforming themselves into left-wing social democratic parties.

In all countries without exception this operation has been extremely painful: The parties have lost the lion's share of their members and none of them have gained their second wind yet. What was for some communists the logical result of an ideological and political evolution that began long ago has been seen by party "hard-liners" as a betrayal of fundamental principles, and therefore people have left the party's ranks in their masses. The largest section of the population saw the formation of new parties merely as a desire to change color and slough off their old skin so as to begin the power struggle with a clean slate.

East European social democracy is encountering more and more major difficulties in elaborating an economic platform. It has long been noted that social democrats most often take the reins of power at periods of high short-term tension [vysokaya konyunktura] and successfully implement their policy in stable systems. But the current economic situation in East Europe is directly set against these parties. The policy of tough budget savings, "belt-tightening," denationalization of overblown state sectors, incentives for small- and medium-scale production in order to shape market relations, and the inevitable emergence of unemployment after decades of virtually full employment are all problems which are no less complex for social democrats than they are for communists.

Hitherto the profound structural transformations which the modern scientific and production revolution has been prompting have been implemented mainly by right-wing conservative parties. In those places where, exceptionally, this task has been shouldered by socialists, they have been forced to resort to neoconservative methods. The people's parties (or movements) are so strong that convincing their voters to voluntarily agree to an indefinite sharp fall in living standards in the hope of a subsequent improvement in economic life and economic growth is a rare political phenomenon. In East Europe only "Solidarity" has been capable of this dangerous somersault. Only time will tell how great its reserves of strength are.

These difficulties do not mean, however, that there is no place for social democracy on the East European landscape. Quite the contrary. Postwar development has made it virtually impossible to improve this area's regional economies by using classic conservative doctrines and recipes—such as pure Thatcherism, for instance. Picking a relatively safe route through the minefields inherited by the East European peoples from the administrative system and minimizing outbursts of violence is probably only possible provided that center-right forces are opposed by viable social democracy relying on the vast experience of that political trend worldwide.

What Accords With Our Interests

The natural question is: What attitude should we in the Soviet Union take to the change of emphasis in the policy of international social democracy and the regeneration of these parties in East Europe?

Above all, we should be realistic, eschew propagandistic emotions, and avoid ingrained stereotypes about the nature of the USSR's relations with its Warsaw Pact allies. In this respect it would not be out of place to clearly differentiate once and for all between state and party interests.

It is obvious that the radical changes in the East European countries are just the start of the transition to democracy. And this transition, judging by many indications, will be exceptionally complex, contradictory, and quite long. The fate and progress of the reforms depends to a considerable extent on how quickly it is possible to create guarantees to ensure a peaceful, nonviolent transitional period and to neutralize the influence of nationalist and various radical right-wing forces. In this task social democracy, with its centuries of experience of a nonconfrontational political ethos, could probably act as a stabilizer and help prevent processes liable to be explosive emerging in the region. There hardly seems to be any need to demonstrate the USSR's interest in this kind of change in the allied European states.

Remaining in the realm of reality, we cannot fail to notice that the model of bureaucratic-edict socialism is not only completely bankrupt in the East European region, but—and this is far more dramatic in terms of its long-term consequences—socialist values and the socialist ideal as such have been serious devalued. The very word "socialism" generates an allergic reaction of repulsion. Against the backdrop of a profound split in the left-wing camp, conservative sentiments are growing and the destructive "power of the streets" is manifesting itself. And that is why the strengthening in these countries of the positions of parties hewing to the social democratic doctrine would be by no means the worst option for us.

It seems that the interests of the Soviet Union and social democracy also coincide in the sense of having things "run" in the East European capitals by responsible and politically mature regimes which understand the priority importance of European security and stability and respect their international obligations—above all, those stemming from the Warsaw Pact and the Helsinki agreements. Otherwise the emergence of uncontrollable processes—namely, a direct threat to the creative changes taking place in Europe, the barely established relations of trust, and the East-West balance of power—could not be ruled out. In this context the consistent adherence of social democracy, particularly on the part of the SPD, to the principles of the inviolability of European borders—above all, along the Oder and Neisse—and its constructive role in resolving the German issue in close conjunction with the creation of a "new all-European architecture" taking account of all states' fundamental security interests would be of key importance.

In short, from the standpoint of the emergent all-European interest, social democracy has considerable potential to exert a constructive influence on the position in East Europe. It is "merely" important—and not only for social democrats—to remember that Hippocrates' wise counsel, "do not harm the patient!", is as valuable in politics as it is in medicine.

West Europe

Genscher Remarks on Disarmament, Reunification

LD0604065690 Moscow TASS in English 0652 GMT 6 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Valentin Vasilets]

[Text] Ottawa April 6 TASS—"The problem of German reunification is closely linked with arms control and disarmament," West German vice-chancellor and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher said.

"We believe that disarmament is really crucial for German unity," he noted.

Genscher paid a brief visit to Ottawa on Thursday. He met Canadian Foreign Minister Charles Joseph Clark to discuss bilateral relations and European issues.

Speaking at a news conference, he stressed it was necessary to preserve the balance of forces in Europe during the process of solving the German issue. To preserve such a balance all NATO countries, including Canada, should make their contribution. The foreign aspects of German reunification can be settled in November at a summit meeting of states party to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the West German foreign minister said. One such aspect is whether a united Germany will remain a NATO member, he added.

A "crisis-control centre" should be formed to enable European states to relieve tense situations before they become uncontrollable. Annual meetings within the security-conference framework should be held to consolidate East-West relations, Genscher noted.

"The existing frontier with Poland is the final boundary," he stressed at a meeting with Clark.

Finland's Koivisto, Gorbachev Exchange Messages

LD0504204690 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1800 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] President Mauno Koivisto and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev stress the importance of the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance] Treaty in Finnish-Soviet relations. The heads of state have sent each other greetings telegrams on the 42d anniversary of the treaty.

In his telegram, Koivisto stresses that while the situation in Europe is characterized by profound change, relations between Finland and the Soviet Union are continuing and cooperation is increasing. According to Koivisto, the cooperation between the two countries makes a contribution to the European striving to turn the continent into an area of security, stability, and interstate cooperation.

In his telegram, Gorbachev says that he is convinced that the Soviet-Finnish declaration "New Thinking in Action," together with the YYA Treaty, creates favorable conditions for the cooperation of our countries in Europe, which is undergoing a process of renewal.

Finnish Criticism of Lithuanian Leadership Cited

*PM0504100190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1*

[TASS report under the general heading: "Emotions and Politics"]

[Text] Helsinki, 4 Apr—People in Finland are making a very careful analysis of the events in the USSR's Baltic republics. Meeting with Swedish journalists, Lieutenant General G. Hagglund, chief of the Finnish Defense Forces General Staff, declared that there is a substantial difference between the processes taking place in East Europe and Lithuania's demands to be granted independence.

In the opinion of this prominent military figure, the events in the Baltic region should not be expected to lead to international conflicts. No one denies the USSR's right to implement a security policy on that territory. It is a question of an internal conflict, the Finnish general emphasized, and they are seeking to avoid a repeat of the Tbilisi tragedy. "It would be criminal to have Lithuania understand that we can help it," G. Hagglund said. "We cannot do that."

The Helsinki-published newspaper SUOMENMAA (central organ of the Center Party) believes that the cause of the exacerbation of the situation in Lithuania "is not the actual desire for independence but the concomitant modus operandi of Lithuania's present leadership—above all V. Landsbergis himself." In the newspaper's estimation it is a question here not only of Lithuania's relations with the Kremlin. "In a short time Landsbergis has managed to criticize the attitude taken toward the Lithuanian parliament's decisions by the foreign policy leadership of at least countries such as the United States, Sweden, and Finland. How seriously can you take a statesman who during the very first days of his activity manages to break off or at least undermine relations with practically everyone with whom he associates? Whatever the Lithuanian parliament's reply to Moscow, Lithuania will hardly be able to sustain for long the present modus operandi of its new leadership."

Finnish Social Democrat Heads Visiting Group

*PM0404131190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
1 Apr 90 Second Edition p 7*

[TASS report: "Interparty Working Group Meeting"]

[Text] U. Iivari, general secretary of the SDP [Social Democratic Party] of Finland, visited Moscow 27-30 March in connection with a session of the CPSU-SDP joint working group on questions of the workers movement and international relations. She had talks at the CPSU Central Committee International and Socioeconomic Departments and the USSR Academy of Sciences Europe Institute, and there were meetings and consultations between specialists of both parties on the working group's topics.

USSR-Austrian Cooperation Protocol Signed

*LD0604084690 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1720 GMT 5 Apr 90*

[Text] Kiev, 5 Apr (TASS)—A protocol was signed here today by Josef Ratzenboeck, head of the government of the Federal land of Upper Austria, and Vitaliy Masol, chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, on cooperation between the Ukraine and the Federal Land of Upper Austria in economics, trade, science, technology, education and culture.

During a conversation the two sides expressed the hope that the implementation of the protocol would help reinforce mutual understanding and friendly relations between the peoples of the USSR and the Austrian Republic and become a concrete contribution by the peoples of the two countries to solving universal problems and constructing the all-European home.

Josef Ratzenboeck is heading a delegation from Upper Austria which has been in the Ukraine since 3 April. The guests have had meetings with Ukrainian businessmen and academics in the republics' chamber of trade and industry and in the inter industry scientific and technical "powder metallurgy" complex, which is a leader in its field in the USSR. It was stressed that Ukrainian-Austrian ties now have a good tradition behind them.

Attention was also devoted to Danube trade, which also opens up good prospects for expanding Ukrainain-Austrian trade and economic links.

The head of the government of Upper Austria visited the Park of Eternal Glory and laid a wreath at the grave of the unknown soldier.

The Ukrainian government held a dinner in honour of Josef Ratzenboeck.

Presidential Decree on Award for Austrian

*LD0304152290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1300 GMT 3 Apr 90*

[Text] We have received the decree of the president of the USSR on awarding Rudolf Sallinger, president of the Federal Economic Chamber of Austria, the Order of Friendship of the Peoples. This is to mark his immense work to develop economic cooperation between the USSR and Austria.

Latin America & Caribbean

Castro Calls TV Marti Transmissions 'Aggression'

*PM0504114590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Apr 90 First Edition p 5*

[Own correspondent A. Moiseyev dispatch: "F. Castro on 'TV Marti' Television Station"]

[Text] Havana, 4 Apr—"We are not interested in a military conflict with the United States although we have long been prepared for it," Fidel Castro, first secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba and president of the republic's councils of state and ministers, stated at a press conference in the capital's Palace of Congresses.

The Cuban leader's meeting with journalists was mainly devoted to the start of test transmissions by the U.S. "TV Marti" television station. F. Castro called them an act of aggression against a sovereign country fraught with unpredictable consequences. It is not out of the question, he said, that the United States is seeking a pretext to justify possible military actions. The leader confirmed his country's legal right to defend national sovereignty in the air.

The United States has offended the Cuban people's feelings by naming the television station for Cuba's national hero, Jose Marti, F. Castro said. He rejected any possibility that the United States' television aggression could cause the emergence of an opposition in Cuba.

Call for 'Progressive Forces' Unity in Havana

PM0404115390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 1 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Appeal For Unity"]

[Text] An open letter from the communist parties of Argentina, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and El Salvador to "revolutionary and progressive movements" in Latin America and the Caribbean has been disseminated in the Cuban capital.

The developing countries, the document notes, are going through a crisis that is unprecedented in their history, one that is associated with the "deepening general crisis of the world capitalist system and the crisis of the bureaucratic model of socialism," which the Soviet Union and East European countries are abandoning.

"The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are becoming the world center of revolutionary struggle, because they have no prospects of economic and democratic development or acquisition of genuine sovereignty in conditions of imperialist domination in the region," the letter says. The paramount task of all progressive forces on the continent is to strengthen their unity, step up the struggle, and expand ties with the people's masses. The purpose of these efforts is to create in Latin America a broad alliance of forces advocating democracy and sovereignty for the region's countries, the document notes.

Soviet Trade Union Delegates Visit Chile

90UI0454A Moscow TRUD in Russian 17 Mar 90 p 3

[Report by TASS special correspondent Vladimir Shekhovtsov: "Trade Union Delegation Visit"]

[Text] Santiago, 16 March—TASS special correspondent Vladimir Shekhovtsov reports: On the invitation of the United Professional Center of Workers of Chile, a Soviet trade union delegation was here headed by M.P. Gubkin, member of the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] Presidium and chairman of the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Geological Prospectors. The delegation took part in events conducted by Chilean trade unions in connection with the transfer of power in the country to the civilian government of President Patricio Aylwin.

The AUCCTU delegation was introduced to the new Chilean president, who wished Soviet workers success in the accomplishment of perestroyka.

Over the course of meetings between the Soviet delegation and Chile's Minister of Labor and Social Security Rene Cortasar, the active membership of the United Professional Center of Workers of Chile, and various branch trade union confederations, great interest was expressed in the role of trade unions in the process of transformations being carried out in the Soviet Union. Chilean trade union representatives expressed their gratitude to the Soviet people for their support and solidarity with the people of Chile during the years of military dictatorship.

On Thursday the Soviet trade union delegation departed for home.

Supreme Soviet Session

Supreme Soviet Committee Discusses Rocket Forces

LD0504133590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] The Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security Issues discussed at its session today questions of financing the Strategic Rocket Forces, their capital construction development, and the social sphere of this section of the Armed Forces.

Secret Anti-Soviet Activities Debated

LD0504162690 Moscow TASS in English 1442 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 5 TASS—Closed hearings on the activities of secret services of capitalist countries against the Soviet Union were held in Moscow today in accordance with the plan of work of the USSR Supreme Soviet committee on defense and state security. The hearings were presided over by Vladimir Lapygin.

A report was delivered by KGB deputy chief, Viktor Glushko who then answered questions of the committee's members.

Glushko was also shown an exposition featuring means used by foreign secret services in their intelligence activities against the Soviet Union.

The committee adopted a resolution on the matter.

Committees Discuss Welfare, Education

LD0504162390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1300 GMT on 5 April carries a three-minute report by correspondent Lyudmila Semina on the work of the commissions and committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet today. According to the report members of the committee for women's affairs, family care, motherhood, and children discussed urgent measures to improve conditions in these spheres. Last year the birthrate was the lowest since 1977 and it is planned to increase childcare benefits to the minimum wage level of R70, with the money coming from funds previously squandered on unnecessary construction projects. Semina adds that other commissions and committees discussed probelms of vacations, the education and development of humanitarian sciences, the development of physical cultural and sport, and state youth policy.

Discussion of Secession Law Viewed

90UN1357B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 22 Mar 90 pp 1, 2

[Article by ELTA correspondent B. Buchyalis on discussion of USSR Supreme Soviet, 21 March 1990 (Moscow, Kremlin): But Still: How Does One Secede From the USSR?"]

[Text] Solidarity among people has always been manifested everywhere in the most varied forms, including, of course, among my fellow journalists. Certain of my Moscow colleagues, for example, are very happy that the Central and Leningrad television have agreed to show on the Moscow channel a videotape of a rally that took place in Vilnius on 18 March in front of the House of Sports. This they did yesterday evening. Others, on the contrary, were disturbed by this and by the mud that was slung at Lithuania. But both sides agreed that this was not the desire or caprice of the journalists but the will of those who stand behind them.

The PRENSA LATINA agency, which is well known in Latin America and is fairly influential in this region, is receiving a good deal of information from me about events in Lithuania but it interprets this information in its own way. Fidel Castro needs the information in a form that corresponds to his own wishes. A division chief of the Czechoslovakian press agency CTK in Moscow, Karel Bartak, conversely, relates word for word what I tell him based on fresh information from my ELTA colleagues. And these reports, too, as far as I know, appear daily in the newspapers of Czechoslovakia and are read on Prague and Bratislava radio. In general there are many people here who wish to communicate with journalists from Lithuania.

But that is not the point. Today the journalists have been interested in the continuation of the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It began, as we know, the day before yesterday. At that time they discussed the agenda for the next two weeks and determined, as A.I. Lukyanov said, the priority issues for the entire parliament. There were about 20 of them but many discussions will obviously be devoted to one of the major issues of the present day both for us and for other republics and, finally, for the entire world—what should the USSR be.

Today they discussed the USSR draft law on the procedure for resolving issues related to the secession of a union republic from the USSR.

The draft of this law was discussed before dinner by the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet and in the second half of the day the same hall was occupied by deputies of the Soviet of Nationalities. Academician Antanas Burachas and Professor Vaydotas Antanaytis observed the discussion and participated in it. I will give their comments.

Academician A. Burachas: In keeping with the norms of international law, the draft law meets the conditions for decolonization. One could say that this is a fairly good document. But it contains a good deal of space and possibilities for those forces which would like, for example, to Russify the people. For instance, in Estonia and Latvia, not to mention Kazakhstan, residents of the basic nationality might not comprise the necessary percentages of participants in the referendum who are in favor of seceding from the USSR, that is, who determine the will of their people.

I reminded members of the USSR Supreme Soviet that a new status was conferred on the last colony which has existed up to this point; its name is Namibia. The same mechanism for decolonization, in my opinion, could be a kind of lesson for the Soviet parliament in discussing the possibilities of the secession of the Baltic republics and other nations from the Soviet empire.

In the draft law under discussion only the mechanism for seceding from the USSR is discussed. But why not think about the peoples and states that would like to merge with this union (the academician smiled here—Author)? Finally: Why do they speak only about how much the departing state owes? Why must it fulfill commitments which, incidentally, were defined quite vaguely? And how much do the states that remain owe the departing state? These issues are crucial, as they say, not only from the theoretical or polemical standpoint, but also because an economic blockade of our country is beginning....

Professor V. Antanaytis: I again reminded the members of the Soviet of the Union that both my colleague, A. Burachas, and I and also others who might possibly speak at the session today or tomorrow are only observers and emphasized that my speech could be understood or perceived only as advice. Commenting on the draft law, I emphasized that it should be differentiated with respect to each republic. For when they entered the USSR they were driven by particular circumstances or, possibly, by their own wishes, while others were driven into this union by crude force. But....

Here I add for my own part that Ye.M. Primakov, chairman of the Soviet of the Union, very rudely tried to interrupt the Kaunass professor. He especially disliked the document V. Anatanaytis read to the entire hall.

He quoted an excerpt from the book by Vladimir Kudryavtsev who several years ago was vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences (quite recently he also ran for the post of chairman of the USSR constitutional supervision committee) and Anatoliy Lukyanov who is well known to us—"The USSR Constitution: Politico-Legal Commentary"" (Izdatelstvo Politicheskaya Literatura, Moscow, 1982). On page 213 it is written: "Each union republic reserves the right to free secession from the USSR.... This is the unconditional right of the union republic. Exercising it does not require the agreement of organs of state power either of the USSR or of other union republics. "We want free unification and therefore we must recognize free separation (without freedom of separation unification cannot be called free)—as V.I. Lenin pointed out."

A few minutes later I met him, somewhat embittered by this direction of the polemics, in the corridors of the meetings in the building of the Supreme Soviet. Members of the Supreme Soviet representing Georgia, Armenia, the Ukraine, and, naturally, Latvia and Estonia who came here agreed with the arguments of our representatives. And the debates on the draft law continued. As always, there were impassioned speeches and there was a great deal of emotion. Ye.M. Primakov found it difficult to keep the hall in order. But the noise concerning how to live in the USSR—to remain in it or to leave it and how to do that—did not die down.

Toward evening it continued in the meeting of the Soviet of Nationalities.

And in the middle of the evening an official who was keeping track from a distance of what was going on at the Spasskiy Gate of the Kremlin asked me the question: "Does all this really not concern you?"

How could I answer him?

Resolution on Territorial Violation Law

PM0604075190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution dated Moscow, Kremlin, 2 April 1990 "On the Procedure for Enacting the USSR Law 'On Enhanced Responsibility for Encroachment on the National Equality of Citizens and Forcible Violation of the Integrity of USSR Territory'"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To enact the USSR Law "On Enhanced Responsibility for Encroachment on the National Equality of Citizens and Forcible Violation of the Integrity of USSR Territory" from the moment of its publication.

2. To recommend that the Supreme Soviets in the union republics bring the union republics' legislation into line with the USSR Law "On Enhanced Responsibility for Encroachment on the National Equality of Citizens and Forcible Violation of the Integrity of USSR Territory.

[Signed] A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Supreme Soviet Committees To Continue Work

LD0604031990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0200 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet committees and commissions will continue work today. Draft laws on the foundation of the country's state youth policies, on the socialist enterprise, on the taxation of state, leased, public and other enterprises, associations and organizations, on the press, and other mass media will be analyzed in detail. The Committee on Agrarian Issues and Foodstuffs will devote one session to the gasification and electrification of rural areas. You will hear a reportage from the hall of sittings, a report by our correspondents at about 09.40 [0540 GMT].

Political & Social

Law Curtails Ethnic Activities

*PM0504160390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Apr 90 First Edition p 1*

[Report: "USSR Law on Enhanced Responsibility for Encroachment on the National Equality of Citizens and Forcible Violation of the Integrity of USSR Territory"]

[Text] The present law proceeds from the need to enhance the protection of citizens' rights and freedoms and resolutely to cut short the activities of various nationalist and separatist associations aimed at discrimination against citizens in connection with their national allegiance, language, or faith, the kindling of interethnic hostility and strife, and forcible violation of the integrity of the USSR's territory which is enshrined in the USSR Constitution; and takes account of the USSR's commitments under international law banning in legal terms any activity aimed at discrimination against citizens or kindling of ethnic hatred, hostility, and violence.

1. The activity of all civic associations, including political parties, social organizations, and mass movements, which is aimed at kindling ethnic or racial hostility, strife, or contempt or at using violence on ethnic, racial, or religious grounds, and also their activity aimed directly at the forcible violation of the integrity of the USSR's territory or the territory of union and autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts or okrugs as enshrined in the USSR Constitution is against the law and subject to prohibition.

2. The activity of associations described in Article 1 of the present law is deemed unlawful and is banned by decision of the supreme court of the relevant union republic, supreme court of the relevant autonomous republic, or kray, oblast, or city court, autonomous oblast court, or autonomous okrug court at the instigation of either the supreme soviet chairman or any other top-level union or autonomous republic state official, union or autonomous republic council of ministers chairman, chairman of the local soviet of people's deputies or chairman of its executive committee, or prosecutor.

In cases where the activity of the aforementioned civic associations extends over the territory of several union republics or affects interrepublican relations, the decision to ban the activity of these associations can be adopted by the USSR Supreme Court at the instigation of the USSR president, USSR Council of Ministers chairman, USSR prosecutor general, and also at the instigation at the Supreme Soviet chairman, or other top-level union or autonomous republic state official, or union or autonomous republic council of ministers chairman. In the interests of ensuring the safety of citizens, the USSR president may temporarily, pending the adoption of a decision by the USSR Supreme Court, suspend the activity of associations described in Article 1 of the present law.

The civic association whose activity has been banned by a court is disbanded and its property passes to the state.

3. Actions to establish civic associations described in Article 1 of the present law, and also active participation in their acitivities entail an administrative penalty in the shape of a fine of up to R10,000, or administrative detention for a period of up to 15 days, provided there is no legislative provision for criminal liability.

The protocols on violations are drawn up by internal affairs organ personnel or other officials authorized to do so by soviets of people's deputies.

Cases involving violations described in the first part of the present article are considered by people's judges as the sole authority.

4. Criminal liability is established for public calls for the violent disruption of the unity of the territory of the USSR, union and autonomous republics, and autonomous oblasts and okrugs, setting forth Article 7 of the USSR Law of 25 December 1958 "On Criminal Liability for State Crimes" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1959, No. 1, Article 8; VEDOMOSTI SYEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR I VERKHNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1989, No. 9, Article 203) as follows:

"Article 7. Calls for the violent overthrow or changing of the Soviet state and social system or for the violent disruption of the unity of the USSR's territory;

"Public calls for the violent overthrow or changing of the Soviet state and social system or for the violent disruption of the unity enshrined in the USSR Constitution of the territory of the USSR, union and autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts and okrugs, as well as the dissemination of materials of such substance for this purpose—

"are punishable by imprisonment for up to three years or by a fine of up to R10,000.

"The same actions committed a second time or by an organized group of persons—

"are punishable by imprisonment for up to seven years or by a fine of up to R20,000.

"Actions provided for in parts 1 or 2 of this article and committed on behalf of foreign organizations or their representatives—

"are punishable by imprisonment for up to 10 years, with or without confiscation of property."

5. Part 1 of Article 34 of the Fundamentals of USSR and Union Republic Criminal Legislation approved by the USSR Law of 25 December 1958 (VEDOMOSTI VERKHNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1959, No. 1, Article 6; 1969, No. 29, Article 249) is supplemented by Point 3(1), as follows:

"3(1) commission of a crime on grounds of national or racial enmity or disdain."

6. In Part 1 of Article 28 of the Fundamentals of USSR and Union Republic Criminal Proceedings approved by the USSR Law of 25 December 1958 (VEDOMOSTI VERKHNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1959, No. 1, Article 15; 1961, No. 26, Article 270; 1963, No. 16, Article 181; 1981, No. 33, Article 966; 1984, No. 3, Article 58; 1989, No. 15, Article 106; VEDOMOSTI SYEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR I VERKHNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1989, No. 9, Article 203) the words "7 (calls for the violent overthrow or changing of the Soviet state and social system)" are replaced by the words "7 (calls for the violent overthrow or changing of the Soviet state and social system or for the violent disruption of the unity of the USSR's territory."

7. Part 2 of Article 14 of the Fundamentals of USSR and Union Republic Legislation on Administrative Offenses (VEDOMOSTI VERKHNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1980, No. 44, Article 909; 1987, No. 22, Article 312; 1988, No. 31, Article 506) is supplemented, after the words "Up to R1,000," by the words "For the creation of and citizens' active participation in associations whose activity is banned—a fine of up to R10,000."

8. Article 1 of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree of 14 April 1978 "On Making Changes to Legislation on Liability for Administrative Offenses" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1978, No. 16, Article 252; 1985, No. 21, Article 369; 1987, No. 25, Article 354; 1988, No. 31, Article 506) is supplemented, after the words "For violation of the procedure for organizing and holding meetings, rallies, street marches, and demonstrations," by the words "creation of associations whose activity is banned, and active participation in them."

[Signed] M. Gorbachev, president of the USSR.
Moscow, the Kremlin, 2 April 1990

Presidential Council Member Interviewed

PM0504130190 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 29 Mar 90 pp 1, 13

[Report on interview with USSR Presidential Council Member Stanislav Shatalin by Laura Starink: "'God Will Judge Gorbachev's Council'"]

[Text] Moscow, 29 Mar—"We must show this year that things are beginning to move in the economy, otherwise we are not worth anything. People want results. But at the same time we must speak the truth: People, you will not get a beautiful and easy life just like that. We were somewhat euphoric in 1985 and we must now offer our apologies for that," said economist Stanislav Shatalin—who for the past two days has been a member of the brand-new 15-member Presidential Council in the Soviet Union.

Shatalin has an office with a view of a construction site. He has just gotten rid of an old amateur economist who wanted to tell him personally where the Soviet Union went wrong in the last 70 years.

It must have been love at first sight. Shatalin made the personal acquaintance of Mikhail Gorbachev only last October, at a scientific conference devoted to the economic reforms.

"A cross between a national security council and a council of national reconciliation" is how Shatalin described the Presidential Council, which held its first meeting Tuesday [27 March]. Just like the Council of the Federation, the new body must assist the president in his difficult task. Shatalin is proud to belong to this select company, which he said is not a discussion club, nor an advisory body, but a council on which all are equal and which also has certain powers. "I can now exercise a certain amount of control over Deputy Prime Minister Abalkin (responsible for the economic reform program—Laura Starink's note) and the other members of the government," Shatalin said. The idea seems to please him.

As well as a number of people who are ex officio members of the council, such as the foreign and interior ministers, the head of the KGB, the defense minister, and the chairman of the State Planning Committee, the council also includes members of varied character and political persuasion which can best be described as center-right. There is no representative of the "leftist" parliamentary faction, although it is true that the Russian nationalist writer, Valentin Rasputin, and the worker, Venyamin Yarin—one of the founders of the Workers' Union, considered to be a conservative organization—are also on the council. According to Shatalin, Gorbachev allowed himself to be led by the criteria of intelligence and honesty. "Gorbachev is looking for people who can tell him 'no,' but who are able to do so in a well argued and competent fashion. Responsibility and professionalism are still in somewhat short supply in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev will have to rely on professionals." Shatalin does not know whether the Presidential Council has replaced the Politburo. "God will judge us."

Stanislav Shatalin (57), communist, economist, member of the Academy of Sciences, secretary of the Academy's Economics Department, active at the "Institute of Economics and Forecasting of Scientific and Technical Progress," has become one of Gorbachev's closest economic advisers rather suddenly. Recently he has been making a name for himself by speaking in quite forthright terms about the stagnation in the party and the country at Central Committee meetings.

Shatalin has gathered around him a group of scientists who see themselves faced with the almost impossible task of transforming a planned economy into a market economy in the shortest possible time. This is the first problem to which the Presidential Council will devote its attention, and Gorbachev has already announced that the economic reforms will be speeded up drastically, if necessary with the aid of unpleasant decrees. The watered-down government program of Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, which was approved by the Congress of People's Deputies in December and which set a very slow pace for economic reforms, is already a dead duck. Will the prime minister have to resign?

No, no, Shatalin said, this is not Holland! "The government program was approved by 75 percent of the votes and that is how our society is. In this country, where there was no political life for 70 years, you have to make compromises. Now we are getting a new type of power: Gorbachev is personally responsible to the whole country and can now make more radical decisions." What direction will Shatalin advise the president to take? If it is up to him, there will be a law on entrepreneurs which will improve the defective law on ownership (Shatalin is a great champion of private property), a radical land reform, a fall in the so-called state orders, an increase in retail prices, a denationalization of state enterprises, and the encouragement of Western investment.

All this must be accompanied by a package of fiscal measures, the first of which—the first taxation law—is currently being elaborated by parliament. There will be no monetary reform—something which the average Russian is rightly afraid of after the stream of rumors about it that have circulated. Western aid, including financial aid, is welcome. Words, words, words, all of which we have heard before.

"Just let us look at the situation calmly," Shatalin said, gesticulating violently, "a country of countless nationalities and religions, a poor infrastructure, a poor climate, a downtrodden intelligentsia—can such a country become a fully civilized country at a stroke? Politically we have made a great deal of progress, we live in a completely different country and anyone who refuses to see that is a provocateur, a reactionary, or a barbarian. I have frequent dealings with Mikhail Sergeyevich. He has given the people the chance to say everything on the subject of what they want, and did you see the presidential elections. I have seldom seen such barbarism! That is a question of culture of the nation. But one thing is certain: The old life is over, there is no single power monopoly any more!"

If it were up to Shatalin, only the infrastructure would remain in state hands. The state would only be allowed to act through fiscal policy and investment in unpopular industries. "Only the most important things would continue to belong to the state: Let us say oil and gas—special equipment, grain, and meat and all the rest must be sold. Never mind if there is some chaos at first; you could straighten it out afterwards. The state has nothing to look for in business." He admitted honestly that he still does not know exactly how the denationalization would be carried out. "We do not know how to distinguish Norilsk (gigantic metal industry center in northern Siberia—Laura Starink's note) from a little shop. There are many methods involving cooperatives and shareholders, but it is a very difficult matter and also faintly absurd. All the factories and real estate have been built up by the people. Will you have to pay the people for them? Also, no one in the Soviet Union has the sums of money needed to buy enterprises. People have no capital. Perhaps we will have to use the Polish or the Hungarian privatization models. In the economy there are thousands of variants of ownership. We will have to find economic niches in which these variants can develop. In the Soviet Union it is often said: Pluralism means equality of all forms of ownership. I say that it is a good creed for an amateur. But it is stupid! People must finally realize that there are all sorts of different forms of economic activity."

Another major problem is ending monopolism in the economy. Because everything is in state hands there is no competition: Whole branches of industry are in the hands of one ministry, which should be viewed more as a great company. "You could not simply cut Norilsk or Uralmash (the big military industrial association in the Urals—Laura Starink's note) into quarters. We will have to try to slowly transfer small pieces into the hands of small businessmen. But we are wrestling not only with more than 1,000 enterprises which have a monopoly on certain products, but also with the state monopoly: interference by the state in the economy. Ideally the state should interfere only when the market system seems unable to solve a given problem. That is a healthy situation."

The telephone rang. Shatalin got excited. "I'll break his neck; he is slowing everything down," he shouted into the receiver and suggested raising the matter with Mikhail Sergeyevich personally. A large American order which threatens to founder on an obstructive bureaucrat, I conclude from his words. Shatalin is a great advocate of foreign investment, and in the Presidential Council this is bound to bring him into conflict with Valentin Rasputin, who fulminates against the sale of old Mother Russia to grasping foreigners. Shatalin is sure that Gorbachev will listen to him. "I am really sick and tired of all that fuss about selling Russia down the river! We live on one planet. As long ago as Peter the Great there was trade with the Netherlands; that is fine! In my view this argument is actually already settled. There will be a bit more grumbling, and that will be that. The people themselves will pass judgment and undoubtedly they will say: Comrade Netherlanders, be our guest!"

This is all well and good, but the people want rapid results. How will Gorbachev deliver these? Shatalin reached for the telephone and joked: "Should we call him and ask what decrees he has in the pipeline?" Shatalin does not yet have a "vertushka," a "hot line" to the Kremlin, but it won't be long before he does. Serious again, Shatalin listed the three cardinal questions which in his view must be resolved quickly: gangsterism, the new federation, and the question of land. "The population is in the grip of gangsterism at all levels. People must be put at ease; they must know that no one will murder and rob them, that no blood will flow. That is our first problem. Then there will have to be a new union agreement very soon, and, third, people must at last be given an opportunity to buy and own land. We must convince them that we are fighting against the kolkhozes [collective farms] and the sovkhozes [state farms] which make their work impossible." Shatalin sees merits in the U.S. system of land ownership: The various states own almost no land. "The land must be the possession of the whole country, of the local authorities, or of private persons. I condemn the decision to allot raw materials and natural resources to the peoples who live on that territory. That has been an unfair concession. I do not want Tyumen people owning oil or Yakuts owning diamonds. And the comparison with Kuwait does not work. If you want natural resources, leave the Soviet Union, you have the right to do so."

Shatalin fears that the disintegration of the federation will do serious damage to the economic reforms. He thinks that what must be created are conditions that are so attractive to the republics that no one will want to leave. As an optimist he thinks that it is still not too late for this. The Lithuanian question was also discussed at the Presidential Council meeting and the general view was: no force, only dialogue.

"For me Lithuania is a personal drama. All the Lithuanian economists are my friends or my students, and now we are suddenly on opposite sides. But I know for certain that the people at the Academy of Sciences in Vilnius have already come to their senses. You cannot play at democracy using antidemocratic methods. I understand their feelings, and of course you cannot view them as extremists. But emotions must be given time to subside. Gorbachev must abandon all pride and humbly begin the dialogue with this people, who really think they have regained their freedom."

Baklanov Meets Aviation Industry Institute Workers

PM0504091590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
3 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "With Aviators Near Moscow"]

[Text] The N.Ye. Zhukovskiy Central Aerohydrodynamics Institute is one of the major scientific collectives of the aviation industry and, possessing strong scientific and technical potential, is rightly considered the leader in the creation of Soviet aviation equipment to a high world standard. Questions of the work of the collective and its party organization under conditions of full economic accountability were examined in this institute near Moscow 2 April with the participation of CPSU Central Committee Secretary O.D. Baklanov and Minister A.S. Systsov.

At a meeting with the aktiv, O.D. Baklanov shared his views on the party's role and position under present conditions and on the course of the discussion of the CPSU Central Committee's precongress platform and the draft CPSU Statutes. He emphasized the special responsibility of CPSU members right now, when the party is going through a difficult time. Analyzing the CPSU Central Committee Platform and the Democratic Platform, the Central Committee secretary pointed out that supporters of the Democratic Platform have recently clearly embarked on a path of undermining party unity. To all appearances, things are moving toward our having to define our position with regard to those who reject the CPSU's line and who are leading it toward a split.

O.D. Baklanov answered questions put by the meeting participants.

Girenko, Razumovskiy Meet Soviet Germans

LD0504203890 Moscow World Service in Russian
0934 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] An INTERFAX correspondent has learned that secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee Andrey Girenko and Georgiy Razumnovskiy had a meeting in Moscow with five members of the leadership of the Vozrozhdeniye Society of Soviet Germans. The meeting was held at the request of communists of the Vozrozhdeniye Society. At the meeting, the Soviet Germans were offered an alternative to the restoration of the Nemetskiy Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in the Volga valley region, annulled by Stalin. It is proposed that a national association or a central council of Soviet Germans be set up. This association would be given the status of the government of an autonomous republic. However, it is not indicated over what territory the powers of this government would extend.

Heinrich Grout, chairman of the Vozrozhdeniye Society of Soviet Germans, believes that this association, a government without territory, will not solve the problems of the Soviet Germans. In Grout's opinion, only the restoration of Germany autonomy in the Volga valley region can solve their problems.

Kryuchkov Views KGB Role in Multiparty System

LD0504161790 Moscow TASS in English
1414 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 5 TASS—The main task of the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) is to act in the interests of the Soviet foreign and internal policy and help the highest bodies of state power to implement political tasks, KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov told TASS today.

Asked about the role and place of state security bodies in the process of creating a truly legal state in the Soviet Union, Kryuchkov said that the Supreme Soviet is considering a bill on the Soviet State Security Committee that provides for control over the KGB activities by the highest bodies of state power and management.

Kryuchkov said that the emerging multiparty system will be based on principles laid down in this law. Touching upon the party membership of the committee's workers and the functioning of the party structures under a multiparty system, he emphasized that "these questions should be resolved by the committee's staff itself and be regulated by the law."

"The world experience shows that the activity of state security worker is always guided by the law, irrespective of the fact to which party he belongs," he said.

Speaking about KGB's personnel policy in conditions of emergence of other political parties, Kryuchkov emphasized that "the Soviet Communist Party cannot ignore the questions of selecting and distributing the personnel." At the same time, the KGB chief said that the expansion of democracy changes "forms and methods of carrying out the personnel policy."

"The Soviet Communist Party is abandoning its direct formal and nomenclatural approach and is passing over to an indirect influence on personnel, such as education, the personnel policy and nomination for posts. The party will pursue its line through communists at state bodies and government organizations," he said.

"The state, financial, public prosecutor's and party control over the KGB work will continue and even increase in the process of formation of the rule-of-law state, and we are feeling it well," the KGB chief said.

He added that the mechanism of such control is envisaged both by the current legislation and a bill on the Soviet Committee for State Security under which the State Security Committee is accountable to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Soviet president and the USSR Council of Ministers. Besides, Kryuchkov emphasized that the KGB chief presents an annual report on the KGB activities to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The USSR Supreme Soviet committee for defense and state security periodically listens to reports of the KGB senior officials and heads of its structural departments. In accordance with their status, USSR people's deputies have a right to get information about the activities of the KGB and its bodies and troops.

"There can be no limits of glasnost in control over the work of highest bodies of state power and management," Kryuchkov said in conclusion. "As for an open discussion of the KGB activities and control over its work, including by the mass media means, we need a reasonable combination of glasnost and demands of conspiracy connected with the specific character of our work."

Holding Back on Exposing Stalin Harms CPSU

PM0504110190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Mar 90 Second Edition p 4

[Article by Viktor Belousov under the general heading "The Party and Perestroyka in Relation to the 28th CPSU Congress" carried under the "Discussion Sheet No. 19" rubric: "A Publicist's Comments: Working on Our Mistakes"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] It is not only pupils taking dictation who make mistakes. But it took perestroyka to make us us realize that top leaders are no exception here either. We have learned this from them themselves rather than by yet another Ilich anecdote. Self-criticism at such a level is a sign of undoubted improvements in our society. [passage omitted]

It used to be the case that everyone made mistakes EXCEPT....

Perestroyka has swept that bogus "except" away. There are no exceptions. Not the party, the central committee, the government, or any single individual. There must be no deception here. Either of oneself, or of others. What we have is real life, with its complexity and contradictions. And it has no grammar or syntax which, once revealed, will always ensure faultless operation. [passage omitted]

What mistakes? Was not the wrong person made party secretary in Volgograd? Was not the renovation of the dacha estate in Tavriya late getting under way? Was not a visit to the capital of a nearby union republic not overdue? Or is something more fundamental involved here? Most likely, it is. So name it, spell it out. Introduce some reassurance. [passage omitted]

But let people see for themselves that there is something concrete rather than something vague and woolly behind your acknowledgment that an error was "committed."

Convince the old Voronezh communist who, you will recall, three years back expressed his bewilderment to the editorial office that the report to the 20th congress on the cult of the personality had not yet been printed and that the party had "not shaken off Stalin" yet.

That report has, it is true, been published at last. But the second part of the question still awaits an answer today. The party's laggardness in perestroyka is an acknowledged fact. But no one seems to have noticed yet that this lag was predetermined. Yes, at the very time when renewal had already started influential people said to themselves and their entourages: "There will be no repeat of the 20th congress." Who said it. Where? Don't try to find it written down. Life and the course of life mistakenly prompt that kind of sentiment. Such a position would be understandable and acceptable if what was meant was a sensationalized and overdone expose of a recent idol. The 20th and 22d congresses transgressed by getting worked up in this way. But to say "there will be no repeat of the 20th congress" is tantamount to refusing again to put the figure of Stalin at the focus of the party's attention. As if everything had been analyzed and said at that time under Khrushchev. But since that well-known April, since the proclamation of "Democracy and Glasnost," God himself, so to speak, has ordered us to start with the person who for decades treated all and sundry in a highly idiosyncratic way. It is not just our set objective that demands this. The health of the party demands it, too.

A poet once coined the simile: "The party and Lenin are like twin brothers." But the party spent 30 years of its life under the leadership of Stalin. Thirty years! The question of the party and Stalin naturally arose. How did this happen here?! It is stupid to maintain that everybody was a free agent here. Stalin left his mark on the party. He penetrated its pores, blood, mindset, character, style, and spirit. His oppression was too great not to leave deep traces. That is precisely why it was impossible to hope that everything would clear up automatically in the course of renewal.

But people did, it seems, hope that. And the upshot was the party crisis. But what else could happen when the vernal sap was mixed with the noxious currents of Stalinism?

What is the point of arguing over whether readers of the party newspaper should be let in on the debates at central committtee plenums. Yippee! It happened. But what then? Silence. Again access was granted. But what does the future hold? Secrets again or boundless glasnost? If secrets, let us say once and for all: This was not instituted by us, such was the custom under Yosif Vissarionovich, we are merely observing tradition.

But let us remember the fervent condemnation at the plenum of one Central Committee member by a group of grassroots comrades. Let me make it clear straightaway: I have never thought there was nothing in Yeltsin to criticize. But why was it done so clumsily, so inopportunely, and by the least informed people? But on the other hand, it was coordinated. As if by command. The administrative edict system was anathematized from the rostrum. But it seemed, and not just to me, that it was present there on that same rostrum and operating to perfection. I wanted to ask which old safe this scenario had been taken out of. And why it had been preserved there not for meticulous historians, but "just in case." And this case was a nasty one and the discomfiture felt inevitable.

All this overhangs the party like a somber shadow. How could this occur? To use the phrase of our reader from Voronezh: If "you haven't shaken him off," what else can you expect?

It would be dishonest to claim that the party has not made progress in assessing Stalin over recent years. But three-four paragraphs in a speech heard by the country, for all their pithiness, are still only three-four paragraphs. It is not the analysis which the interests of perestroyka and the interests of the party itself demand. Add to this the fact that alongside the rejection of the "bad" in Stalin you also get: "but on the other hand...." Who summoned you here, dialectics? Is it really possible that, after having crossed this sea of blood, you have not grasped that it is better for you to keep quiet here and not look for the bright side in this countenance. A sea of blood! Human blood. And an ocean of tears. But....

But you will have heard people say: "Enough about Stalin!"

Okay, others have taken this up. People who consider it their duty as communists and citizens to restore the historical truth, to finish saying what has been started, and to deliver the party from the Stalinist legacy. But there are also people bent on denigrating the party. And the attitude of "That's enough.... There's work to be done" has played into the hands, the disreputable hands, of the latter.

I agree that it is enough if you have just have idle gossip in mind. But it is far from "enough" if you adopt another tack: If you investigate the matter in such a way as to get to the bottom of it! Absolutely. Leaving no grounds here for different interpretations when one person notes with satisfaction "it's been exposed" while another gloatingly says "there has been a cover-up." Different interpretations have occurred. There have been grounds for this. The party has been overtaken in the investigation of the actions and intentions—overt and covert—of Stalin. This has been exploited by those who would very much like the party to go no further in shaking off Stalin. Then it can be counted on that the mud thrown at Stalin will also bespatter the party. And then it will be possible to raise banners above the crowd reading "The CPSU Must Be Called to Account!;" "Down with the CPSU!"

All this should have been foreseen.

I do not know whether the mistake I describe figures among the recognized "mistakes." It seems to me it is unquestionably a mistake. And a gross one.

The word "perestroyka" issued forth from the lips of the party in capital letters. It signified: Under my leadership great mistakes were made. I am aware of this. I acknowledge this.

But what next?

Next we have to work on our mistakes. Patiently, consistently, persistently. But working on our mistakes has not been our strong suite. I can understand this as a human being. The work is not agreeable. And we do not have a lot of experience of it. When it has been trumpeted for decades that you have led "from victory to victory," that you are, it turns out, absolutely first-rate, what kind of mistakes can there be?!

Alas, there are enough of them. This has been acknowledged. How could it be otherwise when the mistakes are now marked not by a red pencil on a piece of paper but by red blood in the squares. The question of the party's attitude to mistakes is becoming all the more acute. Will we come clean in public? Or "will we say nothing for the sake of clarity?"

I have discovered no assurances in the Central Committee draft platform that the party is adopting an acutely critical attitude to its own activity, exposing the mistakes committed, or subjecting them to in-depth and comprehensive analysis.

That is dereliction. Or, to be more accurate, a mistake.

But we must know how to work on our mistakes. Otherwise instead of the good fortune promised to the people they will, so to speak, get a clipped ration card. It will have gone wrong. Yet again.

'Genocide' Crime Should Be Acknowledged in USSR

PM0504085190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 3 Apr 90 p 1

[A. Move article under the rubric "On the Subject of Parliamentary Debates": "Once More 'Article 6,' but a Different One"]

[Excerpts] I come across all sorts of terms when reading and rereading the tragic reports on the bloody events in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia: pogroms, murders, violence, hooligan extremism, fanning of nationalism.... There is just one term missing, the very term which describes the essence of what is happening and provides a truthful political and legal appraisal: genocide!

Yes, genocide, which is described all over the world and in all languages as the gravest of crimes, organically and inseparably linked with fascism. [passage omitted]

Way back in 1945 the Soviet Union signed the agreement setting up the International War Tribunal to try Nazi criminals, with the tribunal's charter being an inalienable part of that agreement. Article 6, paragraph E of Chapter II in that charter contains a precise definition of crimes against humanity.

The charter's general principles were reflected in the court's verdict at the Nuremberg trial and later on, in 1946, were reaffirmed by the well-known UN General Assembly resolution. It was under this law that not only Germany's Nazi war criminals, but also Japanese war criminals were and are tried. It was under the same law that Pol Pot and his stooges were sentenced (some of them in their absence) in Cambodia in 1980. This is how this question is resolved all over the world except, alas, in our own country, where the UN General Assembly resolution has not been implemented or incorporated in the Criminal Code to this day.

A similar situation prevails as regards another international convention—"On the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide and on the Punishment for It"—which was signed by the USSR 9 December 1948.

Surely, the bloody events in Sumgait, Dushanbe, and Fergana, the Baku pogroms, the expulsion of totally innocent people from their homes and beyond a republic's borders, all fall within the term of genocide?

All this is so, but the fact that the republics' criminal codes lack specific norms stipulating liability for genocide blocks any chance of applying this description to actions by those guilty of the gravest of crimes.

This flaw was not eliminated by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree dated 8 April 1989, which introduced amendments to article 11 of the Law on Criminal Liability for State Crimes, since this legislative act—insofar as the introduction of amendments to Article 74 of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Criminal Code and the corresponding articles in other republics' criminal codes is concerned—failed to resolve questions of criminal liability for the perpetration on the basis of genocide of grave crimes such as murder, pogroms, rape, grievous bodily harm, and the destruction of property.

All this goes to demonstrate once more the results of a scornful attitude toward the international pacts we have signed. The United States, for example, has a law (Article 6 of the Constitution) which essentilly states that all international pacts signed by the United States are mandatory for observance by courts in all states. We, unfortunately, have no such law. Maybe it should be enshrined in the Constitution, and then such most grave crimes as crimes against humanity, as crimes of genocide, will not be dubbed "hooliganism" or "abuse of office" but will be properly classified precisely for what they are—crimes against humanity, genocide. With the application of the severest measures of punishment and without the application of any amnesties or statutes of limitation.

Aeroflot-Lufthansa Establish Joint Venture

LD0604051190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1157 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 5 Apr (TASS)—The Sheremetyevo-1 airport near Moscow, which has for a quarter of a century served the USSR's domestic services, will in the next few years be thoroughly reconstructed. It will retain its previous domestic functions, but it has been decided on its basis to build also a new international airport. Together with Sheremetyevo-2, it will be able to handle 15-18 million passengers annually and will become "the world's most modern airport."

Such are the intentions of the leaders of two countries' airlines—the Sovit Aeroflot and the West German Lufthansa companies—who have decided to set up a joint enterprise to design, reconstruct, and operate Sheremetyevo-1. In Moscow today they signed an agreement and named their brainchild Aeroflot-Lufthansa and Partner. The volume of investments in the joint work being planned is impressive, namely, 750 million Deutsche Marks.

The document, which both sides in the presence of journalists called an "historic" one, was signed by Vladimir Potapov, deputy general director of the Central Directorate for International Air Services, and Heinz Ruhnau, chairman of the Board of Deutsche Lufthansa AG.

On the motives for the creation of the joint enterprise Vladimir Potapov said the volume of air transportation in the USSR is increasing annually by 12-15 percent. Sheremetyevo-1 has been overloaded for many years now. The Sheremetyevo-2 international airport, which marked its tenth anniversary on 3 April, has also exhausted its potential. Last year it handled 6.2 million passengers, which is above its handling capacity.

The project to be implemented by the joint enterprise in addition to the reconstruction of Sheremetyevo-1 provides for the construction of a new international terminal and subsequently possibly several terminals and the building of a cargo complex, a hotel and hangars for all classes of wide-fuselaged aircraft. In the longer term, Vladimir Potapov noted, the enterprise will be able, if there is a requirement, to build new airports both in the USSR and abroad.

Changes in Trade Unions' Role Noted

LD0504170390 Moscow TASS in English 1356 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 5 TASS—The reorganization in the working-class movement has led to a substantial change of the role and place of trade unions in society, Gennadiy Yanayev, deputy chairman of the Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions (AUCCTU), told TASS.

They have developed from an organic element of the administrative command system into an independent public structure with a clear-cut principled position, he said.

This process was not easy or speedy, Yanayev said. Heated debates, the clash of opinions and the search for paths of renewal have continued for more than two years at various levels. The acceleration of the process was promoted by the working-class's spontaneous movement, which at times assumed quite acute forms, right up to industrial stoppages.

The working-class movement for the first time, perhaps, put the question squarely before trade union bodies: Either trade unions radically reorganize or workers would create different structures to uphold their rights and social interests.

Protecting workers' rights and interests is now a priority with trade unions, Yanayev said. Trade unions have ceased to be a convenient partner for party and economic bodies.

The attitude taken up by trade unions in connection with the increase in wholesale prices of diesel fuel, goods transportation tariffs and electricity charges may serve as a specific example of that.

When it became clear that millions of workers would have their real wages reduced and that the enterprises' funds for the implementation of social programs, including housing construction, would shrink, the AUCCTU resolutely came out in defense of the working people's interests.

Yanayev cited another example when an attempt was made to sell consumer goods, which are in demand on a mass scale, at auctions or through commercial shops at increased prices.

AUCCTU representatives reminded the government of its guarantees to the people that it would not raise the prices of consumer goods. The persistent and principled stand taken by trade unions on these matters prevailed, Yanayev said.

'Blue' Movement Holds Inaugural Congress

LD0404100690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0400 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Text] As you have probably noticed already, different parties and social organizations are appearing on the political horizon of our country in the present times. And, as it happened, among them there are also: The Blues. Bokan, ph.d., has stressed at the inauguration congress of the Blue movement, the all-union public organization for the social ecology of man through the creativity of the masses, that the movement will be developing in two directions. From the one side—the humanitarian and educational aim, i.e. promotion of creativity. The second direction—practical support for socially important projects, initiatives, and innovations. A representative group of members of the public and a wide circle of state, social, and religious organizations and departments are acting as the founders of the new organization.

Draft CPSU Documents Suggested

PM0604090590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Apr 90 Second Edition p 4

[Feature comprising letter from N. Zubov and Yu. Popov, members of the "Party Democratization" action group at "Nauchnyy Tsentr" Scientific Research Institute; text of Provisional Status of CPSU Congress Delegates; text of Mechanism of Party Referendums in the CPSU; and PRAVDA commentary, under the general heading "Discussion Sheet No. 20: The Party and Perestroyka in Relation to the 28th CPSU Congress"]

[Text] **From Guidelines to Practice**

The drafts of the Central Committee Platform and the new CPSU Statutes offer broad opportunities for the democratization of the party and the affirmation in it of power vested not in the apparatus as before, but in the party masses. At the moment, however, these opportunities have been formulated only at the level of condensed theses and political guidelines. What form should the practical mechanism for their implementation take? A full answer to this question has not been given. Clearly, only practice and the initiative of communists themselves can provide that answer.

In view of that, the members of the "Party Democratization" action group at "Nauchnyy Tsentr" Scientific

Research Institute together with Moscow's Zelenogradskiy CPSU Rayon Committee [raykom], are submitting their proposals on key questions affecting the direct participation by all communists in the elaboration and implementation of party policy.

Much, it seems to us, will depend on the implementation of the new and more democratic procedure for the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and on their active participation in its work. And on whether they will have the ability to embark on a radical reform of the party, without which, in our view, its prestige and influence cannot be maintained.

The provisional status of congress delegates should be urgently examined and approved at a Central Committee plenum. By sending their envoys to the congress, communists will be able to make a conscious choice, clearly and unambiguously showing the responsibility and duties that delegates bear and the guarantees of their fulfillment, that is, the rights and powers of the delegate. Candidate delegates should also be clearly aware of the degree of their responsibility to the communists who elected them, and of their tasks. The power of the party masses as declared in the CPSU Central Committee Platform will be exercised in practice through congress delegates.

A party referendum mechanism is also needed as the supreme and most democratic form for communists to express their opinions in the period of the party's radical perestroyka. This mechanism is extraordinarily important, bearing in mind in particular the sharp polarization of opinions on questions of party reform which surfaced at recent Central Committee plenums and in the precongress discussion. For example, unless we hold a party-wide referendum, we will not be able to make decisions on a number of most important and fundamental questions of the Statutes (the formation of elective party organs, party finances, and so on) corresponding to the opinion of the majority of communists and ensuring in practice the conscious and "democratic unity of party ranks."

We submit for discussion our suggested provisions on the provisional status of CPSU Congress delegates and a party referendum mechanism.

In conclusion, we would note that Moscow's Zelenogradskiy CPSU Raykom plenum supported these documents and the need to submit the aforementioned questions to a CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

[Signed] N. Zubov and Yu. Popov, members of the "Party Democratization" action group at "Nauchnyy Tsentr" Scientific Research Institute, Zelenograd.

Provisional Status of CPSU Congress Delegates

1. General provisions

Implementation of the functions of collegial democratic management of the party by a congress or all-union conference (hereinafter referred to as the congress) of delegates is based on each delegate's active participation in its work, a process in which they resolve the most important general party questions, adopt party documents and decisions, and monitor the work of the supreme party organs and the party press.

Delegates are guided in their activity by the interests and instructions of the communists electing them, and are responsible and directly accountable to them.

A delegate receives his mandate through being elected from a party electoral district on the basis of equal and direct suffrage in a secret ballot for a term of five years, and exercises that mandate without interruption of his production or official activity. A delegate who fails to justify the voters' trust may be recalled ahead of schedule.

The delegate, as a member of the party's supreme organ, enjoys the full range of rights ensuring his active participation in the activity of the congress and in ad hoc and standing commissions and other organs formed by it, bears obligations toward the congress, and fulfills the instructions of the congress or its organs if they are not contrary to congress decisions.

2. The delegate is obliged:

—to attend sessions of the congress and its organs to which he has been elected and to participate actively in their work;

—to inform communists regularly on the work of the congress and its organs, the fulfillment of their decisions and voters' instructions, and also his pre-election program;

—to regularly study communists' opinions and, on the basis of a generalization of them, to produce proposals for the congress and its organs and commissions and for other party organs in his district;

—to promote the political activeness of communists both in the process of discussing draft decisions prepared by congress organs and in the shaping of grassroot decisions with a view to their subsequent conscientious fulfillment;

—to report back on his work at least once a year at electoral district meetings (conferences).

3. The delegate has the right:

—to elect and be elected to congress organs;

—to cast a full vote on all questions examined at a session of an organ of which he is an elected member;

—to a consultative vote in sessions of party organs to which he has not been elected;

—to submit draft decisions and amendments, proposals, suggestions, and delegate's questions; to participate in debates;

—to express an opinion on the personnel of organs created by the congress;

—to request an account or report at a session from any organ or party leader or to call for a vote of confidence in them;

—to join standing and ad hoc delegates' groups formed on the basis of a unity of platforms;

—to call for and take part in an investigation of the work of party organizations and their elected organs in his district, rayon, city, oblast, or republic (hereinafter referred to as region);

—to preferential use of radio and television slots paid for by party organs and also to publication in the party press, both centrally and regionally, for statements on his activity as a deputy;

—to take part in the examination by party organs and organizations of the district (rayon) of any questions affecting the interests of his voters;

—to investigate communists' complaints on his own initiative and to be given the necessary information by party organs, and to submit his proposals on them to the congress and its organs and to other party organs in his region;

—to hold meetings and conferences of the district's voters and meetings with primary organizations; to participate in sessions of the party organs of his region;

—to invite representatives of any party organs in the region to take part in meetings with communists;

—to monitor the examination of proposals and complaints from communists in the district sent to party organs in the region and to personally participate in their examination;

—to appeal to any party organ in his region on questions relating to delegate's activity.

4. Guarantees of delegate's activity

The performance of the delegate's duties and the exercise of his rights are guaranteed by the congress and its organs, the rayon committee and party committees of the district's organizations, specifically with regard to the provision of premises, the organization of meetings with voters, the use of organizational facilities and transport, informational backup, consultations, and other measures to assist the delegate.

Party organs in a region must immediately examine a delegate's questions and appeals and assist him in his monitoring activity.

The exercise of the right to prior publication of a delegate's materials is guaranteed by the chief editors of the corresponding party publications.

Mechanism of Party Referendums in the CPSU

1. Partywide, republic, kray, oblast, city, rayon, and primary referendums are held respectively on the initiative of:

—a CPSU congress, a republic Communist Party congress, a kray, oblast, city, or rayon conference, or a meeting of the primary party organization;

—CPSU Central Committee plenums, republic Communist Party Central Committee plenums, and plenums of kraykoms [kray committees], obkoms [oblast committees], gorkoms [city committees], raykoms, and primary organization party committees;

—the chairman of the CPSU, first secretaries of republic Communist Party Central Committees, kraykoms, obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms, and secretaries of party committees;

—at least one-tenth of the delegates to a CPSU congress, republic Communist Party congress, or kray, oblast, city, or rayon conferences, or one-tenth of the communists in a primary party organization.

2. Referendum proposals are sent to the relevant party committee which, no more than 15 days later, will adopt a resolution announcing the referendum and will publish a questionnaire with questions and multiple choice answers in the party press.

3. The form of the referendum will be at the discretion of the relevant party organization (with secret or open voting). The counting of votes will be organized by a democratically elected tellers' commission.

4. The final results of the referendum will be published in the party press at the relevant level, and the relevant party committees and conferences will make decisions on them aimed at implementing the option chosen by the majority of communists.

5. The referendum will be valid if the necessary majority—at least two-thirds of communists registered with the party organization at the appropriate level—takes part.

Our Commentary

In publishing the drafts proposed by Zelenograd communists, the editorial office works on the assumption that, in preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress, it is important to provide the fullest scope for our party's members to display initiative. It is probable that not everything in these proposals deserves support, many of them may be formulated more concisely. We await readers' responses, critical comments, and new ideas on the practical implementation of the slogan on the affirmation of the power of the party masses within the CPSU.

Economic

USSR Considering Closing Unprofitable Factories

AU0504124790 Paris AFP in English 1220 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 5 (AFP)—Moscow is considering closing loss-making factories, which may account for a third of all national entreprises, according to Soviet Finance Minister Valentin Pavlov. As an alternative to shutting them, some loss-making plants could be sold to foreigners who, under recently-introduced legislation, now have a right to own property in the Soviet Union, the minister told Interfax, a Moscow-Radio publication.

"To achieve a transition to a plan-and-market economy, we must get rid of inefficient enterprises. They must be allowed to go broke and they must be put in the hands of their own staffs, the staffs of other enterprises or foreign investors," he added. "We are prepared to sell them (foreigners) some of our enterprises which must be rebuilt or upgraded (...) We are prepared to introduce an open economy to enable our (foreign) partners to do their own business while promoting perestroika at the same time," the minister said, pointing to the need to boost consumer goods production. Foreigners would be allowed to reinvest profits in the Soviet Union. Export goods could be sold for hard currency or foreigners could be allowed to convert their rubles, at currency auctions, for example, Mr. Pavlov said.

Legislation needed for introduction of a plan-and-market economy will probably be considered by parliament in June, but some measures could be introduced sooner by presidential decree, Mr. Pavlov said.

The minister acknowledged that economic reform is bound to create unemployment and hardship with rising inflation, but "it is through pain that convalescence may be achieved". Mr. Pavlov suggested that prices should reflect market forces, with the government assisting those on low incomes with cash bonuses. Pay would go up by 11.5 per cent this year, he said. The minister acknowledged that too much cash is currently chasing too few goods, but he estimated that out of the current R400 billion of public savings, no more than 15 to 30 billion rubles could be considered as excess money supply. Current economic reforms are a result of the breakdown of the old economic system rather than political calculation, he said.

"There's no bringing back the old run-down mechanism that we have rejected in its pure form (...), for the buttress of that mechanism was fear. [no closing quotes as received] "It is doomed, and not because of someone's whim or because someone introduced perestroika and triggered the consequences (...) If there were no perestroika in the first place, it would still have to be invented because this has been made necessary by the development of our society," he said.

State Commission Official on Economic Agenda

PM0504141390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Interview with A. Orlov, deputy chairman of a USSR Council of Ministers State Commission, by own correspondent V. Romanyuk under the rubric "At the USSR Council of Ministers": "In Order to Accelerate Reform"—date and place unspecified, first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers has adopted the resolution "On the Preparation of the Materials Needed To Implement the Transition to a Planned Market Economy." Analysis of the actual sociopolitical situation in the country, the resolution states, shows that there is an urgent need to bring forward the dates and to clarify the planned phases for implementing the economic reform and, above all, accelerating the transition to a planned market economy. Attention is drawn to the tight timetable: The program should be elaborated before 10 April 1990 and the draft legislative and normative acts on the list should be presented for examination by 1 May. The list contains 12 draft laws, 3 draft Supreme Soviet resolutions, and 14 draft USSR Council of Ministers resolutions.

IZVESTIYA's correspondent asked A. Orlov, deputy chairman of a USSR Council of Ministers State Commission, to comment on this highly unusual document.

[Romanyuk] Does this mean we're moving toward a market?

[Orlov] There is a very strong view that we should return to the 1985 position, tried and tested methods, and known means. The administrative edict system has still not been destroyed and there is still great nostalgia for the past. All the more so as the crisis is still getting worse: In January-February 1990 total national income fell by approximately one percent, commodity output is falling, and incomes have surged once again—by 14-15 percent compared with the same period last year. Now is just the time to choose our subsequent political decisions.

[Romanyuk] All the more so as confidence in the government continues to decline...

[Orlov] That's not nice to hear. Many people in the government realize that the steps being taken could be one of the last opportunities to win that trust back.

[Romanyuk] But in that case the measures should be radical enough to involve the broad masses of working people.

[Orlov] It is important, however, to see the consequences which the market could bring in its wake. To that end, the experience of the organization of social market economies in the FRG, Japan, Sweden, and Poland (the "shock therapy" experience) has been studied in depth.

It is easier to found a market in healthy economic conditions without an overall deficit. We do not enjoy such conditions. And destructive forces are sowing the idea that our government is weak and incapable of carrying out economic reform. With this package of draft laws the government intends to demonstrate its resolve to move perestroyka forward more vigorously. The very titles of the draft laws reveal a great deal: "On Freedom of Economic Activity and the Development of Enterprise," "On the Foundations of Antimonopoly Legislation in the USSR," "On Foreign Investment on Soviet Territory," "On Taxation in Kind in the Rural Economy," and others. Taken as a whole, the drafts create an entirely new economic environment.

The question of amendments to the Law on the State Enterprise—specifically, the abandonment of elected directors—is being raised once again. Under the new conditions enterprises are acquiring greater freedom in their entrepreneurial activity. New factors include the elaboration of the status of leaders for state enterprises, and of a code of entrepreneurial honor for cooperatives. Amendments are also envisaged to the Law on the Cooperative System—specifically, to put a stop to the transformation of credit funds into ready cash and to stipulate unified current accounts and priorities in resource provision for cooperatives working on state prices.

[Romanyuk] To sum up the decisions contained in the new draft laws, what goals are we aiming for?

[Orlov] Let's start with social protection for the population. An important question is the problem of indexing the population's income. Should we do this on an individual basis or on the basis of the entire wages fund? Entirely new problems could emerge in this area, including problems connected with unemployment. And immediately a chain of new issues crops up: How are we going to set up a social work system? What systems should there be to support the unemployed? Should there be subsidies for the poor or help for the homeless?

Prices are the quickest regulator. They are transformed into income, savings, and capital investment. In Sweden prices are relatively high, but there is a clever mechanism of compensation and social support. Swedes say with a lot of weight that their production is capitalism, but their distribution is socialism. That is near to the truth. In principle the restructuring of the pricing system should ensure equilibrium in the market. The most complex part of the program is price reform. Whether we like it or not, the problem will have to be solved. After, needless to say, we have calculated all the necessary compensation for population groups on low or fixed incomes, bearing in mind the possible reactions of different population groups.

[Romanyuk] So just what are we talking about—direct price rises, the establishment of balanced prices (which many specialists are campaigning for), or a fundamental restructuring of the pricing system?

[Orlov] We need to change the structure of prices and their level in all areas—from fuel to metal. While raising the question of purchase prices we also need to solve the issue of retail prices. The government resolution on the stabilization of the consumer market solves the problem within the 1990 framework. Prices of socially important goods will remain unchanged. As for a number of the main food items and the situation in 1991 as a whole, various options are evident: Will the coupon system be retained in distributing meat and a number of other products to people on low incomes? Or will meat prices be raised to market levels, but with compulsory full compensation for less well-off population groups?

[Romanyuk] You talk about all this as if it had already been decided.

[Orlov] No, I'm only talking about one possible "scenario" in this complex process. The Supreme Soviet will have to decide. Incidentally, the Supreme Soviet is currently discussing draft laws on taxing the profits (income) of enterprises and the population's personal income. There are alternative drafts. These must be "brought together" to give us something to choose from. Not everything is clear as regards the cooperative system. Average monthly wages at the moment are R240-260 for workers, around R200 for kolkhoz [collective farm] members, and R500-600 for cooperative members. That is disproportionate! It means that we need state regulation. Just as in the system of loan interest rates, where we have to ensure that credit is no longer free but starts to pay its way. This will enable us to use it to influence structural changes in the national economy.

[Romanyuk] The package also includes draft resolutions on specific issues—the organization of food supplies to the population under conditions of market relations, social protection for less well-off citizens during the transition to market relations, and changes to the 1990 plan and budget.

[Orlov] As you are aware, the Supreme Soviet has ratified the 1990 budget with a deficit half the size of 1989—R60 billion. But the 1989 deficit was not R120 billion, as had been thought, but only R92 billion—this means that the budget deficit could be reduced.

[Romanyuk] What is radical about that, Andrey Vladimirovich? You merely mentioned the Polish option of "shock therapy"—the immediate transition to the market. The press is full of reports about that bold step: Initially prices skyrocketed, but now they're creeping down.

[Orlov] In Poland there is great consolidation around the government—that is a very important factor. But I would not jump to optimistic conclusions: There have not yet been any profound structural changes in the Polish economy—that will take more than just one year. One way or another the discussion boils down to the problems of the consumer market. But there are other markets—in the means of production, capital, labor, and so forth. You sometimes get the impression that if we achieve outward equilibrium on the consumer market everything will be OK. That's a very dangerous illusion. It waylaid us in 1965, when outward appearances were taken to mean that there was equilibrium in the economy.

But it is important to see something else in Poland too: People's motivation is changing. They have started consuming less, but they are sure about their future, they want to increase production efficiency and move the economy into a new state. So it is very important for us to change people's motivation and move interests out of just the distribution sphere. Interest, incentive, demand—all three should work to this end.

On the whole, the package could be rejected, and the team ready to fight for radical reform could be dispersed. But the necessary experience on the basis of which we can move forward would be obtained. I admit that society could reject the market option and lean toward strong administrative measures. The way we move forward—in a balanced and cautious way or resolutely and boldly—is a question of political choice. But we must exped up the decision.

Economic Observer Views Poor Industrial Figures

*PM0404124390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
3 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1*

[Article by economic observer Vasiliy Parfenov under the "Viewpoint" rubric: "Perfidious Minus Sign"]

[Text] For the first time in many decades the USSR State Committee for Statistics summary reports contained figures for our production growth with a minus sign. Of course we can console ourselves with the thought that statistics are no longer concealing the unpleasant truth from us. But that does not make us any happier. In the first two months of this year (there are as yet no figures for the first quarter) industrial production output in the country declined one percent compared with the same period last year. That is on average throughout the country. But in the Azerbaijan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] the decline is measured in tens of percentage points, in the Armenian SSR it is 15.9 percent, and in the Georgian SSR 8.8 percent.

To reveal the immediate reason for the production decline you do not need a microscope, it is on the surface. The mass strikes in the Transcaucasus republics, primarily Azerbaijan, dealt a grave blow to the entire system of production ties. Throughout nearly all of January many plants and factories in this republic were not working, so they had a production shortfall of R334 million.

Among the disrupted orders there is a very large number of subassemblies which plants in other republics were waiting for impatiently. Because of this the chain of production disruptions swept across the whole country like a convulsion in the body of a sick man. In January alone direct losses of working time because of strikes totalled 4.5 million man-days. That was 62 percent of the time losses for all of the previous year.

The second superficial reason for the "negative growth" is the continuing decline of contract discipline. "If I want I shall conclude an economic contract for the delivery of components and if I don't want I shan't"—that is how many plant leaders argue, often relying on the support of labor collective councils. "Bring a stock of bricks without the plan and we will sell you a stock of saw logs also without a plan." These "direct ties" are gradually becoming the rule. And in the existing situation even tearful appeals to the center do not help. Neither the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee] nor the Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply] nor the ministries can call the suppliers to order by their usual method of pressing administrative levers.

This year according to the state plan it is proposed to increase the production of consumer goods by R66 billion compared with last year. Many economists seriously doubt the possibility of achieving this. The government has assured us that the plans are stepped up but realistic and balanced and they can be fulfilled. But what is happening in practice? The first three months of the year have passed yet the enterprises have still not concluded contracts for the delivery of goods worth a total of tens of billions of rubles.

There is one more dangerous trend leading to the minus "growth" of production output manifested increasingly graphically recently—brand new plants for the production of consumer goods work "so-so": There is a shortage of personnel with the relevant training, the technology has not been worked out, and construction shortcomings have not been eliminated. Here are two typical examples. A large-panel house construction plant was commissioned in Tashkent two years ago. It is capable of erecting housing covering 160,000 square meters every year. There is a shortage of housing in the republic yet to this day, the USSR State Committee for Statistics reports, the new plant is working at nine percent of its capacity. The new factory in Poti City can produce 6 million sewn and knitted articles a year and it is the second year since it was commissioned, yet the enterprise's capacities have been assimilated only 11 percent.

The "greens"—various informal associations fighting for a clean atmosphere—have now dealt a no less palpable blow to plants. Ecological problems in our country have accumulated over decades. Now we are having to pay. Grown wise from the bitter experience of chronic disruptions of the plans and program for commissioning nature conservation projects, the public is increasingly frequently raising the question extremely toughly: closing down "dirty" plants and no talking. It is unproductive to blame people for fighting for the right to breathe clean air. Only by radically changing the attitude toward ecological problems and making them the real focus of attention at all levels of management of the economy—from USSR Council of Ministers to enterprise—is it possible to suppress the wave of production stoppages. Meanwhile it is gathering strength. And this too is reducing production output.

With this attitude toward our common cause it is of course not possible rapidly to fill the stores with goods. You cannot make machine tools work and you will not be sated with a policy alone, even the most correct policy. Soviet power is not a profession. You also have to work. Otherwise the perfidious horizontal "minus" sign in the USSR State Committee for Statistics summary reports will bring us all down.

Scientific

12 Apr Launch Set for New Space Module

LD0404202690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Text] There is a report from the Flight Control Center. The final preparations for the launch of a new module to the 'Mir' orbital complex are being concluded at the Baykonur cosmodrome. A 20-tonne scientific laboratory for experiments in space technology is now at the space vehicle assembly complex. The launch is planned for 12 April, though postponement is possible.

Cosmonauts Continue Experiments Aboard Mir

LD0504130190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1423 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 4 April (TASS)—During the fifth main expedition on Mir, the Soviet long-term orbital complex, cosmonauts Aleksandr Viktorenko and Aleksandr Serebrov obtained 297 grams of gallium arsenide on the Gallar plant [ustanovka]. Yevgeniy Markov, chairman of the "Scientific Center" scientific production association of the city of Zelenograd reported this.

As the USSR Glavkosmos told a TASS correspondent, the price of such materials on the world market fluctuates from one to $3.5 million per kilogram. Soviet scientists are now carrying out an analysis of that valuable composite.

The national space program of the Soviet Union on orbital technology runs up to 1994. Its main thrust is to obtain semiconductor materials in space conditions for their further use in microelectronics and radio technology.

As Yevgeniy Markov said, the crew of the sixth main expedition—Anatoliy Solovev and Aleksandr Balandin—are now continuing experiments on the Gallar plant.

In the words of Aleksandr Dunayev, chief of the USSR Glavkosmos, the possibilities for continuing work on space technology are expanding considerably because of the launch of the Kirstall technological module which is to become a component part of the Mir orbital complex. He said that its launch is planned for 18 April [as received] of this year.

Military

Service in Internal Troops Changing

LD0504165790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1424 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Moscow, 5 April. (TASS)—Internal troops of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry have been given the right to recruit conscript soldiers and sergeants into their subunits on a voluntary basis, IZVESTIYA reports today. They will conclude contracts with them, in accordance with which they will start paying wages. [passage omitted]

Subunits already exist which are composed fully of ensigns, recalled the general. They protect important state installations. People serve there who have considerable experience serving in the forces. They receive wages and have an excellent command of their business. Such experience merits attention, although it also requires additional working up.

You see, there are also minuses for all the pluses. These units are not mobile. They are slow. Ensigns live in apartments in various parts of towns. They all have families and children. The system of contracting will be of help precisely in this area.

Either a man due for call-up, or a soldier or a segeant who is already called up, can sign a contract. When the term runs out he can, if he wishes, extend the service. A military serviceman who has signed such a document is obliged to undergo more serious training in his military specialist field.

These military servicemen will be granted permission to go on leave from their unit in civilian clothing, and more comfortable living conditions will be created. At present four regiments have been selected that fulfill various tasks and in which we wish to conduct an experiment.

Krivosheyev Argues for Victory Parade

PM0404160990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with G. Krivosheyev, deputy chief of general staff of the USSR Armed Forces, by Major Yu. Rubtsov, editor of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's military history section: "Victory Parade: What Will It Be Like?"; date and place of interview not stated]

[Excerpt] [Rubtsov] Grigory Fedotovich, our talk is the direct result of the numerous letters reaching both the editorial office and, as far as I know, the General Staff. Their theme is the same—the forthcoming 9 May victory parade—but the authors' positions are different.

"The victory parade is essential. It will be a great memory for our children," is the opinion of Hero of the Soviet Union Kh. Dachiyev from Gudermes, Chechen-Ingush ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]. It is shared by war and labor veteran I. Siritsa, who lives in

Kharkov Oblast, and by I. Grekun from Kaliningrad Oblast and G. Chmykhunov from Nikolayev Oblast, who both took part in the 1945 victory parade.

But here is the directly opposite position: "Military parades are a tribute to ostentation." That is the opinion of I. Kopytovskiy from Kaliningrad. V. Ladygin from Dnepropetrovsk is in solidarity with him: "Who needs it? There is chaos in the country, the stores are empty, and we will show the tramping of soldiers' boots on Red Square."

What is your opinion, Grigoriy Fedotovich?

[Krivosheyev] I personally support the idea of holding a military parade on the 45th anniversary of our great victory over fascism. And I am naturally distressed that some people underestimate the importance of this military ritual celebrated even by our ancestors to mark the victories of Russian arms.

It is well known that triumphal processions of troops were eliminated back under Aleksandr Nevskiy. But under Peter I the celebration of not a single anniversary of some "victory" or other passed without ceremonial marches of regiments under banners to a march tune.

[Rubtsov] And it is obvious that they did not resort to this ritual for fun.

[Krivosheyev] The irreplaceable educational influence of military parades was understood by those who stood at the sources of the Red Army. The 1 May 1918 parade of Moscow Garrison troops was evidence of that. I think that should not be forgotten.

But I accept as a reality the fact that some people are opposed to the present parade. For our society in the process of renewal it is natural that people are debating and expressing their opinion on a question which until recently was considered axiomatic. Well, let's debate and argue our position.

[Rubtsov] To judge by the letters people are primarily concerned by the economic aspect of the matter. "It is difficult to calculate how much the rehearsals for the parade and the parade itself will cost," Captain Second Class A. Aksenov (retired) writes from Sevastopol, for instance. "This pleasure costs the country and people dear. Yet meanwhile the chief hospital of the Black Sea Fleet is expiring from lack of beds." "Instead of a parade which will cost 'a pretty penny,' we should increase pensions for war veterans, who are essentially living in poverty," suggest N. Drobyshev, a frontline veteran from Zhitomir Oblast.

[Krivosheyev] It is hard to disagree that there is a mass of shortcomings in the social sphere. But it is possible to dispute that it is expenditure on holding celebrations which serve as an obstacle in, for instance, increasing pensions. And there is no reason for Comrade Aksenov to write that it is difficult to calculate this expenditure. I shall cite the following figures. On the basis of the experience of previous years about R1 million have been spent on the military parade. This sum includes expenditure on the shipment, accommodation, and feeding of personnel and on the servicing and fuelling of equipment. For instance, we have to pay for leasing the land and premises where people live and prepare for the parade. And take the question of preparing plaster casts of the Combat Banners. Rime does not spare the originals, you cannot go out on parade with them.

Since the parade expected 9 May this year will not be entirely usual, but will have a "digression" into history, additional expenses will be required on servicing equipment from the times of the war and on sewing uniforms of those years.

In addition to the parade of troops, festive salutes and firework displays will be held in Moscow, in the capitals of the union republics, in hero-cities, and in the cities where the headquarters of military districts and fleets are situated. From the experience of previous years a further R370,000 will be spent on this.

Is this a lot or a little? My opponents will perhaps rapidly calculate how many apartments could be constructed with this money or how many additional hospital beds could be brought in. But I would urge them to take a broader look at the question. The parade of troops and people's festive procession and the salute are all important elements of the celebration of our historic victory. In June 1945 we did not have an easier material life, but we did not grudge the money. It is impossible to measure in rubles the spiritual elation which to this day, I am sure, the former frontline soldiers and representatives of more recent generations gain from the ceremony.

[Rubtsov] Grigory Fedotovich, who determines the procedure for holding the festivities and the list of cities where salutes and firework displays are held?

[Krivosheyev] I must say immediately, particularly to those who, like the above-mentioned I. Kopytovskiy, see in the parades evidence of the extravagance of the Armed Forces leadership, that the army acts here only as the executor of the state authorities' decisions.

By its 1 October 1980 decree the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium determined the list of cities where parades of troops (as a rule on the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution), salutes, and firework displays are held. It should be noted that the number of salutes and firework displays has now been reduced and they are now held nine times a year.

It is curious that many people, conversely, are calling for the expansion of the number of cities whose evening skies would be lit up by fireworks on holidays. Thus, Yu. Turutin from Gorkiy and A. Yachmenev from Krasnoyarsk ask on what grounds their cities have been bypassed in that sense while USSR People's Deputy A. Sidorov, on behalf of the veteran public of Sverdlovsk, asks that "the rights to a ceremonial salute" should not be taken from his fellow countrymen, who fear that the abolition of the Urals Military District may involuntarily diminish "the importance of the Urals' contribution to the attainment of Victory."

We have pluralism of opinions, as they say. [passage omitted]

Baltic Republics

TASS Carries Lithuanian Reply to Gorbachev

LD0604121690 Moscow TASS in English 1149 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Text] Vilnius Apr 6 TASS—By TASS special correspondent Aleksandr Budris:

The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet replied on Thursday to President Gorbachev's address to it and to the Lithuanian people.

"Deeply esteemed president,

Your address to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic and to the Lithuanian people was received with great attention and with a desire to understand your viewpoint," the reply says. "We realise that Lithuania's resolution to rejoin the family of independent nations causes concerns to the Soviet Union and to you personally, honourable president.

"You correctly evaluate the situation as complicated, requiring thorough discussion and mutually-acceptable decisons. We highly appreciate all your efforts to solve the problem peacefully, but some questions linked with your position are not quite clear to us. Lithuania is prepared, as before, to take part in an honest dialogue, but it should not be accompanied by arbitrary actions of your armed forces. This is why we propose immediate primary bilateral consultations to clarify the stands of both sides on matters concerning them.

"You know that the problem of Lithuania was not engendered by Lithuania. Lithuania is merely exercising its inalienable right. The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet is prepared to discuss the essence and letter of the acts and decisions passed by the republic's Supreme Soviet from the viewpoint both of international law and the USSR Constitution.

"You know also that Lithuania offers and is ready to maintain the present economic relations, cultural and human contacts with the USSR. We believe that you, honourable president, will prefer a political settlement of the problem to all others. The Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian republic again reaffirms its readiness to open a dialogue and to discuss measures to establish new inter-state relations between us.

[Signed] Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic."

Report Links Lithuania's Prunskiene to KGB

LD0504232290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2007 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Our special correspondent has just sent in a report from Vilnius.

[Begin recording] [Video shows man standing in a street holding a microphone and a newspaper] [A. Barkhatov, correspondent, identified by caption] The Lithuanian newspaper RESPUBLIKA calls itself and independent paper. It is precisely here that there appeared a copy of a document saying that, when going abroad previously, Prime Minister Prunskiene was subjected to careful checking by the Committee for State Security [KGB]. [video shows close-up of the paper's front page, which reproduces the document]

The document supposedly indicates that Prunskiene was a part-time employee of the Committee for State Security. Of course, the publication of the document can be used for some provocative purposes, especially since it could discredit none other than the prime minister. I think the essence of the question and an unambiguous answer will be clear from our meeting in the Lithuanian Committee for State Security.

[Video shows people buying newspapers; Barkhatov interviewing A.I. Ruksenas, head of the Lithuanian press bureau, identified by screen caption]

[Ruksenas] We regard this document and the following article featured here [he opens the newspaper] by the editor...

[Barkhatov, interrupting] About Prunskiene?

[Ruksenas] Yes...by the paper's editor, (Vitas Tomkus), as a total forgery. The reference here was not just to Prime Minister Prunskiene's personality as a woman and as a person, but also as a leader, as the leader of the republic's government, who, during the future talks, will certainly conduct a dialogue on both economic and political questions in Moscow, and so a blow has certainly been struck by this forgery.

[Barkhatov] People in Lithuania are now arguing about what this was—a scandalous provocation, or a manifestation of today's freedom of press. [end recording]

Allegations Rejected

LD0604005990 Vilnius International Service in English 2200 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] The Soviet Union is stepping up its fierce campaign against Lithuania, who reasserted its independence on the 11 March. This includes the regular circling of military helicopters and planes above towns and cities, several large-scale demonstrations of military convoys, the occupation of buildings, the abduction of people, and dissemination of slander and allegations. All this, plus the constant pressure exerted on Lithuania by its occupants and collaborators, has not put it off from the path it has chosen.

Several days ago Mr. Vytautas Landsbergis, the chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council warned parliamentarians against the possible use of blackmail as the last means left for the occupants to resort to. And indeed today the independent daily RESPUBLIKA disclosed the KGB's final trump card. The State Security Committee has one last chance, that is to discredit the leaders of the Lithuania's new government. In this case undoubtedly the best way is to prove that one or another public figure was a KGB informer.

Quite recently a similar scenario unfolded in East Germany, where in the run-up to the elections various documents were used against (?ones) political opponent, proving that he or she was a Stasi informer.

[Words indistinct] RESPUBLIKA refers to the State Security Committee as the Inquisition of the 20th century. This time the object of their witch hunt is the Prime Minister, Mrs. Kasimieras Prunskiene. The newspaper published a photocopy of her card sent by an anonymous reader which supposedly points to her being an agent, but the reader is left to decide whether it's real or falsified.

In her interview to the paper's editor in chief Mrs. Prunkskiene tells about her anonymous letters threats she received during the recent election campaign. Political blackmail is cunningly being used to drive a wedge of misunderstanding and distrust between her as the prime minister and Mr. Landsbergis, as the head of the parliament. In other words attempts are being made to break up the close ties between the government and the parliament. And, finally, this will also serve to estrange the newspaper's editorial staff from its readership, said Mrs. Prunskiene, and noted that she had a clean conscience.

Each institution or establishment in the Soviet Union has a person attached to it from the KGB who closely follows what was going on there. In my contacts with them I have never informed against my colleagues, or sold my conscience for money, said Mrs. Prunskiene with her usual charm. Her first contact with KGB took place 11 years ago before she was to leave for Brazil on a private trip. At that time she taught at the university and a plainclothesman summoned her to one of the classrooms for questioning. This was a normal procedure in the old days, since nearly everyone embarking on a journey to the West had an encounter with them. At present the KGB is using against her a paper she wrote and forwarded to the Andropov government, where she analyzes her model of economic reform. It was then that she first put forth the idea of the Lithuania's economic sovereignty. Mrs. Prunskiene did this at the request of the Soviet attache in Bonn. In her opinion at that time only the State Security Committee could gather objective information and analyze it without any risk. For Kasimiersa Prunskiene it was the only means to express herself as a scholar and make an attempt to reorganize the sluggish economy.

Incidentally in 1985, on the first day when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, she was asked to write a package of proposals for his government. With the emergence of grassroots movement Sajudis, KGB officials stopped bothering Mrs. Prunskiene, although they warned her that her actions were proving a threat to members of her family.

Even today the KGB branch in Lithuania remains loyal to Moscow. (?Thus) it is not clear what further actions, anonymous documents, or letters it will send to the press for publication in the nearest future.

Prunskiene Asks Moscow To Stop 6 Apr Strike

LD0504223890 Vilnius International Service in English 2200 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] The transitional Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party based in Lithuania has informed the leaders of large industrial enterprises of Vilnius that a one-hour strike is being organized on 6 April in Vilnius to protest decisions of the Lithuanian Parliament.

Lithuanian Prime Minister Kasimieras Prunskiene has sent a telegram to the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov asking them to stop actions of this kind.

Lithuania Told To Comply With Draft

LD0504185490 Moscow TASS in English 1847 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 5 TASS—Follows statement by the Soviet Defense Ministry press center:

We were informed at the chief military procurator's office that on April 4 a telegram signed by Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimira Prunskiene was received by Chief Military Procurator and Deputy USSR Procurator General Alexander Katusev, revealing the position of the Lithuanian leadership on Lithuanian citizens' military service in the Soviet Armed Forces.

On April 5, Katusev sent a reply to Vilnius: "Having received your telegram, announcing that the action of the USSR law on general military service on Lithuanian territory has been suspended, I inform you that:

The Congress of USSR People's Deputies has declared invalid the decisions adopted by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, contradicting the USSR Constitution and Soviet laws.

In this connection, all Lithuanian citizens, who left military service unwarranted, are subject to criminal responsibility in accordance with Soviet laws. On condition that they return to places of their service themselves, this will be considered as an extenuating circumstance.

I suggest that you take measures that all servicemen, who have deserted from the Soviet Armed Forces, return to places of their service, and that you inform to all Lithuanian citizens of measures taken. The government should carry out all actions connected with the regular call-up to the Soviet Armed Forces."

Katusev Reply to Prunskiene on Army Service Cited

PM0604110990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 Apr 90 Second Edition p1

[USSR Defense Ministry Press Center report under the general heading "On the Situation in Lithuania": "Reply Sent"]

[Text] We have been informed by the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office that a telegram signed by K. Prunskiene was sent from Vilnius on 4 April to Justice Lieutenant General A. Katusev, chief military prosecutor and USSR deputy general prosecutor. The telegram set out the present Lithuanian leadership's well known views on a number of issues connected with citizens of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] doing service in the USSR Armed Forces.

A. Katusev sent his reply to Vilnius on 5 April: "In response to your telegram announcing the suspension of the USSR Law on Universal Military Service on Lithuanian territory, I hereby notify you of the following:

"The decisions adopted by the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, which run counter to the USSR Constitution and USSR laws, have been deemed null and void by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. In this connection, all citizens of the Lithuanian SSR who arbitrarily leave military service are liable to criminal prosecution under USSR laws. If they should voluntarily return to their place of service, the actions of these individuals will be regarded as mitigating circumstances and the appropriate criminal law conclusions drawn.

"I propose that urgent measures be taken to return all military servicemen who have deserted from the USSR Armed Forces to their place of service and that all Lithuanian citizens be informed of the measures taken. I also propose that full compliance with all measures connected with the next conscription into USSR Armed Forces service be ensured."

Lithuania Reiterates Stand on Independence

AU0504205690 Paris AFP in English 2037 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 5 (AFP)—The Lithuanian parliament late Thursday reiterated its stand for the independence of the Baltic state from the Soviet Union and expressed concern at the use of the Soviet armed forces in the republic.

The statement came in a response to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who has demanded that the parliament retract its March 11 declaration of independence before any discussion of the matter.

A copy of the parliament's text, received by Agence France-Presse here, told him: "We appreciate your efforts for a peaceful solution of problems, however some questions related to your position are not at all clear to us."

The text said "Lithuania is ready for honest dialogue, but that must not be accompanied by acts of insubordination by your armed forces."

Activities by the Soviet military in Lithuania since the independence declaration are seen as part of Kremlin pressure to get the parliament to go back on its stand.

Landsbergis Discusses Moscow's 'Intimidation'

LD0504165490 Moscow Maritime Service in Russian 1300 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Interview with Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, by correspondent, name indistinct; date, place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Esteemed Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic: In such a high post, you are speaking for the first time to our fellow countrymen who are, at present, working intensively far out at sea in both hemispheres of the world, and after all, it is no secret to you that the restoration of Lithuanian statehood has not been preceived equivocally by multinational fishing collectives. There are those who doubt the expediency of such a step.

[Landsbergis] The country in which you live, in which we all live—Lithuania—is entering a phase of legislative self-redetermination. It has decided to become an independent democratic state again. This is not to everybody's liking. For some, the greatest value is the preservation of as much of an enormous empire as possible, with all its conquests, including Lithuania. No matter that everywhere there is destitution, poverty, disintegration; no matter that injustice thrives; as long as people see how big they all are in such a big country.

Yet, this country is also moving toward self-determination. Will it be capable of living according to the truth and not according to falsehood? Is it be capable of striving also for justice in international relations? Well, both there and here, there are people, even people who think very simply, who simply do not like the possibility of losing positions of authority and privileges. They too, do not need such changes, especially such major ones.

But Lithuania is not for turning. Of course it can be stopped through violence, but those times have passed and the leadership of the Soviet Union is not longer what it was. It wants the Soviet Union to be trusted in the world today. Yet, such weapons as intimidation and incitement are being set in motion. We have already seen, and you yourself have no doubt sensed, how rumors are being spread, how people are being intimidated by allegations that they are going to be harmed, that they are going to be driven out, or that something is going to be taken away from them. Who knows, perhaps some people have even been intimidated and have believed this.

Democratic Lithuania wishes to be a homeland for all its citizens, regardless of nationality. It will not expel anyone or harm anyone. There is intimidation about possible unemployment and the possibility of an economic blockade. What can one say in response to this? I do not believe that the Soviet Union, in the form of its present leadership, would so strangle Lithuania as a whole, with all its inhabitants.

[Correspondent] Perhaps the most topical question which now concerns Klaipeda's sailors and their families, is the future of the Klaipeda region. The demand was heard from the rostrum of the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies for the reunification of the port city and the whole of Lithuania Minor to Kaliningrad Oblast. What can you say about this as head of the Lithuanian parliament?

[Landsbergis] There are also attempts to intimidate or incite people through talk about the possible alteration of borders and confiscation of territory from Lithuania. Some advisers have probably slipped Mikhail Gorbachev some such so-called arguments. Klaipeda and Druskininkai have been mentioned there. Perhaps it might be possible also to incite some people in those localities to demand precisely this. None of this has either a basis or a future. This is a means of psychological political pressure. Perhaps specifically, some people could be agitated in one direction, and others in another direction.

One can say quite simply why this has neither a basis nor a future. If the Soviet Union were to regard the seizure of Klaipeda by Hitler in 1939 as a lawful act, then it would be pursuing a very dangerous international policy. So, it might be that from the Soviet Union's point of view, the seizure of Western and then the whole of Czechoslovakia, the seizure of Austria, should also be regarded as lawful. These are links in the same chain of Hitler's crimes which led to the Second World War. True, Stalin was already friends with Hitler then. The shameful deals had been made. But the Soviet Union dissociates itself from this dismal event. So why is it necessary to support Hitler's idea and his claims to Klaipeda in order that the Soviet Union can now express similar claims?

Yakovlev Views Meeting With Lithuanian Officials

LD0504172190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1620 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 5 Apr (TASS)—Aleksandr Yakovlev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, called his recent meeting with a group of deputies of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet a "conversation." Asked by a TASS correspondent whether this meeting did not imply a turn toward dialogue, he stated that "in political practice it is not unusual for each to interpret a particular conversation in a spirit that is advantageous to the interpreter."

He noted that "the meeting was at the insistent request of the Lithuanian deputies, who stressed the 'unofficial' nature of the meeting and said that they had not been empowered by anyone and were acting as private persons." Yakovlev called the conversation "frank from both sides."

"The representatives of the Lithuanian public were told that a constructive and responsible approach was clearly and precisely expressed in the decision of the Congress of USSR Peoples Deputies and in the appeals from President Gorbachev to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and to the Lithuanian people, Yakovlev said.

Currently, the USSR Supreme Soviet has passed a law on the procedure for resolving questions connected with the secession of a union republic from the USSR which is envisaged by the USSR Constitution, questions about a Union treaty are being discussed, and other measures are being taken to establish the economic and political autonomy of republics. In these conditions, any artificial speeding up of events cannot be perceived other than as an unwillingness to conduct consultations and to conduct a dialogue. No matter how subjectively the events are interpreted, one cannot escape the impression that objectively such accelerated events are aimed at putting a brake on the normal constitutional process, the results of which would be in the interests of all republics and in the interests of the Lithuanian people."

The Lithuanian public figures were also told that a normal dialogue on all questions of interest was possible on the basis of the position which existed before 10 March. It was stressed that the actions in the first days after 10 March were aimed in effect against perestroyka, including perestroyka in Lithuania, and against the historic change that is going on in the country as a whole."

"In the process of the conversation, it was noted that the various statements and actions aimed against the Soviet Army on the territory of Lithuania were immoral to say the least, for they were directed against people carrying out their service duty and resolving tasks essential for the defense of the country."

"At the end of the conversation, the Lithuanian participants again stressed the 'private nature' of the talk and expressed the intention of giving further thought as to what measures could be taken to get out of the situation that has arisen," Aleksandr Yakovlev said.

Russians Assail Lithuanian Radio, TV

LD0504230190 Vilnius International Service in English 2200 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] At 5 p.m. today a group of some 300 noisy angry and unfriendly looking people, mostly Russians, gathered at the entrance to the Lithuanian radio and TV headquarters. The pickets, initiated by the so-called Committee for the Defense of the USSR Citizens in

Lithuania, lasted nearly an hour and its participants came forth with a package of demands to the radio and TV leadership.

The demands were listed in a resolution read out by the leaders of the USSR citizens' committee. The resolution demanded that what was termed as anti-Soviet and anti-socialist propaganda in radio and television broadcasts should be stopped and that representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union should be given two hours of live broadcasting on TV each week.

Besides, a demand was made that radio and TV programs should reflect better the whole range of social strata and public organizations of Lithuania.

The resolution was handed in to the chairman of the Lithuanianu Radio and TV, Domijonas Sniukas.

Unlike other rallies and pickets held by pro-Moscow organizations, this particular picket outside the radio and TV building did not develop into any incident or fist-fighting, and in general that was the second picket outside the Lithuanian Radio and TV. The first was held a year and half ago by Sajudis, and was directed against the stagnant mass media leadership of those days. Now it was vice versa. Times are changing.

Moscow Radio Reports on Lithuanian Rallies

LD0504171590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Now to the situation in Lithuania. Here's a conversation between our correspondent Vladimir Bezyayev and Vilnius correspondent Elyana Kurklietyte:

[Begin recording] [Kurklietyte] The session of the republic's Supreme Soviet is continuing today. For several days now they have been discussing the reply to the appeal from the USSR president to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. I cannot say whether the deputies will decide on a final version of that reply today either, because every sentence is being discussed and practically every word is being weighed up.

The draft on the deputies' status and on the structure and apparatus of the Supreme Soviet is also being deliberated today. The agenda for today, the 33d plenary meeting of the session, also contains the matter of the control committee and the nature of protection committee, which are to be reformed and made subordinate to the Supreme Soviet. The deputies likewise plan to supplement the republic's agricultural code, they will hold a second reading debate on the draft law on enterprises, and most likely the entire cabinet of the Council of Ministers, consisting of 17 ministers, will be presented.

[Bezyayev] Elyana, we are all interested, of course, in how the public is reacting to the deputies' decisions, and perhaps you could give us a sort of outline of the atmosphere in the republic. Is everything on the ball?

[Kurklietyte] Yes, there have been very many rallies of late. Yesterday there were rallies involving many thousands in Klaipeda, Kaunas and other towns in Lithuania in support of the Supreme Soviet's decision to restore the Lithuanian state's independence. Many thousands will be taking part in a similar rally in Vilnius tomorrow, and rallies will be held in other towns in the republic. These are being organized by Sajudis, other public organizations, and the unions of Lithuania.

In Vilnius yesterday, outside the Supreme Soviet building, there was also a rally in support of the USSR president's appeals to the Supreme Soviet and to the people of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. This was organized by the Committee of the Soviet Citizens in Lithuania. USSR people's deputies (Auksnis), Tikhonov, Shuvalov and other representatives of the Soyuz group of deputies took part in the rally. One of the speakers dwelt in stark terms on the need to introduce presidential rule in Lithuania, without considering it necessary to conduct any talks between the governments of the republic and the Union. Extreme measures such as the disbandment of the present Supreme Soviet of Lithuania, the annulment of all legislative acts passed by it, and the announcement of fresh elections were also proposed. The rally resulted in two documents: an appeal to the people of the USSR and a resolution. One of the documents announces that a warning strike is to be held, and that unless the demands put forward in the resolution are satisfied an indefinite strike will be declared. So there you have it.

Some of those involved in that rally behaved extremely aggressively, you know. They knocked over some Lithuanian Television mobile television cameras that had been set up on high ground, as well as the cameramen who intended to cover the rally; they beat up some of the participants and lashed out at reporters. Up until then, despite the very, very intense situation in Lithuania, there had been no public disorder.

[Bezyayev] Well, given this, how are these emotions being kept in check? How are they being stopped?

[Kurklietyte] Well, you know, I think the law and order bodies will be handling these incidents. [end recording]

Lithuanian Russian's Distress Reported

LD0504220490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Video report from Vilnius by correspondent V. Dvinin—from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Dvinin] People began to gather from early morning at the premises of the Vilnius city committee of the CPSU. Under the aegis of the Committee of USSR Citizens in Lithuania, a meeting took place here with people's deputies from the Soyuz group. [video shows shots of official building; people waiting in a foyer; meeting in progress]

[Deputy Shuvalov addressing meeting] The Soyuz group of deputies makes one main demand—that the rights of every Soviet citizen, wherever he may live, should be guaranteed.

[Dvinin] Deputy Shuvalov had to listen to plenty of alarming words on precisely this issue.

[First woman in audience] Our children are afraid to go to rallies because they will be dismissed at work.

[Unidentified speaker] Yes, they are being dismissed. Quite so.

[Second woman] I have just one month to go until I get my pension, but they are slighting me. Here, incidentally, the formation of Sajudis and all the fuss began much earlier, i.e. when perestroyka was declared, and it was then that the persecution began.

[Third woman] Where are we to go when everything is connected with Lithuania? Everything is connected. Where am I to go?

[Dvinin] Recriminations against the leadership of our country was also voiced at the meeting.

[First man] Why are the laws not working in our country? Why are they being made and why are they not working? This is an interesting question. Why are they not working?

[Dvinin] There was also mention of this during individual conversations with the deputies.

[Second man, talking separately to another deputy] There must be more clarity from the government, because we are not getting any clarity from the Landsbergis government.

[Dvinin, talking to deputy in office setting] Have many people telephoned you?

[V.I. Alksnis, USSR people's deputy] Yes, dozens of people have already telephoned. The calls are virtually unending. People are distressed and generally despondent. Many are afraid to give their names, and say that something may happen to them, because the telephone is being bugged, and their addresses may be established and ascertained. Therefore, it is, of course, very unpleasant to sense this fear of people.

[Dvinin] What requests are there for Moscow?

[Alksnis] For Moscow there are mostly requests of this nature: Principle and firmness are needed; we have had enough declarations; it is necessary to protect the rights of Soviet citizens on the territory of Lithuania.

[Dvinin] Many meetings with deputies have also taken place at enterprises. In some places, there were attempts to impede the meetings.

[worker] When we got to the hall—or rather not to the hall, not as far as the hall—the entrance doors, the glass doors, which were never locked, were tied up with cable and a padlock had been put on. Well, we broke the cable. We considered that, if people had come to a meeting, then they should enter this hall. And we entered the hall and held the meeting.

[Dvinin] A conversation unfortunately did not take place between us and the director of the Vilnius construction enterprise. [video shows official refusing to be interviewed by correspondent]

RSFSR Notes 'Special Concern' on Lithuania

LD0504221190 Moscow TASS in English 2152 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 6 TASS—The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation [RSFSR] supports a principled stand of the union leadership, set forth in the addresses of the Soviet president to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and the Lithuanian people. Problems that emerged following the adoption by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet of illegal and unilateral acts affect most seriously the relations between the republic and the union, the relations of union republics with each other and the national and state interests of the Russian Federation, says a statement of the Presidium circulated on Thursday.

The historical destinies of the peoples of Lithuania and Russia have long been intertwined. Active human, economic and cultural ties between the Russian Federation and Lithuania consolidated during the past several decades. Naturally, the revision of Lithuania's status will affect the character of these ties, which cannot help affecting the lives of a great number of people in our two republics.

The situation of the non-Lithuanian population and the intensifying anti-Russian propaganda evoke special concern in the Russian Federation.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation calls attention of the Lithuanian authorities to the need to respect unswervingly the rights of Russians, the same as other Soviet citizens, which are guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution. We expect the uninterrupted functioning of communications connecting Kaliningrad region with the rest of the Russian Federation.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation believes that all problems connected with a possible secession of a union republic from the USSR should be discussed in a dialogue with all union republics on the only acceptable basis—within the framework of the Soviet Constitution and union laws.

Citizens Committee Issues Appeal on Deserters

LD0604115390 Moscow World Service in Russian 0948 GMT 6 Apr 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program; report attributed to Interfax]

[Text] The USSR Citizens Committee in Lithuania has appealed to military procuracy bodies not to prosecute Lithuanian youths who have deserted from the army and have been detained recently on the territory of the republic. The appeal points out that the Lithuanians' desertion was encouraged by calls from the new leadership and the anti-army propaganda which has been conducted in the republic recently. As an INTERFAX correspondent reports, military lawyers have promised to take account of the request from the Committee of USSR Citizens, but stressed that each case of desertion will be examined on an individual basis.

Russians in Lithuania Plan Political Strikes

LD0604103690 Moscow World Service in Russian 0948 GMT 6 Apr 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program; report attributed to INTERFAX]

[Text] Short strikes are planned at a number of large industrial enterprises in Vilnius and several other cities in Lithuania where workers from the Russian-speaking population predominate. As Vladislav Shved, second secretary of the provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania on the CPSU Platform, stated in an interview with an INTERFAX correspondent, it was the workers who proposed that they be held. Shved stressed that the strikes will be political in character. In his words, they are being held in protest against the decisions of the Lithuanian parliament. The demand for the restoration of the operation of the USSR Constitution on the republic's territory will be put forward during the strikes, Shved said.

USSR Citizens in Lithuania Issue Appeal

PM0604095690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Apr 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "'No to the Adventurist Course'"]

[Text] Vilnius, 5 Apr—At a press conference held here today, an appeal from the committee of USSR citizens in Lithuania to the peoples of the USSR was circulated. So-called "democrats" and "radicals" among the people's deputies of Russia and the country and various representatives of informal movements, the appeal says, are today trying to organize support for the actions of the newly elected Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, which has unilaterally declared Lithuania's independence. We believe that only the people of Lithuania have the right to choose their future.

The Sajudis leaders who have come to power, the document stresses, have forgotten their election promises to create a democratic rule-of-law state. Pluralism of opinion in Lithuania today means the appeals that can be heard here for the books of Lithuanian people's writer Yu. Baltushis to be burned in response to the criticism he has voiced about the actions of the republic's Supreme Soviet. It means anti-Soviet propaganda on an unprecedented scale in the republican mass media. It means, in effect, a ban on publication of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LITVA, which at present we are forced to print outside the republic. And lastly, it means attempts to outlaw the Lithuanian Communist Party which has not severed relations with the CPSU and to revive the notorious Stalinist Article 58 in the form of a new "law on criminal accountability for antistate appeals"; under the draft, "culprits" are threatened with up to 10 years' imprisonment with confiscation of property.

The irresponsible actions of the republic Supreme Soviet and its ultimatums, the appeal goes on, have jeopardized the future of millions of people and the integrity of the USSR. Do the "democratic" and "radical" envoys of the country's and Russia's parliaments and the Leningrad and Moscow soviet deputies realize this, in their haste to support the decisions of the new power in Lithuania? Do their voters know about this activity? We hope, we are confident, that people of goodwill will understand and support our just demands and not allow the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet to mislead the peoples of the country and the world.

Vilnius Workers Support Adherence to Union

PM0604081590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Leonid Kapelyushnyy report under the rubric "Direct Line. IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "Seeking Mutual Understanding"]

[Text] Vilnius— After a break Lithuania is once again coming out for rallies.

An increasingly frequent subject of discussion is party property which was first guarded by the military and has now been handed over to militia units. Not so long ago representatives of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party categorically stated that they would hand nothing over to the Communist Party which has retained its unity with the CPSU. And indeed nothing has been handed over. The morality of this position is doubtful. But when the army begins to act in a "peaceable" fashion, this naturally does not give any added prestige to those who were persecuted in the past...

One of April's memorable events was the confirmation that newspaper publishing houses are the property of the

CPSU with all the consequences which that entails. SOVETSKAYA LITVA, which was restored after a two-week break (it had been renamed EKHO LITVY and put under the jurisdiction of the republic's Supreme Soviet), got a real chance of being published and established at the House of the Press. But then EKHO LITVY and KURIER WILENSKI lost the roof over their head overnight. GIMTASIS KRASTAS, ATGIMIMAS, and SOGLASIYE were denied the services of the printing press. These popular publications with large printruns, which hold extremely anti-Soviet, anti-Moscow, and anticommunist positions, were not treated badly at the Lithuanian Communist Party printing office. Incidentally, there are hardly any instances in the history of the world communist movement when one party has helped another that holds fundamentally different ideological positions.

The tranquillity in Lithuania is of course purely on the surface. The republic's government can take the credit for this. All enterprises are working, crop farmers are doing the work dictated by the warm spring. At present all the decisions and statements in political documents are made in the name of the people, so your correspondent drove over to a fuel apparatus plant in Vilnius "to ask the people" what they think of the current situation in Lithuania. Approximately equal numbers of Lithuanians, Poles, and Russians work at the plant. Admittedly, there is a large percentage of non-Lithuanians among the work force. A considerable number of them have been bused in from neighboring Belorussia for many years now. Fitter Edmund Lisitskiy proved to by my first interlocutor:

"I have been working at the plant for 12 years, but my roots and my home are in Belorussia. In short, I only work in Lithuania. I don't need an apartment here or any other benefits. We lead a harmonious life here at the plant, there is no dissension. But I do not see how my Lithuanian comrades would live without the Union."

Sigitas Faust, also a fitter, who works in the chief metrologist's department, is of a different opinion.

"Our Supreme Soviet has been elected by the people, it expresses our wishes. Lithuania must leave the USSR. I have always believed that we are occupied, that we had no statehood. It was especially hard here for those people who cooperated with the Germans—albeit in the past. How many innocent people were carted off to Siberia at that time? Several of my relatives ended up there solely because they worked honestly on their modest land. Of course, we must live peacefully, trade, and be on friendly terms with all our neighbors. The border will present no obstacle here."

Viktor Kilmentyev, a technical control department inspector and team leader, has a quite different view:

"I have been at this plant for 23 years. We have never had any ethnic divisions here. I am categorically opposed to Lithuania's leaving the Union."

Paulyus Nagrotskis, team leader in shop No. 9, is a Lithuanian but he believes that Lithuania's proposed departure from the Soviet Union is a hasty, reckless step.

"Before the elections I supported Brazauskas' position and I support him today: First we need to obtain real sovereignty, that is economic sovereignty, and then make political decisions."

Today Lithuania seems to be returning once again to soapbox democracy. Those in favor of seceding from the USSR and those against this step gather crowds of thousands of their supporters.. Firm resolutions are adopted. There has been a call for Moscow to be bombarded with cables, and postal workers are so overworked that the period leading up to New Year seems like a holiday to them.

Two rallies were held in Taribu Square outside the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet on the same day. This was possibly the first time that I can remember invalids holding an independent demonstration.

Toward evening this square and the adjoining areas were overflowing with people supporting the preservation of the union. A large group of USSR Supreme Soviet deputies took part in the rally, along with leaders of the provisional Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee and the Committee of USSR Citizens.

A call rang out at the rally for an appeal to be made to the USSR president to institute presidential rule in the republic since the republic's Supreme Soviet will not heed the president's appeals and decrees for them not to aggravate the confrontation through their legislative activity.

The rally's participants resolutely demanded that left-wing forces be given television and radio airtime.

Notwithstanding the current differences of opinion in Lithuania, there is, perhaps, one thing on which everyone is agreed: It is necessary to seek mutual understanding and move on from ultimatums to dialogue. Independence is so costly that principles can and have to be waived for it. Particularly ambition.

Warsaw Youths Urge U.S. Recognition of Lithuania

LD0504230590 Vilnius International Service in English 2200 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] In the Polish capital of Warsaw two young men have started to hunger strike outsie the U.S. Embassy, demanding George Bush to acknowledge the Republic of Lithuania.

One young man stays outside all the time, while the other comes here evenings after his lectures end.

Both are ready to continue the hunger strike till the United States acknowledges the independence of Lithuania, or till they arfe taken away when weak.

U.S. Senator D'Amato To Visit Lithuania

LD0604082790 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Text] Information has been received from the Polish capital that the U.S. senator, Republican from New York State, Alfonse D'Amato, arrived in Warsaw yeterday on his way to Lithuania. Today he will try to come to Lithuania via Ogorodniki. It seems that two other senators who intended to come to Lithuania will not do this. On 4 April the newspaper WASHINGTON POST stated that Senator Gordon Humphrey and Frank Murkowski were frightened to go to Lithuania.

Lithuanian Deputies Cited on Need for Dialogue

LD0604114690 Moscow TASS in English 1113 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Text] Vilnius Apr 6 TASS—By TASS Special Correspondent Aleksandr Budris:

The Supreme Soviet of Lithuania replied Thursday evening to the USSR president's address to the Lithuanian parliament and people. The Lithuanian legislators expressed readiness to discuss the spirit and letter of the acts and decisions passed by the republic's parliament from the viewpoint of international law and USSR constitution.

As earlier reported, President Gorbachev's March 31 address to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic demanded that the Lithuanian legislators repeal the acts they had passed, since they "run counter to the constitution of the USSR and are provocative and insulting to the union as a whole."

Replying to the president, the Lithuanian parliamentarians expressed hope that the Soviet leader would "prefer a political settlement of the problem to all others," and moved to hold primary bilateral consultations to "clarify the stands of both sides on matters concerning them."

The document proposes a dialogue on measures to establish new bilateral state relations. It stresses that the "republic is ready to maintain the present economic relations, cultural and human contacts with the USSR."

"It follows from the Soviet president's address and from the reply of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet that both sides hear and understand each other," Lithuanian parliamentarian Cheslovas Kudaba told TASS. He believes that "president of the USSR and the Lithuanian parliament must embark upon the road of dialogue. Neither we, nor the Russian people, want confrontation," he noted.

"The leadership of the Lithuanian Republic and the Soviet Union have not yet exhausted all the possibilities for jointly settling arising problems," Lithuanian parliament deputy Yevgency Petrov said. He stressed the need for a meeting between representatives of Lithuanian and the Soviet Union to discuss the procedures for legalising the acts adopted in the republic.

Lithuania Appoints Foreign Affairs Officers

LD0604120190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Summary] A few days ago the Lithuanian Council of Ministers set up a Council of Ministers department for foreign economic relations. Rimantas [name indistinct] was appointed general director of this department.

The Council of Ministers also appointed two deputy foreign ministers: Valdemaras Statkus from Kaunas, a deputy of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, and Ramutis Grigas, a graduate from the Moscow Institute of International Relations and candidate of sciences.

Vilnius Radio Carries 5 Apr Council Session

State Organs Debated

LD0504151890

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1220 GMT on 5 April begins carrying a live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

The announcer says during the closed morning session procedural issues such as the salaries and status of deputies were discussed.

The Supreme Council session is chaired by Deputy Abisalas. At 1222 GMT deputies discuss the structure of the Supreme Council and submit proposals.

At 1246 GMT a draft resolution on the structure of the Supreme Council and its service personnel is put to a vote. The resolution is adopted by a majority of votes, but it is established that there is no quorum.

At 1251 GMT a report on the draft law on the deputy's status is made. Debates on this item take place.

At 1317 GMT a vote is taken and a decision on the status of a deputy is adopted.

The next item on the agenda is then discussed—the draft law on the independent state organs. This concerns the state department for environmental protection, abolishing the people's control committee, and setting up a department of state control and a state department for the protection of cultural heritage.

At 1335 GMT debates begin on these items.

At 1349 GMT a vote on the procedure and on individual articles is taken. The draft law on independent state bodies is adopted.

At 1400 GMT a break is announced until 1430 GMT.

Reply to Gorbachev Debated

LD0504163890

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1430 GMT on 5 April resumes its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius. Deputy Cepaitis reads the first version of a reply to Gorbachev.

At 1437 GMT the second version of the reply, drawn up by a group of deputies led by Deputy Andriukaitis, is read in Russian.

At 1442 GMT questions are asked by deputies about both versions.

At 1444 GMT Deputy Gudaitis makes a statement on his visit to Moscow. He supports the second version of the reply.

At 1455 GMT debates proposing corrections and amendments to the replies take place. One proposal is that no special attention should be paid to the text but to the concept, with a vote for a concept and not for a text.

At 1525 GMT Landsbergis regrets that there are two texts, and says that an agreement should be reached on one text. If one of these texts is adopted as a basis for the reply, he suggests that he should be the editor of the final reply.

At 1531 GMT both versions are put to a vote. The deputies vote for the second version. It will be taken as a basis for drawing up the reply to Gorbachev. The deputies decide that the final text should be prepared today. Members of a commission to edit the reply are nominated and approved.

At 1545 GMT debates on amendments to the land code start.

At 1603 GMT an interval until 1630 GMT is announced.

Land Code Discussed

LD0504190590

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian resumes its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius at 1630 GMT 5 April. Deputy Abisalas, chairing the session, resumes the council's work. Deputies continue debates on amendments to the Land Code concerning decollectivization. It is noted that there are 2,500 farmer's families in Lithuania who either farm or would like to farm their own land. The chairman notes there is no quorum. No vote is taken.

At 1709 GMT Deputy Juknevicius submits a draft law on a certificate for Lithuanian citizens who renounce USSR citizenship. Debates on this take place.

The relay becomes unmonitorable between 1732 and 1751 GMT.

At 1751 GMT Deputy Abisalas lists some issues which require debate next week.

At 1756 GMT a vote is taken on an amendment to the Land Code, inserting into it one new article. The chairman points out that there is not a quorum.

At 1800 GMT the relay becomes unmonitorable.

At 1803 GMT a vote on the amendment to the Land Code is taken; the amendment is adopted.

At 1804 GMT a vote is taken on the law on a certificate for Lithuanian citizens; the law is passed.

At 1807 GMT the final version of the reply to Gorbachev is read.

At 1810 GMT the reply is put to a vote and adopted, with 82 votes in favor, no votes against and six abstentions.

At 1812 GMT Deputy Abisalas proposes that the work in commissions start on Monday, 9 April, at 0900 GMT, and that no plenary meeting be held Monday, but that two plenary meetings be held Tuesday, with one on Wednesday and one on Thursday. At this point reception deteriorates.

At 1821 GMT the relay of the Supreme Council proceedings ends, with an announcer stating that the next plenary session of the Supreme Council will be held on Monday at 1200 GMT.

Soviet Troops Reportedly Remove Vilnius Judges

LD0504183190 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1800 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] President of Lithuania Vytautas Landsbergis hopes that Finland will give moral support to Lithuania's striving for independence. In an interview with the Finnish Broadcasting Company's television news, Landsbergis said that Lithuania has no intention of withdrawing its declaration of independence. It is possible, however, to hold a referendum on independence, but, in Landsbergis' view, it is not needed.

In the interview Landsbergis criticised the Soviet Army's use of force in Lithuania. Soviet troops entered the palace of justice in Vilnius today and removed the judges.

Lithuania's Landsbergis Urges Finnish Support

LD0504183190 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1800 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] President of Lithuania Vytautas Landsbergis, hopes that Finland will give moral support to Lithuania's striving for independence. In an interview with the Finnish Broadcasting Company's television news, Landsbergis said that Lithuania has no intention of withdrawing its declaration of independence. It is possible, however, to hold a referendum on independence, but, in Landsbergis' view, it is not needed.

In the interview Landsbergis criticized the Soviet Army's use of force in Lithuania. Soviet troops entered the palace of justice in Vilnius today and removed the judges.

Nordic Reaction to Lithuanian Independence Viewed

LD0604123490 Moscow International Service in Finnish 1530 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Text] We now give an account of an interview given by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, to Swedish EXPRESSEN newspaper. In the interview he notes the following: I think we have coped fairly well. It is true that our opponent has shown an obstinacy and cruelty that we did not expect. But the democratic countries have shown greater restraint and caution and even conformism than we expected.

I would like to defend the democratic countries against Landsbergis' criticism. The behavior of most countries, and above all of the Nordic countries, on the question of Lithuania has shown rather common sense and taking into account the present political security rather than conformism. Above all, the Lithuanian leadership itself suffers from a lack of political realism. Landsbergis' excessive certainty that Lithuania has coped fairly well with secession from the Soviet Union arouses doubts. We can hardly regard as very good a solution which has caused relations between Moscow and Vilnius to become very difficult and which has aroused concern among the Russian-speaking population of the republic and led to the strengthening of general security. During all this time Moscow has not refused to take part in a dialogue. But why has it been necessary to hamper and delay the achievement of dialogue, asks Vokulovskiy.

As I already noted, most of the Nordic politicians show sound sense with regard to the Lithuanian question, Vokulovskiy continues. an exception is, however, the Danish Government, and above all the country's foreign minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, who on several occasions has already made announcements which are pushng the Lithuanians to impatience, or in just the direction which at the present moment can only make the situation more difficult. In his interview to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE yesterday Ellemann-Jensen noted the following, among other things: The Lithuanians want to start negotiations. We have to help them so that they will not be subjected to Soviet pressure. Judging by everything, the rest of the Danes view the matter more objectively. According to the latest opinion poll, 57 percent of Danes think that the Danish measures in this question must be less obvious than they are at the present moment.

Different Army Protest Methods Suggested

LD2003143090 Vilnius LIETUVOS RYTAS in Lithuanian 6 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by Mindaugas Tamosiunas: "Let Us Not Lose Our Heads"]

[Text] Initiators of military ID return action are restless: they organize one action after the another. Young, emotional men are presented the notion that by refusing to serve in the Soviet Army they are fulfilling a patriotic duty to Lithuania and that such steps can be legally defended because the Geneva Convention of 1949 forbids drafting of citizens from an occupied country into the army of the occupier.

Let us reflect: Are the politicians who instigate or support such moods among the youth acting wisely and honorably?

Politicians cannot be ignorant of the fact that in the eyes of international law, Lithuania has, since 3 August 1940, held the status of an annexed country, which is not identical to an occupied country's status. An occupied country is governed by a military or civilian administration designated by the occupier and it population does not have the right of citizenship. We are, after all, juridically incorporated into the Soviet Union hold USSR citizenship, and enjoy the rights of USSR citizens, while at the same time we are subject to USSR citizens' duties. Foreign countries, including the U.S., regard us as USSR citizens. The latter [the U.S.], and some of the other countries [that regard us as USSR citizens] only fail to recognize the legality of the incorporation of Lithuania into the USSR. Even those countries, however, have come to terms with the accomplished fact [ivykusiu faktu] by means of various international agreements, and guarantee the inviolability of USSR borders. According to the system of international agreements currently in effect—1939-1940 agreement laws between the Lithuanian Republic and the USSR and Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic—the Soviet Army in Lithuania is not an army of occupation.

Keeping in mind the existence of this legal situation, it is not difficult to predict that a youth charged with criminal responsibility for failure to comply with military duty law will definitely lose his case if it is based on the motivation and action of his unwillingness to serve in an "occupation" army. No international court will come to his defense, either. For some reason, organizers of this action fail to mention this fact.

In order to be legally consistent, we should return USSR passports along with the military ID cards, that is, renounce USSR citizenship. You will agree with me that this would clearly be nonsense under the existing circumstances, especially while we still do not possess Lithuanian passports. However, the action of returning military ID's constitutes similar nonsense and its organizers and supporters are deceiving young men with the Geneva

Convention and propel them into a difficult legal confrontation, thus burdening the already difficult position of Lithuanian men who serve in the army.

Professor Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Sajudis Seimas Council [president], during his broadcast on 21 February on the "Atgimimo Banga" program, warned the youth not to fall prey to provocations, since they can harm the goal of independence. However, can there be anything better than labeling the Soviet Army as "occupation army," returning military ID's, and urging mass disobedience of the law of military duty?! This at least, serves provocateurs in the best manner possible.

The republic Supreme Soviet has already commenced legal deliberations on the question of military service. Obviously, the new Supreme Soviet will be even more decisive in this respect. Thus, if we are following the parliamentary path to independence (which is our only path), let us, the young and the old, proceed along this path: Let us all act in accordance with the republic's laws. Let us not forget, that the future independent state of Lithuania will only be able to exist by maintaining the friendliest possible relations with its big eastern neighbor, and that one of the most realistic ways of attaining independence is the variant proposed by the Lithuanian Republic's former minister of foreign affairs, J. Urbsys (LIETUVOS RYTAS, 20 January 1990). Let us feel emotion, but let us not lose our heads.

Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Rules Ammended

90UN1281N Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 13 Mar 90 p 2

[Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic law "On an Amendment to the Regulations of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic" published under the rubric: "First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Lithuania of the First Convocation"]

[Text] With the goal of defining more precisely the system of electing and recalling the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR **decrees:**

1. To amend Regulations of the Lithuanian SSR with Chapter 11.1 as follows:

"Chapter 11.1"

"Election and Recall of the Chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet"

"Article 16.1 The newly-elected chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet is elected by the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet at its first session.

"In the event of the retirement, death, or recall by the Supreme Soviet of the chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, a new chairman is elected at the next session of the Supreme Soviet.

"The chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet is elected from among the deputies of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet by secret ballot for the term of the Supreme Soviet and for not more than two successive terms. Elections of the chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet will be considered binding if no less than two-thirds of the deputies of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet participate in them.

"Article 16.2 Candidates for the position of chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet may be proposed by any of the deputies of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"A candidate is considered nominated if the proposal is approved (seconded) by any one deputy of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"A single deputy of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet may propose or support (second) only one candidate for the position of chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"Article 16.3 Upon completion of the nomination of candidates, the chairman of the session reads out the last name of all the candidates and asks for their agreement to run.

"The Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet approves a sample of the ballot.

"All the candidates who have been nominated and have given their agreement to run are listed in alphabetical order on the ballot according to their last and first names.

"Article 16.4 In alphabetical order, the candidates who have been nominated announce a program for future activities. The program is discussed by the deputies of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"After discussion of the candidates' programs has been completed, the candidates are granted a concluding word.

"Up to 15 minutes are allotted for announcement of programs, and up to five minutes are allotted for concluding words.

"Article 16.5 After discussion of the programs, the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet elects a commission to count the votes.

"A break is announced before giving the ballots to the deputies of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"The ballots are certified with a seal and then handed out by the commission for counting the votes.

"Upon receiving the ballots, the deputies of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet sign their names on a list for the distribution of ballots.

"Article 16.6 A voting booth and a ballot box must be installed at the polling place.

"The ballot box is set up in such a fashion that the voter walks through the voting booth as he approaches it.

"The commission for counting the votes is responsible for the organization of voting.

"Article 16.7 On the ballot the voter crosses out the last names of the candidates he is voting against.

"Improper ballots and ballots where more than one candidate has been left after voting are invalid. Names that have been written in will not be counted.

"Article 16.8 If only one candidate is nominated for the post of chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, he will be considered elected if more than half of the deputies participating in the voting vote for him.

"Article 16.9 If two candidates are nominated for the post of chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, a candidate will be considered elected if more than half of the deputies participating in the session of the Supreme Soviet vote for him.

"If neither of the candidates has received such a majority of the votes, a repeat election is held. In this event, the candidate who receives the greater number of votes is the winner.

"If the votes are divided equally between the candidates, voting will be conducted again after a break.

"Article 16.10 If more than two candidates are nominated for the post of chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, a candidate will be considered elected if more than half of the deputies participating in the session of the Supreme Soviet vote for him.

"If no one of the candidates has received such a majority of the votes, a repeat election is held. In this event, the last names of all the candidates are left on the ballot except that of the candidate who received the smallest number of votes.

"In the event that several candidates have received both an equal number of votes and the smallest number of votes and there are three or more candidates who have received a greater number of votes than the former candidates, the former candidates will not participate in the following round of elections.

"In the event that less than three candidates have received more votes than the candidates who received the smallest number of votes, all the candidates will take part in a repeat election. If the situation does not change after the voting has taken place, voting will be repeated on another day.

"Article 16.11 In the event that two candidates remain after a repeat election, the candidate who has received the greatest number of votes wins. If the votes are divided equally between the candidates, voting will be conducted again after a break.

"Article 16.12 If the votes are divided equally between two candidates a second time, voting will be conducted again on another day.

"Article 16.13 If the winning candidate has not received more than half of the votes in elections between two candidates, open voting is conducted to determine confidence in him. If the Supreme Soviet gives him a vote of confidence by a simple majority of votes, he is considered elected to the post of chairman. If the Supreme Soviet gives him a vote of no confidence, new elections are declared.

"Article 16.14 Before each repeat election is conducted, a candidate may withdraw his agreement to run.

"Article 16.15 The Supreme Soviet confirms the results of the secret ballot.

"Article 16.16 The right to demand the recall of the chairman may be exercised by no less than 15 deputies of the Supreme Soviet. Such a demand must be presented in the form of a letter to the chairman of the session, who is obligated to bring it immediately to the attention of the Supreme Soviet.

"Discussions on the question of the recall of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet will be conducted by the deputy chairman or by a deputy designated by the Soviet.

"In the event that a demand for the recall of the chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet is presented more than once at the same session, twice the number of deputies are required for each succeeding presentation.

"Examination of a proposal to recall the chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet lasts not less than three hours.

The issue of recalling the chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet is resolved by secret vote in the event that more than half of the deputies of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet have voted for resolution of the issue."

2. To reword the third part of Article 15 of the Regulations of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet as follows:

"To conduct open voting by raising a voting card, or a roll call vote by filling out a voting card, at sessions of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet when discussing questions of adopting constitutional amendments, laws, and resolutions and when appointing, electing, and releasing from their posts officials of organs established by the Supreme Soviet, with the exception of the election and recall of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet. In the event of a roll call vote, the card is handed in to the committee for counting votes.

"The chairman will announce the results of the roll call vote and read off the last names of those who have participated in the voting. The deputies will stand up to confirm their votes.

"A roll call vote will be conducted when it is demanded by at least 15 deputies. For questions of the regulations of the session, voting is conducted with the use of an electronic computing system."

3. To acknowledge that Article 8 of the Regulations of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet is no longer in force.

4. This present Law goes into effect immediately after it has been passed and signed by the chairman and secretary of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet after their election.

[Signed] V. LANDSBERGIS, chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet.
L. SABUTIS, secretary of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet.
Vilnius, 11 March 1990

Landsbergis on 14 Mar Political Situation

WA0304191090 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 16 Mar 90 p 1

[Report by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet : "On the Political Situation in the Republic on 14 March"]

[Text] Today happens to be a sunny day. It would be nice if the sun would also shine in our hearts. Alas, clouds also occur in our life. We will have to find out in detail where they come from, why the sky is overcast, and whether we are capable of controlling our atmosphere.

It would appear that everything around us is quiet. However, disturbances are possible. Information has been received to the effect that forces hostile to the path Lithuania has chosen want to strike at our most sensitive spot—the bread supply. If someone succeeded in organizing a strike for least for a short period of time, for several days, at the bakeries and bread combine in Vilnius, this may be enough to create small disturbances in Vilnius, where the populace is mixed from both the ethnic and political point of view, and where the people indulge in various kinds of uneasiness and idle talk. As I said yesterday, the political forces that would like to raise doubts about the decisions made by us, universal expressions of the will of Lithuanians and the people residing in Lithuania, may be pursuing this goal.

Certainly the fact that several officers have sent telegrams arguing that the decisions were not harmonized with every resident of Lithuania is not a phenomenon that bothers us greatly. This was to be expected. Such declarations may be made by individual groups in the future. The only issue is the degree to which this process will be encouraged and how they will want to take advantage of it. I have already seen the disseminated advertisements and invitations to a protest meeting which is being organized by groups known to you and which are now openly uniting—such as the old-style communists on the platform of the CPSU, members of the organization Yedinstvo, the so-called defenders of socialism who still have not clarified their legal status, and still other political groups calling themselves different names. Apparently, a definite list of them also aims to show that these forces are more numerous than they really are. However, it appears that there is no particular uneasiness or disruptions in Snyechkus, though the wish has been stated that we make a declaration on behalf of the Supreme Soviet concerning the treatment of the future city of Snyechkus and its population. This desire was expressed there, and, perhaps, it needs to be carried out.

Certainly the situation in our republic depends to a considerable degree on our accord and constructive work. We have had to say many times that we strive for constructive work, that we want to find forms which include opposing views as such rather than as an expression of absolute confrontation. After all, it may happen that clashes will occur over insignificant problems which will show that the point is not the problem but something else, causing the problem to be artificially aggravated. In this instance, we encountered a multitude of very strong protests concerning a not-so-important procedural imprecision or lack of compliance with the letter, which seemingly resulted more from lack of experience than ill will. However, we have perceived that this fixation on criticism, which may also occur in a friendly manner, during a break for example, or in the form of advice, is sometimes carried out with a tendency toward peremptory criticism or discreditation.

Yesterday's discussion concerning an appeal to the residents of Lithuania calling for accord appeared rather strange. It turned out that at the very least this accord is interpreted in different ways, in other words, it is perceived as an accord only under certain conditions. Here is one appeal. I thought about it, and I heard it yesterday; what is so bad about it? To be sure, I was also able to understand and see one aspect of it which its opponents could dislike. This appeal does not endorse the campaign for the collection of signatures in Lithuania. I also discussed this yesterday morning and did not support the campaign for collecting signatures regardless of in whose favor they are collected. It is possible that signatures are already being collected against our resolutions; it is possible to collect signatures against many things. It is possible to collect signatures against both Brazauskas and Landsbergis because both of them have come out in favor of Lithuania's independence. Signatures can be collected against Sajudis with the demand for irreversible contacts between Lithuania with the Soviet Union and at the same time in support of Brazauskas, as if he were a proponent of this very stance. Complete confusion in the minds of the people may be created. This is why, in coming out against such campaigns, I thought and still think that the declaration proposed yesterday by Deputy Andrikene should not have been met with such hostility. And yet this was the case...

It is possible that we are no longer going to argue the merits of collecting signatures; beyond that there was nothing in the declaration with which we could not agree. However, it may also happen that the opposing political forces will take advantage of even an insignificant pretext just to prevent the other side from adopting a resolution. This would be bad. We would waste time and, in the event that the situation exacerbates, may give a pretext for people to think and explain that the situation in Lithuania is unstable and that they should wait and see what happens next; that the election campaign and political struggle are supposedly still under way, and that it is not clear what position Lithuania will take. This will interfere with our international recognition and our contacts with the rest of the world—ties that are called upon to protect our people from the possible consequences of a lopsided and poor economy. This is why I want to appeal once again to all the people in this auditorium and Lithuania not to look for a pretext for confrontation, act from a sense of wounded pride or the hope of restoring some position, but rather to take a broader view of the situation. The situation in Lithuania is what it is, what the elections have created. There is a majority in the parliament, and there is a minority, and this is a normal situation. I would like to appeal for only the most significant resolutions to be adopted in an atmosphere of common understanding and accord. However, if such resolutions have to be passed by a majority vote, and are so passed, this does not provide a foundation for protesting them, and is not proof that the rights of the minority are being infringed. There have been voices to this effect. They are misleading. The voice of the minority is always important; we should listen to it, we will try to listen to it. We have called, and will continue to call, for cooperation. However, the opposition of the minority should be constructive, by no means destructive, such as would obstruct further advancement. I hope that this will be the case, and this is how I would like to close my introductory remarks, inviting all of us to engage in constructive work.

Igor Zorin Comments on Lithuanian Situation

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[Text] [Announcer] And now a feature which occurs very often in our panoramas: Correspondent returns from posting. Our special correspondent in this case—and I have him with me now—is Igor Zorin, who is just back from Lithuania. I naturally asked him to share his impressions on the situation in that republic.

[Begin recording] [Zorin] I won't say the Lithuanian political knot is tighter that the Gordian knot, but, alas, so far it is proving difficult to untie, and moreover it seems to me to me to be drawing tighter and tighter, unfortunately. Yet how one wishes that it would just dissolve of its own accord, this devil's knot! I used the word political advisedly. In the opinion of many of the people I've been talking with in Lithuania, most of today's problems are the result of the political recklessness of Lithuania's present leadership. In that amber republic you can often hear that: a calm sea throws up amber nuggets on the shore, but storms produce only the fragments of ancient shipwrecks.

[Announcer] A very symbolic comment.

[Zorin] I was in Lithuania when television and radio made public Comrade Gorbachev's appeal to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and to the people of the Lithuanian SSR. On a late-night television program I saw the reaction of Vytautas Landesbergis to a question on his opinion of the message from the president of the USSR. Many people were surprised—myself among them—by the off-hand tone of Landsbergis toward the appeal by Comrade Gorbachev—a man whose name is on the lips of billions of people all over the world. And in general that name is synonymous with democracy, glasnost, perestroyka of thought, and building one peaceful home for all. You'll agree that Gorbachev's policy has revolutionized the consciousness of politicians of almost every country in the world—but not, it seems, of Vytautas Landsbergis. This conservatory professor turned politician unfortunately retains his inclination to see the world evidently in musical images, or only in musical images, or preferentially in those images, and is seemingly unconcerned about the real demands of life. In Lithuania I even heard a series of anecdotes about him. They say Landsbergis' policy is giving all of Lithuania a permanent cold. Another thing I heard is that it's time he listened to the opinion of the original inhabitants of Lithuania, who are beginning to criticize his intransigence in relations, for example, with the center. And, who knows, perhaps as a professional musician he ought to try putting on the agenda—this is purely my own opinion—the question of a vote of confidence by the people in his political activity, in which many of the world's politicians regard him as an amateur, even a beginner. The reason I've broached this subject is that I've just seen on the teleprinter that the electors of the Kharkov factories—numbering, I think, many thousands of hundreds of thousands—have again expressed confidence in USSR People's Deputy Sukhov, who himself considered he was unworthy to be such as he had not carried out a single point of his pre-election campaign. In other words, not fulfilling his program is troubling his conscience. Surely the pre-election program of Vytautas Landsbergis didn't include any mention of an irrevocable break with the USSR?

[Announcer] I think at that time it was put rather more mildly, shall we say.

[Zorin] In any case I doubt whether it was included in this form.

[Announcer] I doubt it too, frankly. Well, your question is entirely legitimate. Thank you for your interesting report, which I'm sure everyone has listened to with attention. [end recording]

Prunskiene Interviewed on Lithuanian Independence

90UN1233 Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 3 Mar 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with K. Prunskiene, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet and deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers, by A. Gasyunene: "The Baltic Path May Become a New Model for Relations"]

[Text] [Gasyunene] In the course of the USSR Supreme Soviet session this week you had a detailed conversation with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. Please tell us about that meeting, your impression of it, and whether you came away from it with anything new.

[Prunskiene] Six members of the Supreme Soviet from the Baltic republics—and academician Eduardas Vilkas and I from Lithuania—talked with Mikhail Gorbachev on a wide number of issues concerning the restoration of statehood to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. In my opinion, this conversation was something of a step toward a dialogue on a qualitatively new level. While previous conversations and discussions concerned important but primarily isolated issues, for example turning enterprises over to the republic's economic complex, implementing laws on independence, or the Army, that stage is now past and our dialog is underway. On our side we have clearly formulated a proposal to begin negotiations on the restoration of Lithuanian statehood. Mikhail Sergeyevich said that this would be disadvantageous for the republic and that we will have our fill of independence before long, but he did not have any convincing arguments this time either. We cannot understand why ties must be broken if they are profitable for both the Baltic region and for the Union. All the more so because this time both sides persistently bore in mind the concept that these negotiations should be based on mutual understanding and the avoidance of artificial obstacles.

I reminded Mikhail Sergeyevich that he had once taken a positive stance, although that was with respect to terms of federation. But what has changed if 12 republics of the Union continue to cooperate with three independent states? Of course we may see the appearance of a desire to penalize or punish, but we do not think that the leaders of a large state will be influenced by such a mood. On our side we have the historical experience and justice that we gained in negotiations between an independent Lithuania and Soviet Russia in 1920 and the USSR in 1939. This tradition could be continued now too.

[Gasyunene] Our conversation gives one the opportunity to sense how fast and how deep are the changes occurring in our self-consciousness. I remember that a year ago the demand for greater rights or secession from a strong center seemed laughable. But today there are new realities...

[Prunskiene] Yes, an era of new relations has arrived. I especially felt this upon my arrival at the CSSR embassy, where I was invited along with other USSR Supreme Soviet deputies on the occasion of a visit by President V. Havel. We have different historical experiences and paths of development, but we are beginning to perceive one another as equal partners in a coming collaboration. And our intentions are of the very best.

We want democratic parliaments to be formed in Russia, the Ukraine, and the other republics. We have contacts with many of the candidates for deputy. Right now it is difficult to foresee how the forces will group themselves and which currents will become strong and prevail. But the general mood is to be independent and to escape from the same traditions of wielding power and ineffectively administering everything from a strong center.

Each republic has its own path. Perhaps some will create a completely new union, but we insist on our independence and aspire to the restoration of Lithuanian statehood in order to realize our potential and so that the people of Lithuania may live better.

[Gasyunene] That means that the negotiations and their outcome have become the center of attention. The aspiration of the people of Lithuania has been expressed clearly and concisely. But any negotiations involve as a minimum the interests of two parties.

[Prunskiene] We must be great diplomats and not idealize any one force. The subject of the negotiations in this instance is the Soviet Union and Mikhail Gorbachev as leader of the state. Recognition of his role and his relations with the world community as well as the importance of that factor—all this creates a specific context for negotiations which must be taken into account. I just had a detailed conversation on this subject with deputies of the republic's newly elected Supreme Soviet where I talked about the work being conducted in Moscow step by step. Several—I emphasize several—came to the conclusion that I overestimate Mikhail Gorbachev's good intentions to carry the negotiations to a positive solution. But one must not insist on only one model for the development of a process, especially one as complex as the restoration of statehood. That is risky. One must also take a realistic view of the situation of the second party and consider the position of Gorbachev and his influence. His personal attitude, his desire to keep us in the federation or, on the contrary, to let us go, is not the free decision of Gorbachev the man. The decision will be made by Gorbachev the politician and head of state.

Lithuania now finds itself at the center of world public opinion. This factor is very important. Any interference on the path to the restoration of our statehood will simply be evaluated by the world community as a political defeat. Our actions are based on parliamentary methods and the restoration of historical justice. And of course that evokes sympathy.

Today trust means quite a lot. For instance, the USSR's way out of its economic crisis depends in large part on how it is perceived in the world and what sort of partner it is in this matter. This very factor becomes a specific guarantee that we will achieve the goal we have set.

[Gasyunene] We are speaking about the principal trends of high politics. Even as we recognize this, we nevertheless seem to apply it to ourselves, our families, and our daily life. Therefore it is appropriate to ask: What will happen tomorrow, and what will tomorrow be like in general? I expect that your voters, who are getting ready to vote for you in the runoff elections on Sunday, will also ask this question...

[Prunskiene] Yes, of course they will ask it. Doubts, uncertainty, and questions about what Lithuania is will pass immediately. But life consists of the simplest things, and people tend to worry about whether there will be work, guaranteed social security, and national equality. Therefore, in our conversations with Mikhail Sergeyevich we also tried to examine a number of economic ties. There is a proposal to leave several joint enterprises in Lithuania if it is reasonable and profitable for both parties, and not to keep, as they say, "one's hand in." Reaction to the latter in Lithuania has been strained, and the parliament will, of course, decide the issue.

We put much hope in the broadening of cooperation with Western countries and firms. For the time being we are at the beginning of our path. Interest in our production and labor potential is huge. I am not exaggerating when I say that today there is pilgrimage of business people from all over the world to Lithuania. We must make effective use of this interest and not let the opportunity go by.

[Gasyunene] But for the time being our market for basic items, raw materials, and sales is with the East, not the West. What kind of prospects for cooperation are there in this case?

[Prunskiene] The notion of "a strong center" has now lost its former meaning. Direct contacts between republics, regions, and enterprises must become our center and our basis for cooperation. And we are mapping out blocs of such programs for all sectors. Here we are supported by many colleagues and deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet. But the timing for this is complicated. The previous administrative and command ties are collapsing, and new ones are being instituted under difficult conditions of anarchy and poor discipline. For that reason the stabilization of the economy takes on special significance today, and the establishment of order in all the teams is a most important point of policy.

[Gasyunene] As you mentioned, economics and economic accounts exist in any bloc of bilateral negotiations. But today Lithuania is a multiethnic republic. Is this reality being taken into account?

[Prunskiene] Yes, this question has also been discussed and it will be considered further in the course of negotiations. Over the decades a unique demographic structure, one that is very diverse, has formed in the Baltic republics. According to the deputies who participated in the discussion, this issue is exaggerated out of all proportion. I know that none of the three republics intends to infringe upon the national and social interests of the non-indigenous population. And the economic program is not divided up. Who and what is it being done for, but for all the people of Lithuania. The Union side brings up a number of issues concerning the security of the national and social interests of the non-indigenous population. People of all nationalities living in Lithuania should feel confident and secure. And at that level, problems should be decided sensibly on a democratic basis.

[Gasyunene] There are many debates and thoughts concerning what sort of path Lithuania is following. Many tend toward the Finnish variant of development, and now the Austrian version is being mentioned. Are they acceptable in our circumstances?

[Prunskiene] I incline toward the view that a special, Baltic path of restoring state independence and emerging from the economic crisis is arising. Certainly the experience of Finland and postwar Austria is instructive. But we are living in the realities of today, and they require new approaches to political and economic problems. And I see the formulation of this Baltic path of development most of all as the responsibility for its implementation. It is especially important that an agreement be reached now to approach the solution of these questions on a Union level.

Kaliningrad Deputies Tour Lithuania

PM0604083590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by USSR People's Deputies V. Voblikov, A. Obolenskiy, and T. Poluektova: "Two Days in Lithuania"]

[Text] We were brought to Lithuania by the concern of our electorate and primarily of the inhabitants of Kaliningrad Oblast, who could not fail to be perturbed by the decisions of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet on the republic's withdrawal from the USSR. After all, these decisions vitally affect the interests of the inhabitants of Kaliningrad Oblast, which could be separated territorially from the remainder of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. The sometimes contradictory reports on instances of the oppression of the Russian populations and of illegal actions by our troops also gave rise to alarm and to a desire to acquaint ourselves personally with the situation in Lithuania.

During our two-day stay in Lithuania we, together and separately, visited two enterprises of union significance—the Vilnius branch of the experimental scientific research institute of metal cutting tools, in whose collective Lithuanians predominate, and the institute-plant of radio measurement instruments, where Russians make up 80-85 percent of the workers. We attended a meeting of inhabitants in Snechkus City, with a predominantly

Russian population. We talked with inhabitants of Ignalina City (at the post office, in a store, and with militia workers)—a typical Lithuanian city. We met with the party aktiv of the section of the Lithuanian Communist Party which stands on the CPSU Central Committee platform and with its secretary, V.N. Shved, with leading workers of the republic's MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], KGB, and prosecutor's office, with members of the republic Supreme Soviet foreign affairs committee, with V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, with K. Prunskene, chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, and with deputy chairman A. Brazauskas.

The main aim of the trip was to obtain as much first-hand information as possible and to have the opportunity to form our own idea of the events taking place in Lithuania. And we are grateful to USSR People's Deputy K. Uoke for his assistance in organizing meetings with inhabitants adhering to different views. As a result we can say that the idea of the independence of the Lithuanian republic is supported by the overwhelming majority of Lithuanians and even by part of the population of Russian, Polish, and other nationalities. But there are different views on the degree of this independence and the mechanism for the implementation of the right to it, right up to withdrawal from the Soviet Union. Without data from sociological polls among the population we naturally cannot judge the qualitative correlation of representatives of particular viewpoints (we regard as unconvincing the assertion that on this question you can rely on the results of the election of Lithuanian Supreme Soviet deputies. If only because the results of other elections—to the local soviets—attest to a more cautious attitude among the population toward the policy pursued by the "Sajudis" leadership).

As convinced supporters of nations' right to self-determination and of the peoples' right to choose their type of statehood independently and to decide their own fate, we cannot nonetheless simply identify the decisions of the present Lithuanian SSR leadership with the will of its entire people. We proceed from the premise that the leadership's official position is set forth in the anthology of materials distributed among the USSR people's deputies (contained inter alia in the recent acts and laws of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet). It met with confirmation during our talks and meetings with the Lithuanian republic's top officials.

The base idea for forming the state policy which has led in Lithuania to the country's management by the group of "Sajudis" leaders is the thesis of the republic's 50-year occupation by the Soviet Armed Forces. Without attempting to analyze events of 50 years ago, we consider it necessary to note that the attempt to extend the attitude toward them to the entire duration of our peoples' joint life in one state gives rise to a number of puzzled questions.

1. If we proceed from the premise that Lithuania's occupation continues to this day, it is obvious that its independence can be proclaimed only through talks with the "occupying" authorities and not unilaterally? [question mark as published]

2. How are we to understand the categorical denial by the republic's present leadership of the legality of the election of all Lithuanian Supreme Soviets in the past 50 years and accordingly of the decisions they have taken, except for the recent Law on Elections in the Lithuanian SSR, elections which were the only ones to take place democratically under the same conditions of "occupation" (!) and gave power to democratically elected deputies?

3. If we understand from moral and legal positions the actions of V. Landsbergis and other Lithuanian leaders who, firmly convinced that the republic's "occupation" continues to this day, nonetheless agreed to run at the elections of USSR people's deputies in the spring of 1989 and accepted deputies' seats "from the hands of the occupiers? [this and next question mark as published]" Here it would at least have been possible to understand participation in the elections for the territorial okrugs, but they did not object either to obtaining 32 seats for the national-territorial okrugs as a union republic with equal rights, thus acknowledging the operation of the union Constitution on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]?

The list of these questions could be continued, but we do not set ourselves the aim of driving the Lithuanian republic's leaders into a corner. We merely want to show that the method of returning to the historical past to begin reckoning the state's most recent history from a point convenient to the views of a particular politician does not withstand even superficial criticism.

We believe that the logic of the conclusions used to justify this position is far from irreproachable and following it blindly without a careful comprehensive analysis can entail grave consequences for both the Lithuanian and the Russian peoples.

We are convinced that the Lithuanian people, like any other, have the right to decide their own fate for themselves. But here we should perhaps proceed not from speculative digressions into the past but from firm present-day realities and a calculation of the various options for the future, including the most unfavorable. Only then will this be real concern for the people's welfare. So far from our talks with the leadership we have drawn the conclusion that there has been virtually no study of economic options for the republic's development under conditions of independence. The hope that, having declared that the country has been under "occupation" for 50 years, it is possible simply to "requisition" the enterprises constructed on its territory is in our view naive, as is the thesis that the owner, having regained in the form of profit the funds invested in constructing the enterprise, loses the right to further profit, in other words, forfeits the right of ownership. If such ideas are realized, the opposite side could after all also take measures, including economic ones.

The use of the thesis of Lithuania's "occupation" right up to the present as the base thesis is also dangerous in that it has brought to life interethnic tension in the republic, above all between Lithuanians and Russians. Indeed, one can understand the indignation of people who were "assigned" to work in the republic, gave this work the best years of their lives, raised their children here, and have nothing to do with events of 50 years ago. By early March this year, according to the leaders of "Sajudis" and the far more radical "league for the independence of Lithuania," tension between the Russian and Lithuanian population and to a lesser extent between Lithuanians and Poles had been successfully reduced. But the rushed decision of the republic's new Supreme Soviet on the restoration of Lithuania's independence, which is the logical result of their doctrine of "occupation," has stepped up the tension again. While there was a general semblance of calm, this tension in relations between people could be felt, especially at meetings with the Russian population.

The Lithuanian government's use of the "occupation idea" quite naturally makes people nervous, uncertain of protection, and fearful for the future. Manifestations of extreme intolerance are also encountered, on both sides, unfortunately. The Russian-speaking population is particularly perturbed by the lack of information about events in Lithuania itself, because broadcasts are in Lithuanian. Accordingly, in Snechkus City there were questions about transmitting broadcasts, particularly those giving information, with a simultaneous translation into Russian, about publishing a special newspaper and allocating a separate television channel for broadcasting in Russian. There are also other reasons for the sense of alienation and isolation. In particular the fact that the question of the USSR Supreme Soviet's dispatch of a special fully empowered commission to Lithuania, whose aim was to set up dialogue with the Lithuanian government on the problem, so acute right now, of the defense of the interests of people who do not want to become citizens of the Lithuanian republic—this question has not been resolved.

The stoking of the sense of uncertainty in the future is occurring not only because of the lack of specific steps toward each other but also because of actions by the military authorities. People cannot fail to protest the helicopters flying over the city and the passage of military vehicles. There was a blatant violation of the legal mechanism in the solution of the question of the airborne units' taking under guard of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee building as there was in the operation with regard to the Lithuanian youths who had deserted from the army and hidden in the closed section of a psychiatric hospital. Instead of at least trying to resolve the question of their arrest within the procedure established by law, force was simply used. Moreover, as far as we know, during this action bodily injuries were inflicted on a militia worker during his execution of his official duties.

This episode in our view requires the swiftest but painstaking investigation and publicity. To ensure that its exploitation does not become the reason for the further intensification of confrontation.

It is easy to guess that these measures, instead of intimidating the population, had the opposite effect. The unceremonious use of force merely plays into the hand of the supporters of the "occupation" doctrine. Fairness requires that we note that in the incident with the deserters indirect blame also attaches to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, which by its rash decision as it were pushed a number of youths to an illegal action—desertion. However that may be, the process the process of the formation of an opposition to Landsbergis' course, which emerged after 11 March 1990, obviously slowed down after these actions.

The main conclusion to which we came as a result of our trip was that concern at the course of the development of events is intensifying. We are firmly convinced that it is impossible to resolve questions of self-determination by strong-arm methods or by unilateral decisions. Obstinacy and the reluctance to try to understand the opposite side's arguments are pushing our peoples toward a dangerous brink. It is as though that decisive moment has come when, forgetting the welfare of their peoples, the sides must find mutually acceptable decisions. Displaying state wisdom means finding a path toward ending the escalation of tension. While, it goes without saying, resolving all questions by peaceful and lawful means.

We are already about one year late in taking an active part in this process since back in the spring of last year the question of initiating dialogue and urgently elaborating a law on the mechanism for the republic's withdrawal from the USSR was persistently raised by V.N. Shved in his memorandum in the CPSU Central Committee.

We should also like to suggest to the government and Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation that in the very near future they discuss with the Lithuanian leadership the question of the protection of the interests of the Russian citizens on Lithuanian soil and of the resolution of problems connected with the special position of Kaliningrad Oblast.

Lithuanian Deputy Recounts Talks With Yakovlev

LD0604101590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1444 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Statement by Deputy Gudaitis at the Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live relay]

[Excerpts] Esteemed deputies. We have met in Moscow with Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the President Council. It seems to all three of us—your colleagues—that this conversation was important and positive. I would like only to say briefly that the conversation gave hope that mutual consultations between the Soviet Union and Lithuania may start, and these consultations should finish with negotiations.

I would like to emphasize that Aleksandr Yakovlev apprehended that our 11 March actions are irrevocable, that they are the expression of the will of the people of Lithuania. But he insisted that we should look more flexibly and creatively for formulae which would create a basis for these consultations. We should be more flexible and diplomatic. [passage omitted]

Having acquainted myself with the texts of the reply, I must say that the text proposed by the group of deputies led by Deputy Andriukaitis is more acceptable to me. It is more diplomatic and it seems to me that this is what we need. [passage omitted]

I think that we should start a dialogue now; we must create by all possible means prerequisites for a dialogue, for consultations, and later for negotiations. [passage omitted]

We need at present completely different tactics, diplomatic tactics. I think that it should be of an offensive nature; we should display initiative, knock on all doors in Moscow, even use the abolished status of the people's deputy, use all opportunities to negotiate in the name of Lithuania's interests at the highest level. [passage omitted]

The way to international recognition, the way to Rejkjavik, is via Moscow, We must start from negotiations in Moscow. Then we will come to that international recognition about which we are dreaming. Such is my opinion, and it is also the opinion of my colleagues with whom I was in Moscow.

'Soyuz' Deputies Discuss Lithuania

PM0604085190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Special correspondent Captain Third Rank V. Urban report: "'Soyuz' in Lithuania"]

[Text] Vilnius, 5 Apr—While the Third Extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies was in session our newspaper published an interview with Colonel N. Petrushenko, one of the leaders of the "Soyuz" group of deputies. He said then that the group's immediate plans included a trip to Lithuania and a study of the situation in the republic.

Nikolay Semenovich himself flew to Vilnius on Sunday. A large group of people's deputies arrived 4 April. It is well known that the Committee of USSR Citizens in Lithuania asked the "Soyuz" group to represent its interests in the USSR Supreme Soviet. One of the aims of this trip was to explain the recently adopted law on the procedure for republics to leave the USSR.

That same day deputies attended a rally in support of the USSR President's Appeal to the People of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. The rally took place outside the republic's Supreme Soviet building but no local parliamentarians attending the routine sitting came out to the gathering, which numbered, according to various estimates, between 15,000 and 20,000 persons. USSR People's Deputies V. Alksnis, Ye. Kogan, N. Petrushenko, and Ye. Kim delivered speeches. The appeal and the resolution adopted by the participants in the rally support the idea of introducing direct presidential rule in Lithuania. A warning strike scheduled for 6 April was also announced.

A rally without emotion is no rally. That is why it is always easy to provoke those assembled. So a young man with a poster proclaiming "The USSR Is the Way to Slavery..." climbed onto a small mobile tower where a fixed television camera was mounted. How should this be assessed in the situation in question? The best word for it is probably provocation. After all, that is how feelings get whipped up to fever pitch. But nor do I agree with the actions of those people who began to rock the tower. It collapsed, and the television camera with it. I think that only one man got his own way—the young provocateur. Local television naturally preferred this episode out of the whole rally. To be objective, I must say that in this case some of the rally's participants recklessly impeded the work of television cameramen and reporters.

But I did not see any of the aggression on the part of those present depicted by local journalists. The slogan which stuck in my mind was "Peace for our common home—Lithuania!" We must pay heed to this. Confrontation is intensifying here, positions are increasingly polarizing. Here is a small but typical incident. People with green armbands—representatives of Sajudis—stood outside the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet building and about 15 meters away there were guys with red armbands who were charged with maintaining order at the rally. That is the situation....

Of course, Sajudis will easily be able to organize hundreds of events of a completely different nature and assemble thousands of people at a moment's notice. Which, incidentally, it does quite often.

Students from the teacher training institute picket the Vilnius Higher Party School building virtually every day. This building is CPSU property. But the local authorities promised to hand this school back to the students, so they now periodically pose in front of the television cameras. If the reporters drive off, the pickets also disperse.

Recently Landsbergis proposed that his confederates answer with cables in support of the Lithuanian parliament's decisions. Most who sent cables advocate the republic's secession from the USSR. But this is more the kind of propaganda stunt "Sajudis" was pulling almost two years ago. Now, however, everything must be resolved legislatively. The main thing here is a well-considered approach and sober calculation. There are no signs of this at present. How should we view the cable from the Lithuanian Council of Ministers to the USSR defense minister and the chief military prosecutor, which says that Lithuanian citizens who leave their military service and return home cannot be deemed deserters? There appear to have been many explanations for this. But the republic authorities are still standing by their position. Their position is not, incidentally, shared by representatives of the "Soyuz" group of deputies.

I interviewed Colonel N. Petrushenko actually at the rally.

"Meetings in labor collectives and troop units have shown that people are most concerned by the haste and peremptoriness of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet decisions," Nikolay Semenovich said. "I remember Sajudis deputies at the first congress in Moscow. They said quite reasonably then: A parliament which allows itself to be unanimous should be disbanded. Now they are acting in the same way."

[Urban] Has there been progress in resolving the problems in the Army?

[Petrushenko] Yes, but I would like to say a special word about one aspect. I had a meeting in Kaunas with Cardinal Sladkyavichyus. The point is that all deserters have not yet returned to their units, despite the steps that have been taken, including the tremendous amount of explanatory work among the population. The local mass media have carried reports that Landsbergis has announced that the fugitives can take refuge in churches. Naturally the military command is seriously concerned about this. I was accompanied by the military commandant of the garrison and the military commissar in Kaunas. We asked his eminence to help solve the problem.

[Urban] How did the Cardinal react to Landsbergis' statement?

[Petrushenko] He said that such actions are politically wrong since the church is outside politics. The republic's leaders did not consult the church. Certainly, this is not an ecclesiastical matter, his eminence said, to get involved in worldly things. The walls of churches should not be a guarantee in such matters.

[Urban] I don't think you can have failed to touch on political questions....

[Petrushenko] Who isn't concerned with politics now? I don't think such people exist. That is why the question of what we see as the Lithuanian government's thoughtless decisions to put a stop to the activity of rayispolkoms [rayon soviet executive committees] in carrying out the spring draft and also in providing military commissariats with economic services was raised during our conversation. What is happening? For instance, a soldier—even when some misfortune befalls his kith and kin—does not know of this since reports of this kind largely go through military commissariats.... There are the soldiers' wives, to whom we need to pay benefits. How many people go there to obtain information about service life? We discussed this with his eminence. Moreover, we informed him that literally the previous day the civil defense administration in the city had been stood down, yet there is a nuclear power station next door. The cardinal said that these people who are at the helm of the republic do not think about people.

[Urban] What results has your trip yielded?

[Petrushenko] We will give a full briefing at the USSR Supreme Soviet. But I personally have divided impressions. Above all, I feel that we deputies have let the Lithuanians and all the inhabitants of the Baltic down by coming here too late. [Petrushenko ends]

On Thursday representatives of the "Soyuz" group of deputies held a reception for citizens at Vilnius Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform) Gorkom [City Party Committee].

Klaipeda City Committee Building in Dispute

LD0504232590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 5 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A plenum of the city committee of the communist party of Lithuania on the CPSU platform has been held in Klaipeda. It considered the questions of preparations for the communist subbotnik. The Bureau invited our correspondent along to the plenum. [video caption names S. Chekalin as correspondent]

[Chekalin] When we drove up to the city committee building, in the hall of which the plenum was due to take place, it emerged that the building is locked up and is guarded by militiamen armed with truncheons. We were told that the participants of the plenum had also not been allowed in. [video shows militiaman refusing admission at door of building] Nevertheless we insisted on an interview. [video shows interview with V. Greychyunas, first secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania city committee.]

[Begin recording] [Greychyunas] This building in which you and I are situated houses the city committee of the communist party of Lithuania. Here in this building is where we carry out our work. The CPSU is not housed here. According to our information it is accomodated in the House of Officers, where it has obtained premises.

[Chekalin] A question that arises at once is that this building was probably on the books of party bodies and it is still the property of the CPSU, or is that not the case? What is your answer?

[Greychyunas] It is not the property of the CPSU. It is the property of the communist party of Lithuania. The building was built back in the pre-war years in Klaipeda and in the post-war years party bodies were administratively housed here. For a long time after the war it was on the books of the local soviets, but now it is on the books of the communist party of Lithuania. Therefore, to consider....

[Chekalin, interrupting] A thing of interest is how many communists on the platform of the CPSU are there here in Klaipeda and how many are there belonging to the Lithuanian Communist Party?

[Greychyunas] Let me just say that at present there are almost 4,000 communists belonging to the Communist Party of Lithuania. [end recording] [video now shows interview with I. Bremkauskas, first secretary of the city committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania on the CPSU platform]

[Begin recording] [Bremkauskas] The building belongs to and is on the books of the CPSU. Its value is R329,000.

[Chekalin] Presumably there are documents there and even secret records?

[Bremkauskas] There are many archives there. They have been in the building for a long time now, since 1945. There are various archives and record cards, and so on. So everything is kept there.

[Chekalin] What about road transport?

[Bremkauskas] Yes, road transport, everything is in their hands.

[Chekalin] So they have handed over practically nothing to you?

[Bremkauskas] It is not even a matter of practically nothing. In the last few days they have included telephones too so that our staff members cannot work and take telephone calls.

[Chekalin] Tell me, how many people are there on the Lithuanian platform and how many people, communists, are there on the CPSU platform?

[Bremkauskas] On 4 March there were 6,555 on the CPSU platform and there are 2,900 on the platform of the communist party of Lithuania, and there are already people who have handed in their party cards. However, new young people are joining our party organization. At such a grave moment for the party and the people, you know, people are joining the party. [end recording] [video now shows L.A. Cehakyev, secretary of the party committee at the ship repair yard, speaking. Chekayev is seated along with others in same room as Bremkauskas]

[Begin recording] [Chekayev] People at the yard are at present expressing a wish to join the party, the CPSU. It is truly out of conviction. In this respect there is no age qualification, as it were. There is, for instance, a young lad of 18 years, in fact he is not yet 18 years of age. He is longing to join the party. He says he cannot now not join the party and asks that he be admitted. At the same time there are people over the age of 50 years, in the past we somehow put an age restriction on them, who are also saying that they have not been party members but at this present difficult moment they want to join the party. [end recording]

Lithuanian Army Service Anomalies Viewed

LD0504165590 Moscow TASS in English 1637 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Vilnius April 5 (TASS)—"Lithuanian youths should serve in the army on the republic's territory," the former Lithuanian leadership and the Sajudis movement urged recently.

The Soviet Defense Ministry satisfied this request. Many recruits were left to serve in the units deployed close to their homes.

"One hundred and seventy seven Lithuanian youths were called up to our unit. Together with those transferred from other parts of the country, there are a total of 214," Major General Alexander Zhitnikov told TASS. "However, the republican leaders hold too lightly the destinies of the young men and openly encourage Lithuanian soldiers to engage in illegal actions. They desert their units and are hidden in churches."

Instigation to desertion continues, including on the highest level. Zhitnikov produced a telegram received on April 4. It was addressed to the Soviet defense minister, the USSR deputy prosecutor general—chief military prosecutor, the commander of the Leningrad Military District and commanders of military units, and was signed by Lithuanian Prime Minister Prunskiene.

It said that on March 12, 1990 the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet had adopted a resolution suspending the Soviet law on universal military service on Lithuanian territory. Thus, citizens of the Lithuanian Republic who give up military service and return home, cannot be regarded as deserters and criminal proceedings cannot be instituted against them. Issues dealing with the defense interests of the Soviet Union and Lithuania, including further military service of Lithuanian youths in the Soviet Armed Forces, will be settled by means of talks between the governments of the Soviet Union and the Lithuanian Republic.

An answer to the prime minister was given this morning. It said that "in accordance with the Soviet constitution and other existing laws, servicemen, including from the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, who leave their units without permission, are regarded as deserters. This is why they will be searched for, detained and called to account, including the institution of criminal proceedings."

The general said that "the new leaders of the republic continually speak about violence on the part of the center. However, they try to act only from the position of strength. There is no logic in it."

Vilnius Demonstrators Object to New Procurator

LD0604082890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Sajudis Information Agency report]

[Text] Vilnius—On 5 April Arturas Paulauskas, the procurator of the Republic of Lithuania, was prevented from entering the republican procuracy. At 1300 about 1,000 people picketed there. The main slogan of the picket was "Paulauskas yes, Petrauskas no".

Jurgis Jurkevicius, senior procurator of the Procuracy, read an appeal by Liudvikas Sabutis, secretary of the Supreme Council of Lithuania, which stated: to the USSR Procuracy official Petrauskas. Being supported by armed force, you have occupied the premises of the Lithuanian Procuracy and have been appointed the procurator of the nonexistent Lithuanian SSR procuracy. You are forcing people to disobey the laws of the Republic of Lithuania and are hampering the work of other state institutions. This has to be termed as sabotage.

At 1630 about 40 soldiers and officers armed with automatic weapons occupied the building of the Procuracy of the Lithuanian Republic. They wore militia uniforms. A group of Lithuanian and foreign journalists witnessed this.

Press Conference Told of Procuracy Occupation

LD0604083990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Sajudis Information Agency Report]

[Text] Vilnius—On 5 April, after the evening meeting of the Republican Supreme Council, a press conference took place. Questions from journalists were answered by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania; deputy chairman of the Supreme Council Kazimieras Motieka; deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers Romualdas Ozolas; and secretary of the Supreme Council Liudvikas Sabutis.

Kazimieras Motieka, speaking of the incident on 5 April at the republican Procuracy, noted that the intrusion of 40 soldiers armed with automatic weapons cannot be regarded as the maintenance of public order. Soldiers occupied all the floors of the building, mounted guard, and established headquarters in several rooms. These actions, Moteika continued, are incompatible with both Soviet and Lithuanian constitutions and are contrary to the norms of international law.

Landsbergis informed the journalists that three U.S. senators intended to visit Lithuania: Alfonse D'Amato, Gordon Humphrey, and Frank Murkowski. They have been granted Lithuanian visas, but with the strengthened regulations on the border there may problems about the arrival of these senators, the chairman of the Supreme Council noted.

The foreign minister of the Republic of Lithuania, Algirdas Saudargas, has left for Warsaw to meet with the senators.

Lithuanian Procurator Unable To Enter Office

LD0504225790 Vilnius International Service in English 2200 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Today the chief procurator of Lithuania, Arturas Paulauskas, was not allowed to enter his office. At present his office is occupied by Antanas Petrauskas, specially appointed by Soviet general procurator (?to) Lithuania.

The Lithuanian procurator's office has been taken over by the Soviet Interior Ministry troops and a number of the armed men in militia uniforms inside the building is growing.

Moscow on Situation 'Heating Up' in Lithuania

LD0504171590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Now to the situation in Lithuania. Here's a conversation between our correspondent Vladimir Bezyayev and Vilnius correspondent Elyana Kurklietyte:

[Kurklietyte] The session of the republic's Supreme Soviet is continuing today. For several days now they have been discussing the reply to the appeal from the USSR president to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. I cannot say whether the deputies will decide on a final version of that reply today either, because every sentence is being discussed and practically every word is being weighed.

The draft on the deputies' status and on the structure and apparatus of the Supreme Soviet is also being deliberated today. The agenda for today, the 33d plenary meeting of the session, also contains the matter of control committee and the nature of protection committee, which are to be reformed and made subordinate to the Supreme Soviet. The deputies likewise plan to supplement the republic's agricultural code, they will hold a second reading debate on the draft law on enterprises, and most likely the entire cabinet of the Council of Ministers, consisting of 17 ministers, will be presented.

[Bezyayev] Elyana, we are all interested, of course, in how the public is reacting to the deputies' decisions, and perhaps you could give us a sort of outline of the atmosphere in the republic. Are things heating up?

[Kurklietyte] Yes, there have been very many rallies of late. Yesterday there were rallies involving many thousands in Klaipeda, Kaunas and other towns in Lithuania in support of the Supreme Soviet's decision to restore Lithuanian independence. Many thousands will be taking part in a similar rally in Vilnius tomorrow, and rallies will be held in other towns in the republic. These are being organized by Sajudis, other public organizations, and the unions of Lithuania.

In Vilnius yesterday, outside the Supreme Soviet building, there was also a rally in support of the USSR president's appeals to the Supreme Soviet and to the people of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. This was organized by the Committee of Soviet Citizens in Lithuania. USSR people's deputies Alksnis, Tikhonov, Shuvalov, and other representatives of the Soyuz group of deputies took part in the rally. One of the speakers dwelt in stark terms on the need to introduce presidential rule in Lithuania, without considering it necessary to conduct any talks between the governments of the republic and the union. Extreme measures such as the disbandment of the present Supreme Soviet of Lithuania, the annulment of all legislative acts passed by it, and the announcement of fresh elections were also proposed. The rally resulted in two documents: an appeal to the people of the USSR and a resolution. One of the documents announces that a warning strike is to be held, and that unless the demands put forward in the resolution are satisfied an indefinite strike will be declared. So there you have it.

Some of those involved in that rally behaved extremely aggressively, you know. They knocked over some Lithuanian television mobile cameras that had been set up on high ground, as well as the cameramen who intended to cover the rally; they beat up some of the participants and lashed out at reporters. Up until then, despite the very, very intense situation in Lithuania, there had been no public disorder.

[Bezyayev] Well, given this, how are these emotions being kept in check? How are they being stopped?

[Kurklietyte] Well, you know, I think the law and order bodies will be handling these incidents.

Vagris on Latvian Communist Party 'Crisis'

LD0604093890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0330 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Text] The Latvian Communist Party congress opens in Riga today. The stream of resolutions and documents received bears witness to the clash of ideas and alternative draft programs that will take place at the congress. In the republic there are up to 50 different parties, sociopolitical movements, and organizations. The congress was preceded by sharp discussions in the press, at meetings, and at conferences and plenary meetings of communists. Our correspondent Ninel Meshkun reports:

[Meshkun] Having permitted itself to be drawn into a debate, the Latvian Communist Party in essence lost the election campaign and changed from being the ruling party into an opposition one. There is no longer unity in its ranks. In the course of party discussions and plenums, words are already being heard about a crisis in the Latvian Communist Party. This was the subject of my interview with Yan Yanovich Vagris, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party.

There is a crisis in the party. How do you assess the situation.

[Vagris] In the process of discussions on the status of the Latvian Communist Party there was a delineation between the communists who think that the Latvian Communist Party should be independent. The supporters of this view planned to hold their congress of the Latvian Independent Communist Party on 14 April. We favor an autonomous party but without breaking ties with the CPSU. That is, in essence, the fundamental difference and the subject of discussion. Therefore, we must say this unambiguously at our own congress before the planned congress of the Latvian Independent Communist Party.

Latvian CP Facing Split as Congress Convenes

PM0604085790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by Lieutenant Colonel A. Ranevskiy: "Latvia: Spring of Hope?"]

[Text] Riga, 4 Apr—The unusually early spring in Latvia has stimulated, as it were, a growth in political activity in the republic. Spring betokens hope. But hopes are not always realized. The other day, for example, the city's evening newspaper regretfully informed supporters of the Estonian People's Front [EPF] that they cannot rejoice at the results of the runoff elections in Riga for the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet. Only two candidates supporting the EPF won in nine electoral okrugs in the city.

For supporters of Latvian independence the loss of even one deputy's seat means reduced chances of achieving the necessary majority in the new parliament. Many Rigans preferred to vote for the good of the republic within a renewed Soviet federation. Repeat elections for the Supreme Soviet are in prospect, and imminently, 6 April, yet another important event will take place—the opening of the Latvian Communist Party's [CP] 25th congress.

A large group of servicemen—68 people—figures among its delegates. Army Communists are opposed to federalism in the party and demarcation on national grounds.

However, no illusions should be cherished. The situation in the party is very difficult. The split dividing Communists into different camps is deepening. The champions of an independent Latvian Communist Party are basically representatives of the indigenous nationality and will be holding their own congress. For the time being, however, the delegates of the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress have the floor.

TASS Previews Latvian Communist Party Congress

LD0604082990 Moscow TASS in English 0743 GMT 6 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga April 6 TASS—The 25th Congress of the Latvian Communist Party opens here today to discuss and approve the party's programme and rules and elect its leading bodies.

The nearly 800 delegates to the congress are divided about the future status of their organisation.

Some believe the party should be independent and maintain only "partner relations" with the Soviet Communist Party, while crusading for Latvian independence. They hope that no less than 20,000 communists, mostly ethnic Latvians, from among the party's 177,000 members will rally to their support.

A more numerous group favours complete independence for their party, but without cutting organisational ties with Soviet communists. They believe Latvian communists should be represented in the Soviet Communist Party's elected bodies and take part in party and social renewal in the Soviet Union.

Surprisingly, a third party emerged on the eve of the congress. It calls itself "The Third Way" and aims to reconcile the first two camps. Proponents of the third way suggest setting up a union of sovereign equal parties coordinated by a small centre. Ethnic feuding will destroy the Marxist movement in Latvia, they warn. About 60 per cent of Latvian communists will not side with any of the first two trends, they believe.

The flood of letters and resolutions and the cast of delegates suggest that the fight will be a hard one.

Only eight per cent of the delegates represent workers and farmers. Most delegates have higher education. Forty-one per cent are Latvians. Ten per cent say they belong to the People's Front, two per cent side with the Interfront Russian-speakers movement.

The congress is expected to last two days and should its participants "leave through different doors," the Baltic region with a population smaller than that of the city of Moscow, will boast six communist parties.

Latvian Leader on Independence, Moscow Ties

AU0604103790 Vienna AZ in German 6 Apr 90 p 6

[Report on interview with Latvian Popular Front leader Mavriks Vulfons by G. Hoffmann-Ostenhof in Vienna; date not given: "I Simply Like Gorbachev"]

[Text] "I simply like Gorbachev," Mavriks Vulfons, one of the leaders of the Latvian Popular Front, stated. He is on good speaking terms with the Soviet leader. Unlike Lithuania, the small Baltic republic of Latvia, which was also annexed by Stalin in 1940, wants to embark on a more temperate course toward independence. However, it will also formally declare its independence in the near future. "We are pressed for time," Mavriks Vulfons, a historian and deputy to the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, who is still a member of the Communist Party, stressed in an interview for AZ in Vienna. The Latvian parliament in Riga, which is dominated by the Popular Front, will convene on 3 May—according to Vulfons. At this session Latvia will declare its independence. "We do not want to repeat the Lithuanian example," Vulfons stated. However, he thinks that the way Moscow is currently treating Lithuania is scandalous. He is outraged about the harassment on the part of the Russians. Vulfons, who is one of Latvia's most popular politicians, is in favor of holding talks before May. He knows how to speak with Gorbachev. "He is a very complicated man," he pointed out, giving me a photograph that showed him having a friendly conversation with Gorbachev. On the reverse of the photograph the following sentence was written: In memory of our joint work during the years of perestroyka. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. "He gave me the photograph, telling me jokingly: I wrote that so that you cannot show it to your radical friends. This shows the contradiction of the man."

The Latvian proposal allows for compromises. The republic wants independence, but acknowledges Soviet security interests. The Soviet Army should be allowed to maintain bases on Latvian territory, and access to the ports should be regulated. In addition, the 38-percent-strong Russian minority should be granted full minority rights.

Will Gorbachev accept this? Vulfons is optimistic: "Gorbachev may be a tough negotiator, but so far he has always been open to proposals."

Platform Supporters Barred From Party Congress

LD0504234990 Riga International Service in Latvian 1730 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Summary] Some supporters of the so-called Democratic Platform, for the time being still a comparatively small group of reformers of the CPSU in Moscow, Leningrad, and other central regions, have come to Riga to observe the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress. According to latest information, however, the Secretariat of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee has not admitted them.

New Latvian Foreign Minister on Independence

AU0104155190 Vienna Domestic Service in German 0500 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Interview with new Latvian Foreign Minister Eiznspocs by Wolfgang Grosse in Russian with superimposed German translation—recorded; place and date not given]

[Text] [Grosse] The most influential political forces of your republic are striving toward an independent Latvian state. Could the secession of the three Baltic republics not have negative effects on the stability of our continent, and what place does an independent Latvia take in the all-European process?

[Eiznspocs] The idea of Latvian independence and sovereignty is now on the agenda and it affects all inhabitants of the republic. Of course everybody has his own view in this question. There are different approaches to the really most complex, multi-faceted question. I am in favor of avoiding any precipitous action, of dealing with this idea in a business-like manner, and looking both, toward the East and Europe. Latvia is part of Europe, and it is of interest to us how the European states and peoples react to the developments here. I am in favor of solving the question of sovereignty without exacerbating the situation in the republic, through the exchange of opinions, cool judgments, meetings and talks. I think that everyone is proceeding along these lines, and thus we have a real chance to adopt those declarations adopted by the Latvian Supreme Soviet last year and early this year. Latvia was visited by a European Parliament delegation last week. In the course of the talks with this large group of deputies and officials, we specifically discussed how Latvia and the USSR can approach those processes that are taking place in Europe, and what contribution small Latvia can make to the common European home. It must not stay outside.

[Grosse] Mr. Minister, by what you just said you have characterized the situation of Latvia on our continent. In your personal opinion, what should be the priorities of a future independent Latvia?

[Eiznspocs] The independence of Latvia, particularly its economic independence, is not a question that can be decided overnight. This requires a certain amount of time, and it requires great efforts to increase labor productivity, to establish a balance on the domestic market, and to promote our products on foreign markets. This is why the questions of sovereignty and independence of our republic are accompanied by the task of setting the priorities in our cooperation with other states. Today I perceive these in our economic relations with our neighbors, the states of the region of the Baltic Sea. We have a particular interest in relations with the members of the Nordic Council. As you know, this organization has existed for several decades, and it has a rich tradition in the spheres of economic cooperation, humanitarian contacts, and it considers environmental protection to be one of its priorities. Latvia has an entire range of ideas of how to save nature. We should coordinate our ideas with the Scandinavian states, because the Baltic Sea affects us all. If one country has purification plants, but the other does not, the sea will not become cleaner. This means that the priorities are in the economic sphere, in a new attitude toward work, and the search for goods for trade on the European market, the creation of the necessary foreign currency reserves. All this is becoming more and more realistic since we already established the Latvian Bank. This means that we are gradually proceeding, but we are concentrating on the economy.

Latvian Youths Incited To Evade Draft

LD0504181490 Moscow TASS in English 1755 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 5 TASS—Latvian Popular Front and some other public organizations' calls in mass media to evade the draft to the military service were considered as a incitement to crime by the Latvian procutrator's office, the IZVESTIA newspaper writes today in its report from Riga.

Popular Front's leadership has appealed to the Latvian youth to ignore military commissriats' call-up papers and not to go to recruiting stations.

Popular Front's leadership calls for sabotage of the USSR Council of Ministers' decree on the regular call-up of citizens to the military service, the statement reads. Popular Front's actions contradict the USSR constitution, the republican constitution, and the union and republican legislation.

"Latvian Popular Front's activists and even some people's deputies of the USSR and the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic, blinded by the idea of separatism, make irresponsible statements in mass media and provoke the youth to commit a crime against the state," the propcurator's office states.

Military service is a constitutional duty of each citizen of the republic, the statement reminds and enumerates articles of the Latvian criminal code connected with the responsibility for the evasion from military service.

"Latvian Popular Front's leadership is not troubled by the fact that young people could be imprisoned," the statement reads.

Estonian People's Control Decision Rejected

LD0604100890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1015 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 6 Apr (TASS)—As has already been reported, the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR on 4 April adopted a decision on halting the operation of the People's Control Committee of the Estonian SSR, which will in effect entail the abolition of the whole system of organs of people's control in the republic. This violates Article 92 of the USSR Constitution and a number of articles of the Constitution of the Estonian SSR and also the USSR "on people's control in the USSR."

A report from the USSR People's Control Committee stresses: It is quite obvious that any action aimed at eliminating the organs of people's control will essentially lead to the undermining of one of the main principles of socialist self-government of the people and considerably restricts the possibility of active participation by the workers in resolving questions of state and social life.

The USSR People's Control Committee assesses the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR of 4 April 1990 as unconstitutional and considers it essential that all organs of peoples control in the republic should continue to fulfill the functions they are charged with by law.

Local Soviets Protest Estonian Decision

LD0504171190 Moscow TASS in English 1656 GMT 5 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn April 5 TASS—The decision of Estonia's Supreme Soviet to declare the Soviet power illegal in Estonia has aggravated the socio-political situation in this Soviet Baltic republic.

A resolution on Estonia's state status passed on March 30 proclaimed the beginning of a transitional period which should end by the formation of constitutional bodies of state power in Estonia.

The decision arouses discontent predominantly among non-Estonians who account for about 40 per cent of the republic's population. Most of them live in the north-eastern part of Estonia.

An emergency session of the Soviet of People's Deputies of the town of Sillamyae, held on Sunday, declared the resolution on Estonia's state status invalid and said that it would not be carried out on the soviet's administrative territory as contradicting the Soviet Constitution and the Constitution of Soviet Estonia.

The deputies requested the prosecutor-general of the USSR and the Soviet minister of the interior to transfer control over the city's Public Prosecutor's Office and militia directly to the centre for the time until the constitutional conflict is resolved.

A city council in Khotla-Yarve, another major industrial centre in the northeast of Estonia, also declared the resolution on Estonia's state status illegal in the town's administrative borders.

A group of Russian-speaking deputies to the Estonian Supreme Soviet expressed their discontent with the proposal already during the preliminary discussion, but the bill was put to vote and adopted. Part of the Russian-speaking deputies refused to take part in voting.

Deputy Lembit Annus said that the Estonian Supreme Soviet was not ready for a normal discussion of such documents, commissions that should prepare all projects had not been formed, and the time-limit for the work of Estonia's parliament had not been fixed either.

"There is an impression," Annus said "that those who voted for the resolution tried to demonstrate their solidarity with Lithuania at any cost."

The advocates of an immediate renunciation of Soviet power in Estonia rejected the proposal of President of the Estonian Supreme Soviet Arnold Ryuytel to put off the bill's discussion, to form a presidium of Estonia's parliament and instruct it to work out a compromise variant with due account of proposals and amendments.

According to Annus, Estonia's Supreme Soviet and its hasty decisions only aggravated the conflict inside Estonia rather than demonstrated any political support for Lithuania.

Estonian Speaker Urges Lithuanian Flexibility

LD0504123190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1733 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Moscow, 4 Apr (TASS)—The tense situation in Lithuania is causing serious concern in other republics of the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

"I am not sure that such a high-ranking body of state power as the Supreme Soviet should adopt decisions the implementation of which is known to be impossible," Ulos Nuqis, speaker of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] told a TASS correspondent. As a politician, he did not wish to voice categorical judgements about the actions of the Lithuanian leadership, but as an ordinary citizen, he believes the tactics chosen by "Sajudis" to be erroneous. "On the level of proclamations, one can declare even a monarchy but, after all, this does not mean that a kingdom will subsequently appear," said the deputy. "I think that the fundamentalists from "Sajudis" have realized their error and are now making corrective alterations to their tactics and are beginning to act more flexibly." Hopes for a stabilization of the situation and an easing of tension have appeared. [passage omitted]

Tallinn Antidraft Demonstration Reported

PM0504114190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by TASS correspondent A. Kharchenko: "Estonia: The 'Defense Union' Again?"]

[Text] Tallinn—"Based on the decisions of the Estonian Congress, we demand that the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet and government stop assisting the compulsory conscription into the Soviet occupation Army," these words were uttered in front of the ancient city hall during a rally organized there by the Tallinn Christian Democratic Youth Union. It was USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution 305 of 29 March 1990 "On the Discharge From the Ranks of the USSR Armed Forces and Border, Internal, and Railroad Troops into the Reserve of Servicemen Who Have Fulfilled the Prescribed Period of Active Military Service and on the Next Draft of Citizens for Active Military Service in April-June 1990" which gave rise to this.

"I am against serving in the Soviet Army," stated Tiina Hallik, member of the Estonian National Independence

Party, who is the daughter of K.S. Hallik, people's deputy of the USSR and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Tiina Hallik opposed the Law "On Labor Service in the Estonian SSR" because with it anarchy and disorder will appear in the republic. But Estonia does need defenders who will provide a reliable barrier on the republic's eastern border!

An appeal to join the Kaitseliit (Defense Union) was made at the rally. During the years of bourgeois Estonia this organization helped the authorities maintain order and enjoyed every support from President K. Pats' authoritarian regime.

Opening Session of Estonian Parliament Viewed

PM0204143990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Session Opens"]

[Text] Tallinn, 29 Mar—Credentials were presented to Estonian Supreme Soviet deputies today in the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet's Hall of Sessions.

The republic's new Supreme Soviet is starting work in a rather complex atmosphere. At the recent 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress two parties were formed—both were communist parties and their leaders lay equal claim to being the true successors of the Estonian Communist Party. Communists, who won 55 of the Supreme Soviet's 105 seats were already dispersed among various social organizations and movements. But now, following the demarcation of positions, the situation could become even more complicated.

During the election campaign, following the elections, and even the day before the session opened many people were trying to guess which coalition would be the leading coalition in parliament. No single power has a majority in parliament. The largest representation is held by the People's Front of Estonia (46 seats); it is followed by the democratic "Free Estonia" association (13 seats); while the "Greens," the Labor Collectives' Union, and the Agrarian Union have a few seats each. Organizations with influence among the Russian-speaking population are represented by 27 seats at the Supreme Soviet.

"The longest life in the political arena will go to the party which can win independence for Estonia"—that idea has been repeatedly stated by Estonian newspapers on the eve of the session. There is a grain of truth in it, since in recent months the desire to acquire statehood has received new impetus in the process of the preparations for and holding of the Estonian Citizens' Congress. The congress and its elected Estonia Committee are setting themselves the goal of restoring the republic on the basis of the 1938 Estonian Constitution. More than 20 members of the Estonia Committee are deputies to the new Supreme Soviet.

The 28 March meeting of the Estonia Committee adopted an appeal stating that the Supreme Soviet is an administrative organ of power, whereas the committee reflects the Estonian people's interests. The committee proposed proclaiming a transitional period during which preparations for the restoration of an Estonian state would be made using political and constitutional methods.

It is worth noting that the committee representatives complained that they had recently achieved no mutual understanding with the Estonian People's Front. It is not difficult to find the reason behind this dissension. Estonian People's Front leader E. Savisaar is counting on becoming the head of government. Otherwise, why would he run for the Supreme Soviet, all the more so since—as a deputy—he is barred by law from holding the post of economics minister? It is thought that Savisaar's chances are not good; the chances of I. Toome, the current chairman of the Estonian Government, are far better.

A.F. Ryuytel, the current chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, was elected chairman of the Estonian Supreme Soviet at today's session.

TV Interviews Estonia's Malkovskiy

LD0504172490 Tallinn Estonian Television Network in Russian 1600 GMT 29 Mar 90

[Excerpt] The opening of the first session of the 12th Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic took place in Tallinn today. Our correspondent reports:

[Begin recording] [Correspondent] The newly elected deputies started work at 1200. Prior to the opening of the session there was a scheduled plenum of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, at which the communists confirmed the powers of the newly elected Central Committee and delegated to the alternative Central Committee of the Communist Party on the platform of the CPSU Central Committee the representatives from primary party organizations of Narva, Sillamae, and Kohtla-Jarve. A new secretary of the Central Committee was also elected at the plenum. He is Vladimir Malkovskiy.

[Malkovskiy] Well, first I must tell the communists who are standing on the platform of ideological and organizational ties with the CPSU that I have not changed my convictions, and I am with them. But in order that things should proceed normally in the republic, and that the transitional period should proceed without any complications, I think that it is necessary to join the Central Committee. I would call it a central committee of parity. Therefore, on the recommendations of the joint plenum of the city committees of the party of Narva, Sillamae, and Kohtla-Jarve, I consented to become secretary and today I have been elected secretary of that Central Committee. [end recording] [passage omitted]

City, Rayon Party Organizations Granted Autonomy

LD0504174390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] A plenum of the coalition Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia took place in Tallinn today. Questions connected with the financial and economic activity of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia in the transition period were discussed. It was decided to give starting 1 May the city and rayon party organizations the right to become financially autonomous. The plenum has finished its work.

Estonian Communist Party Leaders View Split

LD0504203490

[Editorial Report] Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian at 1100 GMT on 29 March carries in its 45-minute "Peak Hour" program a discussion between presenter Raul Malk and Enn-Arno Sillari, first secretary, and Harri Roots, secretary, of the indepenent Communist Party of Estonia. Malk notes that the party's third plenum, held this morning, elected another secretary, Vladimir Malkovskiy, and also adopted a party statute. Sillari says that there are also issues beyond the scope of the statute that still require solutions.

Raul Malk asks what is now different for the rank-and-file communist, now that the party is independent. Roots answers: "I think that first and foremost it is that the Communist Party of Estonia has begun its transformation into a parliamentary party with a democratic society, into a party that functions on the basis of its constitutional and program documents, on an equal footing with all other political parties which exist in the given society and which participate in politics. And also, as is the custom in the civilized world, the main outlet for the Communist Party of Estonia should become the parliament. This is, well, a principled change but I would like to emphasize once again that this process is still in its initial phase and is only just beginning to take shape."

Asked about the existing CPSU membership cards which communists still hold, Roots says that there is a prevalent view that now, when communists are asked to express support for the independent Communist Party of Estonia, they do not need their CPSU cards. He goes on: "We cannot indeed force anybody to discontinue their party—CPSU in this case—membership; we have no such intention. The intention is indeed to provide a communist with an option. We understand very well that in that way we will place communists in an unusual, one could say, an extraordinary and not at all easy situation: well, to decide for themselves, with their own heads." Everybody is welcome to leave the CPSU but nobody will be pressured to do so, he says.

Malk asks: "Reading the program that has been adopted, could one in brief assess it as the program of the left-wing party of the independent Estonia?" Roots answers: "One could broadly define it as such. But one must understand one thing here: This Communist Party of Estonia program has not been adopted for ever. It is not of the kind which will stand for centuries and thousands of years, yes? Instead, it is a program whose main period of action or activity should be the period during which we will emerge from our present crisis situation within society, here, in this selfsame Estonian society." When Malk suggests that it is thus valid for six months, for the transition period, Roots says that Raul Malk must have a great sense of humor if he thinks that a crisis in society can be overcome in six months.

Malk says that it is his personal view that CPSU Secretary Girenko, while in Estonia during the Communist Party of Estonia congress, exercised some influence over the night party, the pro-CPSU section of the Communist Party of Estonia. He asks Sillari and Roots if it is their view that Moscow has not yet adopted a uniform stance on the matter, comparing what Girenko said in Estonia and what their Moscow contacts have said to Sillari and Roots since. Sillari says: "I think, yes, it wil be discussed and of course, there is no uniform opinion within the CPSU Central Committee."

Estonian CP Congress Debates Outlined

PM2603120790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Mar 90 Second Edition p 3

[Special correspondents I. Teterin and V. Shirokov dispatch: "At the Estonian Communist Party Congress"]

[Text] Tallinn, 25 Mar—The Estonian Communists' forum has spent three days in heated debate. It revolved around the crisis phenomena in society's life, the republic's future state system, and the Communist Party's [CP] role and position in the contemporary political system.

It became clear from the very first hours of the congress' work that delegates were divided into supporters of two alternative options for the party's future. According to the first and numerically stronger group, the Communist Party must become autonomous and must struggle for the attainment of Estonia's state independence. The second position's stance is that the Estonian Communist Party should not break its organizational unity with the CPSU and should engage in active practical work to create a new Soviet federation on the basis of the conclusion of a new union treaty.

This debate, which was dramatic in many respects, resulted in the adoption of an action program for the Estonian Communist Party in the new conditions. It lays down the main strategic goals, even though the program as such will remain in effect only until next fall, when a regular congress of the Estonian Communist Party will be held. That is when it will be finally adopted, together with the statutes of a renewed Communist Party. The current period has been described as transitional. Each communist will have to autonomously decide for himself to what extent he supports the idea of the Estonian Communist Party's reorganization into an autonomous party. A decision on the principles of mutual relations with the CPSU will also be elaborated later —with due consideration for the documents to be adopted by the 28th Estonian Communist Party Congress.

The Estonian Communist Party congress decided to introduce the post of party chairman, whose holder will not be a member of the Central Committee or its bureau and is accountable to the congress alone. V. Vyalyas, former first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, was unanimously elected to this post.

It was also decided that a delegation of Estonian Communists will take part in the 28th CPSU Congress. Some of the delegates to the forum of USSR Communists were elected yesterday. The remaining delegates will be elected by party districts.

A sharp debate developed at the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress on the question of elections of the party's leadership organs—its Central Committee and Secretariat.

A.N. Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, attended and addressed the congress. A detailed report on the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress will be published by PRAVDA in the very near future.

Strife in Estonian Party Congress Detailed

90UN1339A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 28 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent S. Tarakanov: "A Night Vote"]

[Text] Tallin—*There is a saying: All's well that ends well. The forum of communists of Estonia had two endings. Last Sunday at 13 minutes before midnight, a part of the delegates, united around the program of the independent Communist Party of Estonia, declared the adjournment of the congress; the delegates who adhere to the platform of the Communist Party loyal to the CPSU continued it. After establishing its managerial organs and adopting documents, they concluded work late at night on Monday.*

Many delegates were surprised that the Central Committee submitted the political report, and not the summary report, for their attention. V. Vyalyas, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia, who presented this report, attributed this to the especially important question that is troubling everyone today. The question concerns the future of Estonia. In the opinion of the speaker, it is necessary to take three factors into account in making this determination: "First, Estonia, as the primordial home of the Estonians, and the land of their ancestors, is located right here. And it can only be located here in the future. Second, just as true is the fact that Estonia's neighbors are precisely those states and peoples who encircle us from the east and the west and from the north and the south. And they will not disappear. The neighbors are not selected—they are a given. Third, at the present time, hundreds of thousands of people of other nationalities are living on the territory of Estonia whose integration with respect to Estonia is quite different. However, this notwithstanding, it is on this plot of land that they live. This is a fact that should be taken into account."

It was impossible, of course, not to agree with these initial positions. But the report was interspersed with points of view on the most important questions that basically did not coincide with the interests of many Russian-speaking communists. And first and foremost is the problem of the state independence of the republic.

"In the report and the draft program," said, V. Chetvergov, a candidate member of the bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia, "hopes stick out like a sore thumb to break political relations with the USSR, and not only to preserve economic relations, but to get the greatest possible favorable treatment."

Also recalled is a statement by A. Gusev, the first secretary of the Morskoy Rayon committee: "Some very much want to leave the head of the cow in the USSR, but the udders—in Estonia."

But the most typical was the speech of A. Sammalpyarg, an instructor in the Khiyumasskiy Rayon committee. I will quote him in detail: "The Communist Party of Estonia is split today. The inevitable happened, but there are cracks and splinters in the entire CPSU monolith. Recall at least the reports about the so-called oblast revolutions in the party organizations of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. They are without a national coloration. Then is it appropriate to talk today about national sources of a great opposition? The reasons for our agitation are that the state today is not in a position realistically to propose reliable guarantees for the protection of the rights and interests of a majority of the citizens. Estonians need rights for survival and protection against the threat of dissolution... Instead of dismantling the unitary Soviet state, which was established by the 'great leader of all peoples,' we are offered its modernization... What can we do? I suppose there is one way out—to create a single universal mechanism for the protection of individual rights and all residents of the republic. This can be attained by an independent Estonian state that is the subject of international law."

The discussion, which every now and then reached a dramatic tension, was conducted, in fact, around a dilemma: To be or not to be an Estonia that is part of the Union, and its Communist Party, that is part of the CPSU?

Another epicenter in the conflict of opinions was the evaluation of the work of the Central Committee. Several delegates proposed recognizing it as unsatisfactory. For example, G. Israelyan, the chief of a department of the Tallinnskiy gorkom [city party committee] declared in this respect: "I believe that in the last year and a half the Central Committee was not able to organize the fulfillment of its own decisions. The impression is left that all of its activity was directed at the organizational and ideological disintegration of the party, a lessening of its role in the sociopolitical life of Estonia, and a surrender of its positions. This went on under the slogan of dismantling the command-administrative system, which, incidentally, does not care a rap. It is alive, but it changed its Moscow registration to a Tallinn registration. But then the struggle against the authority of the party turned into a struggle against the party itself... In what do I see the unfinished work of the Central Committee? In the erosion of criteria and uncertain reaction to sociopolitical events. The impression was created: The Central Committee was accountable not to the party organization, but to the People's Front."

Supporters of a "satisfactory" evaluation (in particular M. Luukas, the first secretary of the Paydeskiy Rayon party committee of the Communist Party of Estonia) asserted that it was the situation that dictated "reasonable" and "well-considered actions." As a result, the activity of the Communist Party of Estonia Central Committee was recognized as satisfactory.

But the main conflict broke out over the documents of the congress. And the first "wedge" to be driven into the crack that led to the split was the draft of the "statute of the transition period of the Communist Party of Estonia." It announced that, during the transition period, members of the party who did not want to combine belonging to an independent Communist Party of Estonia with the status of a member of the CPSU could submit a statement on withdrawal from the CPSU along with the party card. However, two pages of the typewritten text with the draft statute were not reviewed by the congress, but "they did their thing." At the center of verbal skirmishes were the drafts of the program of the reorganization of the Communist Party of Estonia, the resolution "Concerning the Historical-Legal Evaluation of the Activity of the Communist Party of Estonia," and the appeal of the delegates to all members of the Communist Party of Estonia. V. Kovtun, secretary of the party committee of the Estonian maritime steamship line, in connection with the presentation of these documents at the congress, read a statement of the delegates who stood on the CPSU platform. It said that the adoption of these documents practically means the destruction of the Union, the split of the Communist Party of Estonia, and the creation of a new party.

And that is what happened, when the program for the reorganization of the Communist Party of Estonia was adopted as "a basis." Afterwards, V. Malkovskiy, the first secretary of the Narva gorkom [city party committee] of the Communist Party of Estonia, informed the delegates of amendments that were submitted to the editorial commission, but not taken into account by it. A proposal was also heard to rename this document "Theses of the Platform of the Communist Party of Estonia for the 28th CPSU Congress." Arguments flared up around the documents. In the end, it was agreed to reprint and make multiple copies of the document, inasmuch as, after its changes, it was difficult to understand when listening to a reading of it. The second day of the work of the congress ended on this, giving hope for a compromise.

At the Sunday morning session, the first to speak was A.N. Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. I will note: On the very first day of the congress, he related in detail the attitude of the CPSU Central Committee toward events in the republic. "Some comrades," he said, "link the independent policy of the development of the Communist Party and its withdrawal from the CPSU with the independence of Estonia. What this kind of an approach can lead to, if all of the consequences are not considered, is clearly indicated by the situation in today's Lithuania and its Communist Party." And this time as well, the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU expressed himself in a well-reasoned way for the prevention of a split, proposing to present the program of the Communist Party of Estonia as the opinion of communists to the 28th Congress.

During a critical discussion, the draft program for the reorganization of the Communist Party of Estonia acquired a new heading—"The Communist Party of Estonia under New Conditions (program)." Four hundred and twenty-one delegates voted for this. The 232 delegates who voted against, after getting together at the meeting, came to the conclusion that to preserve unity during the transition period a proposal should be made to elect a coalition secretariat, but not to take part in voting on the "program."

The proposal of E.A. Sillari, secretary of the Communist Party of Estonia Central Committee, to establish the position of chairman of the Communist Party with very great authority came as a surprise to the delegates. It was proposed to elect V. Vyalyas to this post in an open vote. The delegates were practically unanimous on this question.

And again a conference of the delegates-supporters of a single CPSU. This time before the elections of the leading organs.

By the way, during the voting at the congress of leaders of supporters of the unity of the CPSU, A. Gusev, L. Annus, P. Panfilov, and V. Kovtun, as the saying goes, were blackballed, and the remainder received from 94 to 266 votes against. And so what? Communists N. Zakharov and G. Smirnov, and later V. Yermolayev also, who were elected to the staff of the Central Committee of a now already independent Communist Party of Estonia, gave up these powers. A political statement of the delegates who were in the CPSU was also read. It announced that part of the delegates in a unilateral procedure adopted a program, which signifies the elimination of the organization of the CPSU in Estonia and the start of the formation of a new party.

Thus, the crisis reached an apogee at the congress. E.A. Sillari, first secretary, who was elected by the plenum of the Central Committee of the independent Communist Party of Estonia, proposed that four persons be co-opted to the staff of the Central Committee. A lot of proposals came in not to select those who were "blackballed." One more spark of hope to preserve unity was still smoldering. Of the 605 persons in attendance in the hall, 324 voted for co-opting—a minimal majority. On this, in the opinion of the delegates of the independent Communist Party of Estonia, the 20th Congress completed its work.

But the congress...continued. I. Shepelevich, the director of the Kh. Pegelman electrotechnical plant, became its chairman. Despite the late time, the tension of the discussions did not subside. Basically, the congress approved the platform of the CPSU Central Committee, decided to conduct a referendum among the communists, and it sent a letter addressed to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and to M.S. Gorbachev.

The 20th Communist Party of Estonia Congress evokes complex feelings. There was a lot of emotion here, going too far on both sides. As was aptly observed by one of the delegates, it resembled the work of the First Congress of People's Deputies. It was painful to see when worker V. Baranovskiy, seeing the futility of bringing the discussion of the program into a peaceful channel, turned in his mandate and left the hall. Of course, this is not the main thing. It is the result that is painful. It is not easy to comprehend one's comrades who became party members, but not of your party.

A.N. Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, spoke dozens of times at the most difficult moments. It was interesting to hear his opinion about whether a single party could have been preserved.

"It could have been," he answered, "if the congress adopted its program as a draft for the 28th CPSU Congress. This would have made it possible for it to work as a single party in the six-month transition period."

7 'Dangerous Criminals' Arrested in Estonia

LD0504164990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1500 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 5 April (TASS)—According to a statement issued here by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the organized crime unit of the ministry of internal afairs of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic, in collaboration with the militia of Estonia, Georgia, and Novgorod oblast, have arrested a group of seven dangerous criminals.

Having stolen six machine guns and 24 magazines with 720 rounds from a military unit stationed in Estonia, three former servicemen of the unit sold the arms to a number of citizens, including members of cooperatives and persons with previous convictions.

While operational investigative measures were being carried out, armed persons who had resisted arrest were rendered harmless. In addition to the stolen machine guns, other items were confiscated: several revolvers, a small-caliber rifle, a carbine, machine gun and revolver components, and ammunition. In the course of the operation, a previously committed murder was uncovered. In all, criminal proceedings are being instituted against 21 people.

RSFSR

Yarov Elected Leningrad Soviet Chairman

LD0504102490 Moscow TASS in English 0954 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Leningrad April 5 TASS—Yuriy Yarov, 45, defeated a furniture plant director and an environmental protection official to become the new chairman of the Leningrad regional soviet on Wednesday [4 April].

Yarov, who is younger than his opponents, banked on his reputation as an efficient chief of the Leningrad Executive Committee.

He is an experienced manager, for many years served as a chief engineer of a large plant, and was then promoted to director.

For several years he had a party job and for the past 18 months he led the Leningrad Regional Executive Committee.

Other contenders for the post at the continiung sessior of the Leningrad region legislature were: Stepan Kolomeytsev, general director of a furniture plant, who for many years served as a deputy minister in Kazakhstan, and Valeriy Esinovskiy, chairman of the environmental protection committee in the city of Kirishi near Leningrad.

Leningrad KGB Chief on Oblast Crime

90UN1324A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 24 Mar 90 p 4

[Report on interview with Lieutenant-General A. Kurkov, head of the Leningrad Oblast KGB administration, by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA special correspondent A. Kadzharov: "Without an Informant"]

[Text][A. Kadzharov] The National Labor Union (NTS), which obtains its financing from Western special services, openly conducted a meeting of its paid activists in Leningrad recently. One of them, R. Yevdokimov, even made it to the second round of the city council elections.

When people learn about this they must start thinking: What is the KGB doing? Have we become so tolerant that in accordance with pluralism we will register a political organization tainted by its cooperation with the Nazis in the past and actively anti-Soviet at present?

[A. Kurkov] The answers to these questions are not as simple as it may seem at first glance. You can judge for yourself: The NTS has changed one of the items of its program—the item that insisted on an armed overthrow of our regime. Even though they still demand a return to the prerevolutionary order and do not recognize the communists' right to exist, we have to take this into consideration. However, neither myself nor many others are particularly happy about it.

[A. Kadhzarov] Can such an approach result in a weakening of KGB functions and, therefore, in a threat to our security?

[A. Kurkov] I do not think so. The perestroyka made us stronger, especially from an organizational point of view. The present structure of the Leningrad KGB administration repeats to a large extent that of the union KGB. There is an intelligence service and several counterintelligence subunits. Their goal is to uncover agents of foreign services and subversive centers. The number of those, unfortunately, is not diminishing even now, in the fifth year of the perestroyka.

We also protect state secrets; we try to prevent any damage to the country's economy, as well as acts of subversion. We also try to stop major dealings in hard currency, smuggling, and terrorism. We have an investigation department and subunits for government communication.

Finally, we have a service generated by the Second Congress of People's Deputies. The congress repealed the infamous Article 70 of the criminal code. Our administration for prevention of ideological subversion "served" for this article. To provide for the new task of observing the constitution, and nothing but the constitution, a new subunit was formed to protect the Soviet constitutional structure from any attempt at violent action against it. Note that the emphasis is on the word "violent."

[A. Kadzharov] The limits of permitted behavior have expanded considerably; for this reason the KGB should stay informed better than before. In this connection I have to ask you about outside informants.

[A. Kurkov] There are no such people in the KGB. Our organization is highly professional. Among our employees are graduates of higher educational establishments who have been specially trained, of course. There are also young people with secondary education. They come to us after military service, and now join KGB higher schools.

Good education, by the way, is a tradition that came to the KGB from the legendary Cheka. Do you happen to know that 20 percent of Cheka officials during the first years of the Soviet power had higher education? And this was not present higher education but a real classical one. One of every six Cheka officials could be fluent in foreign languages. But by the early thirties only a little over one percent of the GPU employees were graduates of higher educational establishments.

It is different now. Only well-educated people and not fanatics, drunk with the knowledge that they can do anything, can be in charge of the situation in the city, comprehend the processes taking place in it, and have a well-defined idea of what state security should be. As far as I know, none of them think that they are doing something objectionable from the moral point of view. By the way, we also get letters written of their own free will by people who do not work for us. I want to assure you that we are interested only in those that mention acts of violence directed against individuals and against the country. The information we receive is never used to violate or damage the rights of the individual.

[A. Kadhzarov] But until recently it was quite different. As recently as 1985 people were persecuted and subject to repression; manuscripts were confiscated. What should be done to those who were doing all that? Many people now demand that they be severely punished.

[A. Kurkov] No matter how negative your attitude may be toward the events of the 60's, 70's, and first half of the 80's, you cannot think of them as repression. Legal and administrative action was taken against the people in accordance with the laws of the time. Investigations were conducted under the control of the procuracy, and both prosecutors and defense lawyers participated in trials.

There have been changes in the evaluation of those events, in legal practice, and in the law. Therefore, we can now talk about reviewing some concrete cases in accordance with existing regulations. But there is no reason to talk about punishing the officials who participated in the case of one or another dissident, for instance. These people were executing the law of the time. However, if they were rude or unethical at that time, or did not observe the standard procedure, then, of course, it is different. Similar violations are treated in a special way and our employees are punished. This did happen once in the Leningrad KGB administration also.

[A. Kadzharov] Anatoliy Alekseyevich, is there any current danger of armed action against our regime?

[A. Kurkov] That kind of danger can never be excluded, I think. The same can be said about terrorist acts. In all these cases we take an active part in the investigation. Here is an example of a recent incident. A man came to one of the departments of the Leningrad First Medical Institute and asked that his present, a box of cognac, be given to a professor who was absent at that particular time. After the man left, a lab assistant decided to have a look at the cognac. She was killed by the explosion. We participated in the investigation of the incident during its first stages until we established that the crime was committed for personal reasons.

We also follow up on the threats frequently received by various officials. Fortunately, most of them prove to be false.

[A. Kadhzarov] A number of organizations have emerged in our city which to me seem extremist. There are groups of anarchists, nationalists, and even of undisguised fascists.

[A. Kurkov] Let me tell you right away that the KGB administration knows the people who openly support Zionist or, for instance, anti-Semitic views. In case of any real action we, of course, will take the strictest measures. As for fascism, it seems more like a stupid attraction of some young people to specific symbolism rather than anything serious, if we can judge by the materials of recent years. Here is what is important: It is disgusting and appalling to look for scapegoats among the representatives of one or another ethnic group and thus to resolve one's own problems. As for Leningrad, according to my information all the rumors are based on an over-emotional interpretation of various statements and not on a real worsening of interethnic relations. Such statements can be qualified as an intentional call for ethnic feuds.

[A. Kadzharov] By the way, there has been a law adopted for that particular case, too.

[A. Kurkov] This should be applied, and not only in Uzbekistan where a certain "fighter" for the nationalist idea was recently punished.

[A. Kadhzarov] Tell me, please, how is the general criminal situation in Leningrad compared to the fight against crime? The KGB participates in the fight, too, doesn't it?

[A. Kurkov] The situation in Leningrad, as probably in many other cities, is rather out of balance. Economic hardships, lax discipline, decreasing respect for the law, as well as the revolutionary psychological atmosphere of breaking away from the past—all these contributed, of course, to the increase in crime. As you know, this normally happens in any country setting out to transform itself. Here is a question to counter yours: What was the first venture of our law-enforcement system at the beginning of the perestroyka?

[A. Kadzharov] It was a commutation of punishment. Quite a large number of criminal cases were reviewed; half of the convicts were released; deferred punishment started to be practiced.

[A. Kurkov] That is correct. To this I want to add that it has become very difficult to obtain an arrest warrant from the procuracy although the law, generally speaking, provides for it. I know this because from 1983 through 1989 I was in charge of the Leningrad militia. And this is what we have now: some people had committed crimes but were allowed to go free after having signed a statement about not leaving their place of residence. These people committed hundreds of new crimes. An extra-cautious approach to applying Article 206 of the RSFSR penal code on hooliganism is another example of an action that resulted in an increase in serious crimes against individuals. These crimes have their roots, as lawyers know, in Article 206.

[A. Kadhzarov] What about less serious crime?

[A. Kurkov] I have to talk about the legal situation again. We stopped using Article 209, which punished people for evasion of work and for vagrancy. So we now have thousands of people hanging around in the city doing nothing. As a result we have many hundreds of apartment burglaries. They take whatever they see, including food from the refrigerator. My general opinion is that we started to talk too much about organized crime and the mafia and stopped paying due attention to so-called first-time offenses, which means 70 percent of all violations of the law, and which means young people left without any supervision or anything to occupy themselves. Our recent political debates ignored our eternal problem—young people's leisure time. When society separates into strata according to material well-being, it turns money into a real cult. This is the basis of many crimes.

[A. Kadzharov] Referring back to the mafia: What cases are you now investigating?

[A. Kurkov] Together with the militia we recently arrested several large groups of criminals. We are investigating some cases of smuggling. We know about some Soviet citizens who have established contacts with foreign criminal groups. They try to smuggle art objects, antiques, and jewelry from Leningrad and to bring computers, video equipment, and other rare goods from abroad.

Some of those investigations will soon be finished. Speaking in general, our "profits" from smugglers recently exceeded R2.5 million.

Recently we got on the tracks of a group of scientists who invented an extra powerful narcotic. Just think about it: An entire institute full of experts could not synthesize it for many years and they did it at home!

We have some information on the illegal exports of petroleum products from the country. Somebody exported them in huge amounts as oil by-products. This trace does not stop at Leningrad enterprises.

[A. Kadhzarov] Is it true that the technical information which has been obtained abroad brings savings of many millions of rubles to the country's economy and completely covers all the expenses of the state security service?

[A. Kurkov] Yes, it is true. Unfortunately, I cannot say any more about this.

[A. Kadzharov] Tell me,if possible, about the counterintelligence service. How important is their work, especially in connection with the obvious relaxation of international tensions?

[A. Kurkov] I must say that none of the Western subversive centers or intelligence services stopped their activities because of the perestroyka. On the contrary, they became noticeably more active.

They continue to recruit agents from among Soviet citizens; they have not ceased to be interested in the political trends of our country and in our defense hardware. We are trying to put a timely end to their hostile actions. Lubman, Kazachkov, and Pavlov, the spies who were arrested in Leningrad, are now serving their sentences in a corrective labor colony. The KGB is watching some people who are suspected of spying, and not without reason.

[A. Kadhzarov] The law-enforcing organs have recently been showing more concern for the purity of their ranks. When you were requested by Yu. Andropov to take charge of the Leningrad militia, for instance, some of its officers had to leave. They were the people tainted by their contacts with criminals, people who had violated laws. How are things in the KGB in this respect?

[A. Kurkov] I do know both systems. Generally speaking, requirements were always stricter for the KGB officials. For that reason we do not need to start an immediate campaign to clean up our ranks. But sometimes unpleasant incidents also occur. For example, a KGB administration official attempted to tell someone about KGB methods and interests, quite legitimate by the way, in a certain person. This official was, of course, immediately fired.

[A. Kadzharov] The mass media often inform us about idling ships and railroad cars with full loads of imported consumer goods. So the people naturally want to know when the sabotage of transportation will be stopped.

[A. Kurkov] We have no reason to qualify the transportation problems as sabotage. We are building a rule-of-the-law state all together and we should be guided only by the law. Any other approach benefits only those who see extremism in everything and add to the tensions. These people are trying to apply pressure on law-enforcing officials.

But if we start talking about the outrage—I cannot think of another name for it—of unloaded cars and rotting rare produce, I want to name general lack of discipline, lack of flexibility, negligence and dereliction of duty as the reasons for it. It seems more difficult to bring the system into some order than to find a "saboteur."

[A. Kadhzarov] Anatoliy Alekseyevich, please answer the most frequent questions from the RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA readers' letters. These people are interested in the work of the state security service. For instance, what do you think about the Pamyat society?

[A. Kurkov] The Pamyat society has not been registered in Leningrad as such. We must be talking about a dozen or so people calling themselves its members. Two of them were given a warning last year because of their actions, and one more received an official warning.

[A. Kadzharov] The RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, unlike any other paper, regularly writes about the informals. What is your opinion of them?

[A. Kurkov] The informal organizations are part of today's reality. Most of their members are sincerely supporting the perestroyka. But people are only human. Some of them, probably, are rather ambitious in their plans. But I think it would be incorrect to consider them dangerous to the country at present.

[A. Kadhzarov] What should be done about dissident literature confiscated in the past?

[A. Kurkov] One can demand that it be given back. But I am afraid that most of it has been destroyed according to regulations.

[A. Kadhzarov] A question in this regard: Does the KGB influence the press?

[A. Kurkov] No, it does not.

[A. Kadhzarov] Is there an inside prison on the grounds of the Leningrad KGB administration? Rumors are still circulating about cells in the basement of the "big house."

[A. Kurkov] The basement is there but it has never had any cells in it. We do have a prison or, rather, a detention center.

[A. Kadhzarov] Who is in detention now?

[A. Kurkov] Over a dozen people—mainly smugglers and people representing organized crime.

[A. Kadhzarov] Who controls the KGB's work?

[A. Kurkov] A special subunit of the procuracy supervises the observance of laws by the KGB.

[A. Kadhzarov] Do you listen to people's telephone conversations and censor letters?

[A. Kurkov] Yes, we do, but only after a procurator issues a warrant. For that we have to prove to him that it is absolutely necessary for the success of a given investigation. But we do not do it "just in case" or for our own information.

[A. Kadhzarov] Tell me a few words about yourself, if you can.

[A. Kurkov] I am 59. I am a CPSU member. I have served in the KGB since I was 23. I started as a translator and later was transferred to investigations where I worked for many years, both in Leningrad and abroad.

[A. Kadhzarov] For this work you were decorated with two combat orders. Excuse me for interrupting, but I hope some day you will be able to tell RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA readers about your foreign trips.

[A. Kurkov] I would not mind doing that.

Leningrad Readers Back 'Chauvinist' Article

PM2703121590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Mar 90 Second Edition p4

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA own correspondent A. Kalinichenko under the rubric "Serious Subject": "Who Are We Deceiving?"]

[Text] Leningrad—Futile! I am afraid they will not hear. So many angry, pure, wise words have already been spoken and written. It is useless. In vain. Anti-Semitism is like Aegopodium. That variety of grass is tenacious, resilient, with roots like mites. Aegopodium cannot be weeded out, torn up. It spreads like wildfire, proprietorially enmeshing new boundaries in its dense web. And now its tenacious roots have forced their way into a sphere hitherto protected against openly chauvinist propaganda—the party newspaper. Before the eyes of hundreds of thousands of Leningraders. On 11 January LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA published an item by I. Losev, "Slogans in the Square."

The rubric was "Follow-Up." The author of the piece followed up his subject by quoting lines from readers' responses to a short article of his carried in the 22 October issue, when he unequivocally condemned the Oktyabrskiy Rayispolkom [Rayon Soviet Executive Committee] for refusing to allow the "Rossy" informal association to stage a demonstration. The rayispolkom decision reads as follows: "In the course of considering the application, it was established that the purpose of staging the demonstration was to change the cadre composition of cultural institutions on the basis of nationality, which runs counter to the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Constitution, as, under Article 127, the direct or indirect limitation of rights or, conversely, the establishment of direct or indirect advantages for citizens on the basis of their race and nationality is punishable by law—in the same way as the advocacy of racial or national exclusivity or hatred and contempt is punishable by law...."

The article quotes Ye. Myasnikova, a teacher and one of the leaders of the association:

"We applied to the Oktyabrskiy Rayispolkom to stage a demonstration in favor of fully nationalizing cultural institutions on Russian territory of the RSFSR and received a refusal."

The author writes: "In my view, the idea upheld by this citizens' association is defined by the word patriotism." At that time there was no reaction either by the editorial office or by Leningrad party organs to Losev's brand of patriotism in the form of the "full nationalization" of cultural institutions on Russian territory of the RSFSR. Evidently unexpected "patriotic" events like these cannot shock Leningrad, which has already seen unsanctioned "Pamyat" rallies in the Rumyantsevo Gardens, the strutting of Vasilyev and his associates within the walls of Leningrad University, purging work to "nationalize" the Leningrad Conservatory, and so on and so forth. The people of Leningrad were not amazed, not horrified, not stopped in their tracks, and the Aegopodium gained an even stronger grip than before.

And now it has been written in black and white in the party newspaper: "Would it be terrible and 'fascist' if Russian children in Russian schools were taught Russian history and culture by Russian teachers?" One would like to ask this: "Would it be terrible and anti-Russian if some teachers of literature and Russian language were not 'pure' Aryans?" For example, my father, a Russian, was taught Russian language and literature by a Buryat teacher in a remote Siberian village in his childhood. That did not prevent my father from becoming an erudite, cultured man and an expert in and lover of literature or from studying ten foreign languages. My father still corresponds with his teacher, Mikhail Markhayevich Malanov, to this day. Every letter from his Buryat teacher is an example of the long-lost epistolary genre; his letters are gramatically faultless, lucid, and philosophical. Malanov's ex-students include poets, artistes, and teachers of Russian language and literature.

...Anti-Semitism has changed its disposition. From being bashful and hypocritical in the past, it is now aggressive, brazen, and provocative. Moreover, its expression is that of the noble fighter against Russian national dignity being trampled upon by Jews. I quote from I. Losev's article: "A simple mathematical calculation shows that one in five Jews living in the Soviet Union works in culture or politics. How is this to be explained?"

The question is almost rhetorical. It is as clear as daylight to those who perceive the problem in all its "globality and seriousness": The explanation is a Jewish-Masonic conspiracy. What else? Hence the obvious conclusion that the only solution, the really salutary CATHARSIS for Russian culture is to expel people of a different creed from it. That will not be easy, of course. It will be hard to unmask those who, protected by their Russian surname and outwardly Russian appearance, are concealing the distant, hidden roots of their unsavory genealogical tree. The work ahead will be painstaking but necessary. Necessary for our descendants! Necessary for Russia! First we need Russian teachers (and, naturally, Russian students) for Russian schools, then we need Russian professors (and, naturally, Russian students) for Russian higher education establishments, Russian literature, Russian music, Russian art—have you guessed the rest? Right!

You think I am kidding, distorting the facts? Nothing of the kind. Following the publication of Losev's article in LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA the telephones never stopped ringing, many subscribers were in solidarity with the article, thanked the author, supported him in his noble efforts to free our schools of non-Russian teachers, and went even further than he had done.

I am holding a laconically eloquent letter sent in response to the article published on 11 January. "We cannot understand why Jews are not put in their place in our country, why most of them are writers, doctors, and 'Russian artistes,' or why Jews have been allowed to take over variety art for so long now. They are all head producers! Most of them are in the Leningrad Grand Drama Theater! We ask you to reply. Metal worker M.A. Sergeyev, 32 years of age, the 'Krasnaya Zarya' Plant."

...The day before Losev's article was published, "Rossy" held a picket in front of the Leningrad Publishing House. Virtually everyone taking part held a placard in their hands: "A Russian press for Russia," "SMENA is the mouthpiece of Zionism," and so forth.

They threatened that next time they would get the editor of VECHERNIY LENINGRAD, because he holds a dissenting opinion, and shouted threats and insults at journalists who walked past. But that day was not only marked by an outburst of chauvinist obscenities. There were good signs as well. Almost the entire creative collective of LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, more than 30 people, signed a letter to the editor, A. Varsobin, protesting against Losev's unconstitutional, immoral article. I would like to quote a short report carried on the front page of the newspaper on 16 January. "An open party meeting of the editorial board yesterday discussed the article by I. Losev, 'Slogans in the Square,' published on 11 January this year. The meeting deemed the article to be politically wrong and out of step with the party policy of consolidating society during this complex period of perestroyka. The meeting instructed the editorial party bureau to discuss the question of the personal responsibility of those communists who authorized its publication."

An article by V. Koshvanets, head of the party and soviet building department, was carried above this terse, uncompromising account. Lyrical and tender, it warmly depicted the author's first school teacher, a Jewish woman who had been taken into hiding by her fellow villagers in German-occupied territory. A very touching story. The journalist had chosen a confiding, conciliatory tone—but I do not believe him. I do not believe in the sincerity of the author calling for tolerance, love, and charity, because just a few days earlier the same pen which wrote the lines about the school teacher had signed the article by his subordinate, Losev, as perfectly suitable for publication. What yoga-like suppleness we sometimes find in our journalists' bodies! One day we bend one way, the next day we bend another. It all turns out equally well.

V. Koshvanets' recollections were published under the rubric "How Our Words Have Influence." Yes, Losev's words have had a bad influence: They have awakened something slumbering and terrible, something that had lain latent in some people, troubling neither them nor anyone else. But the editors were in a position to foresee what kind of impact their newspaper's words would have, despite the poetic lines. You do not have to be a big strategist in national politics to be able to do that.

I spoke to Losev on the day LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA repented. The telephone never stopped ringing. I do not think my colleague had often heard so many heartfelt words of support and approval in just one day. If I had been in the shoes of this young journalist in this situation I would have felt myself at least to be some military commander who had saved Mother Russia from the enemy hordes. A commander now being sent, innocent, to the executioner's block.

Losev did not allow me to record our conversation. "If you distort any of my words you will really upset the applecart," he said. So I will refrain from direct quotes. I will just mention my interlocutor's smart suit—to make a good show in front of the press. So, according to him, he has a negative attitude to the "disgraceful phenomenon of anti-Semitism" and even disowns the piece to which he put his signature, claiming that it was nothing more than an impartial review of readers' letters. Why, in the era of pluralism, should someone be deprived of the opportunity to defend his views? Well, first, even despite the fact that the editor, as Koshvanets informs me, removed from the original article the sections in which Losev is blatantly in solidarity with those statements smacking most of the Black Hundreds, the remainder is more than enough to give people an idea of the author's stand on the matter. Second, I will allow myself to quote Ye. Smirnov, head of department at the N.K. Krupskaya Cultural Institute, who spoke out about "Slogans in the Square" in the newspaper VECHERNIY LENINGRAD: "This is neither pluralism nor 'diametrically opposite' points of view, each of which has the right to exist. If it is, we will soon come to regard the questions of whether to rob or not, whether to commit acts of violence or not, and so on and so forth as subjects for pluralism."

So whom are we deceiving?

RSFSR Congress of Deputies Preparations

PM0604080790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 5 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "Toward the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies"]

[Text] The commission working on the main suggestions regarding the First Congress of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputies and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet session began its work in Moscow yesterday. The commission comprises newly-elected RSFSR people's deputies from autonomous republics, krays, and oblasts in the Russian Federation. The first plenary sitting chaired by V.I. Vorotnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, defined the tasks and areas of the preparatory commission's activity. Then subcommissions began their work. It is intended for deputies to elaborate proposals regarding the agenda, the procedure for holding congress sittings and sessions, the formation of their working bodies, the election of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and the chambers' chairmen and deputy chairmen, and the formation of the chambers' standing commissions and the Russian parliament's committees. It is planned to discuss a number of other important questions. The commission is continuing its work.

RSFSR Union Congress Issues Statements

904F0115A Moscow TRUD in Russian 25 Mar 90 p 1

[Text of statements and appeal issued by the Constituent Congress of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Trade Unions]

[text]Statement of the Constituent Congress of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Trade Unions 'For the Unity of Action of Trade Unions and All Workers in the Country!'

Our congress, expressing the will and desire of republic trade union organizations for renewal and consolidation, has laid a foundation for starting the process of uniting the trade union movement in the RSFSR. We state quite definitely that there lies behind this step no desire for national-territorial isolation or exclusivity. The trade unions of Russia have been, are, and will be an integral part of the trade union movement of the Soviet Union.

While favoring sovereignty and economic independence for the RSFSR and all other union republics, we are also for every possible strengthening of our state—the USSR—as the most important guarantee of peaceful labor and the free development of all nations and nationalities.

We are for real labor, civic and political rights, social safeguards for every Soviet regardless of his nationality, place of residence or religious faith; we are against any attempts to split the ranks of the working people and set the workers of different nationality one against the other.

Our call for unity also reflects real concern that national or regional separatism, sector isolationism and the dangerous phenomena that are seen today will lead ineluctably to a breakup of the trade union movement in the country and severely weaken the trade unions' protective capacity in the face of the cohesive bureaucracy and a market economy with its intensive labor and attacks on the social gains of the workers.

This is why we, the delegates to the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Trade Unions, while favoring diversity in the organizational structures of USSR trade unions and their free and independent development, are issuing this appeal to all detachments and elements of Soviet trade unions—the primary organizations and sector and inter-union organs—for unity of goals and actions.

We appeal for businesslike cooperation between the trade unions and all public movements and associations, and for independent initiatives that are made in the name of social safeguards for the workers and that support perestroyka in word and deed.

Only cohesion, mutual support, and joint struggle for high social goals will help our trade unions demonstrate that they are an authoritative and powerful public force capable of reliably defending the legitimate demands of the country's workers, peasants and intelligentsia.

For the unity of goals and actions, for trade union solidarity in the interests of the workers!

Appeal of the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Trade Unions to the 1st RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies

We, the delegates to the first Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Trade Unions in the history of the RSFSR, appeal to the 1st RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies.

The economic and ecological situation in which our republic finds itself can no longer be tolerated. The imbalance in money circulation and the consumer market, the shortages of goods, the catastrophic shortage of housing, hospitals and cultural establishments, and the debauch of speculation and the shadow economy are all affecting rank-and-file workers and their families.

One of the central conditions for dealing with the consequences of the distortions in economic policy, the miscalculations and mistakes in the location of production forces, the barbaric exploitation of Russia's natural resources, and departmental and local arbitrary rule, is to form a strong and competent government.

In this connection we appeal to you, the people's deputies of the RSFSR, in the name of the interests of the peoples of Russia, to take a special first step—to show wisdom in forming the republic Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers so that they focus their efforts on the most important task, namely, extricating the economy of the RSFSR from its crisis state and reviving Russia as a truly independent republic, and ensuring the free development of each people living on its territory.

Our congress has defined the priority direction in the activity of RSFSR trade unions as being to create a mechanism to provide social safeguards for the worker, and the spiritual rebirth of the peoples of the republic. We are convinced that you also—RSFSR people's deputies—are not indifferent to these issues. We, therefore, ask you to give the trade unions a reliable legal tool to carry out these functions and include among the priority matters to be considered by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet session a law on the rights of Russia's trade unions. The adoption of this kind of all-union law cannot be further delayed.

The trade union center of Russia is ready to cooperate with the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Expressing the interests of the workers, we reserve for ourselves the right to speak not only as a partner but also as a constructive opponent of the government, submitting our own proposals on solving the problems. In our opinion no legislative enactment or government decision affecting the interests of the workers should be adopted without first considering alternative drafts and without giving due consideration to the opinions of the republic's trade unions.

Statement of the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Trade Unions with Reference to Events in the Lithuanian SSR.

We, the delegates to the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Trade Unions, are following with alarm the development of events in the Lithuanian SSR.

It is an indisputable fact that each sovereign republic in our union has the right to self-determination. But it is also impossible to deny that secession from the USSR creates serious political, socioeconomic, territorial, and legal problems both for the peoples living in the Lithuanian SSR and for the federation as a whole.

This reality cannot be ignored, just as it is impossible to ignore the corresponding decisions of the country's highest legislative organ—the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

We call on the workers of the Lithuanian SSR to promote with all their efforts a calm and well-considered solution to the problems that have arisen. It is essential to avoid one-sided ultimatums and counter-ultimatums that only complicate our common future, no matter how it may appear to us at present. We express our firm conviction that after the adoption of laws relating to the dynamic nature of the processes in the federation and admission to and withdrawal from the federation, on which we are now working, we shall through our joint efforts be able to find a way acceptable to all.

We must create a legal mechanism that would guarantee full realization of the legitimate interests of numerically large and numerically small peoples, all national groups, and each person.

We therefore support the resolution of the 10-12 March Extraordinary Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies on the decisions of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet. We are convinced of the common sense, restraint, and well-weighed considerations of the Lithuanian people and their working class and all workers. We are well aware of their desire for the renewal of society and consolidation of the republic's sovereignty. We, as Russians, are experiencing the same feelings and we believe that the resolution of all our problems is possible only through strict observance of the laws of the USSR and by giving due consideration to the mutual interests of the Lithuanian SSR and the other

RSFSR People's Deputy Election Results

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["List of RSFSR people's deputies elected 4 March 1990 from territorial and national-territorial districts"]

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Artur Aleksandrovich **Askalonov**, head of the ispolkom [executive committee] public health department of the Altayskiy Kray Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, city of Barnaul. Blagoveshchenka Territorial District No 153 of Altayskiy Kray.

Dzhaudat Sunagatovich **Akhtyamov**, section chief of the Central City Hospital, CPSU member, city of Asbest. Asbest Territorial District No 662 of Sverdlovsk Oblast.

Volot Vandanovich **Ayushiyev**, head of the ispolkom finance department of the Soviet of People's Deputies of the Aginsk Buryat Autonomous Okrug, CPSU member, Aginskoye working settlement. Aginsk Buryat national-territorial district No 159 of the Aginsk Buryat Autonomous Okrug of Chita Oblast.

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Yuriy Mikhaylovich **Beloglazov**, director of the Sterlitamak Trolley Bus Administration, CPSU member, city of Sterlitamak. Sterlitamak Territorial District No 800 of the Bashkir ASSR.

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Vladimir Vasilyevich **Bespalov**, shop foreman at the Kovylkino Electromechanics Plant, CPSU member, city of Kovylkino. Krasnoslobodsk Territorial District No 843 of the Mordvin ASSR.

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Filipp Denisovich **Bobkov**, first deputy chairman of the USSR Committee for State Security, CPSU member, Moscow. Pliyev National- Territorial District No 122 of the North Ossetian ASSR.

Vladimir Fedorovich **Bryukhovetskiy**, first secretary of the Orekhovo-Zuyevo CPSU gorkom [city committee], CPSU member, city of Orekhovo-Zuyevo. Orekhovo-Zuyevo City Territorial District No 86 of Moscow Oblast.

Aleksandr Petrovich **Bulakh**, shop foreman at the Belaya Kalitva Metallurgical Plant, CPSU member, city of Belaya Kalitva. Krasnosulinsk Territorial District No 610 of Rostov Oblast.

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Vladimir Ivanovich **Vershinin**, ispolkom chairman of the Bratsk City Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, city of Bratsk. Central Territorial District No 389 of Irkutsk Oblast.

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The Central Electoral Commission on Elections of RSFSR People's Deputies

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Yaroslavl Rejects Nuclear Power Station Project

PM0404095790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 1 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[Report by A. Solenikov, chairman of the board of the Yaroslavl branch of the Committee To Save the Volga: "Nuclear Power Station Abandoned"]

[Text] The Yaroslavl Oblast public's two-year struggle against the construction of a nuclear heat and electric power station, which the "Yarenergo" territorial administration and leaders of the oblast soviet executive committee [oblispolkom] were pressing for, has ended in victory. The CPSU oblast committee [obkom] and the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] adopted a joint resolution on the abandonment of the planning and construction of the nuclear power station and asked the USSR Council of Ministers to provide in the country's energy program for the construction of a gas-fueled energy facility in Yaroslavl Oblast.

The obkom bureau and oblispolkom cite public opinion and proposals by labor collectives, party, trade union, and Communist Youth League organization, and a public expert council on oblast energy problems. SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA announced the setting up of the council last May under the oblast board of the USSR Union of Scientific and Engineering Societies in an article entitled "Get Independent Expert Opinion on the Project."

The council members came up with cogent conclusions on the economic, demographic, and ecological grounds for abandoning the funding of planning and survey work for the construction of the nuclear power station.

The council examined the "Nedra" ultradeep drilling association's plan for heating parts of Yaroslavl, Tutayev, Rybinsk, and other cities and settlements in the oblast based on the use of heat from subterranean water-bearing strata and the construction of water-circulation thermal power stations.

Ingush Demonstrate for Restoration of Autonomy

PM1203145190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Ali Kazikhanov report, under the rubric "Direct Line. IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "Rallies, Rallies"]

[Text] Groznyy—For several days now rallies have been on the boil in the city of Nazran. Many enterprises and establishments in the unofficial Ingush capital are not operating.

Everyone now knows of the tragic fate of this small Caucasian people. Twice the Ingush experienced the blows of Stalinist policy: In 1943 they lost their autonomy, and 10 years later they were subjected to inhuman persecution, which destroyed half their population, and deported from their native areas.

A year ago 51,000 adult Ingush signed a letter to the supreme bodies, asking for the restoration of their autonomous formation within the 1934 borders and the return of the territory which has been part of neighboring North Osetia since the time of their deportation.

Now mass rallies in support of these demands are taking place on Nazran's main square. Passions intensified after articles with which the Ingush disagree appeared in some newspapers.

"We are trying to persuade people to disperse, but as yet to no effect," I was told by A.-Kh. Aushev, first secretary of Nazranovskiy Rayon party committee. "However, we can understand the people. No one in the republic knows how this problem is to be solved, if at all."

No antisocial manifestations were recorded at the rallies. The situation is being controlled by the population itself.

Kraykom Eliminates Raykoms To Streamline Structure

PM0504111590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Mar 90 Second Edition p 4

[Correspondent V. Pankratov report: "Experiment: Rayon Committees Abolished...."]

[Text] Stavropol—The Stavropol CPSU Kray Committee [kraykom] bureau has made the decision to abolish the party rayon committees in the kray center. They do not meet present-day needs and have lost their old significance. The tasks previously resolved by the rayon party link have been assumed by the CPSU city committee [gorkom] itself. It has been reinforced. The abolition of the three CPSU raykoms has released a considerable number of party workers. Some of them have been used to strengthen primary party organizations, which were in need of this.

The city party organization's structure is now less cumbersome, more manageable, and better coordinated. The efforts of the party apparatus, which suffered in the past from the inevitable parallelism and duplication, has increased. Many Communists felt the need for reorganization. And the first report-and-election meetings before the 28th CPSU Congress highlighted the unity of their approach to that question. The kraykom bureau merely took the general opinion into account.

It is not impossible that soviet and economic organs have superfluous elements. Checking that is the duty of the kray soviet presidium, which has been instructed by the CPSU kraykom bureau to determine the future prospects for improving the administrative structures. A special party kraykom commission has been formed to resolve the related organizational tasks.

Election of Volgograd Party Leader Detailed

PM2303143790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 22 Mar 90 First Edition p 1

[Own correspondent V. Cherkasov report: "Notes From Volgograd Oblast Party Conference: Recovering From Illness"]

[Text] Volgograd—I will be honest: Volgograd is tired. Not just of the dreary empty shelves in stores, the waiting lines, and the coupons for which no goods are obtainable. It appears you can get used to even that. It is not just tired of the rumors about unbelievable catastrophies, which one, each more horrific than the one before, haunted the city for almost three months. In the end people became indifferent even to these mind-blowing fabrications.

The Volgograders are tired of the political stagnation, of the unexpected perestroyka twilight in the oblast party organization which culminated in the sixth CPSU Obkom [oblast committee] Plenum 24 January. On that day V.I. Kalashnikov, former first secretary, resigned. At the end of January, at the seventh "emergency" plenum, all the bureau members followed suit. Most of them had successfully helped him to bring the oblast's communists to crisis point.

What happened in Volgograd began to snowball throughout the country. In this sense the bitter experience of the oblast party organization served as a kind of political proving ground, as a kind of organizational experiment in the course of which a renewed party was born. After all, it was no accident that the conference was attended by guests from Bashkiria, Tataria, Saratov, Astrakhan, and Rostov-na-Donu, which had never happened in the past.

Even cursory acquaintance with the case history of the "Volgograd illness" shows that its development followed a certain dramatic logic. The slogan widely used at countless rallies—"Rid the party of the partocracy!"—did not arise in a vacuum. It is not a question of V. Kalashnikov's autoritarianism alone. Virtually all the obkom secretaries were involved in housing scandals, ate in a special restaurant, and received treatment in a special clinic. The prestigious state dachas in picturesque Latoshinka remained the last bastion of the obkom bigwigs even at a time when in other oblasts in the country they were long forgotten.

Naturally, the tens of thousands of rank-and-file communists of the oblast are not to blame for these misdemeanors of the party administrators. They have the people's confidence and, therefore, they were able to carry out the organizational and political renewal of the oblast party organization. During this process new party structures were created of which there is no mention in the CPSU Statutes, but without which the oblast party organization would be in a state of anarchy.

Practical political struggle rejects all dogma. The healthy forces of the oblast party organization have elected a provisional CPSU Obkom Bureau made up of figures respected among the people. And what all Volgograders noticed straightaway was: The wave of nervous tension in the oblast has begun to subside.

The provisional party obkom bureau is headed by Yu. Nekrasov, chief of the obkom publishing house, a quiet, well balanced man. Thanks to this institution, which did not exist in the party before, it has been possible to avoid all kind of excesses.

The purpose of all the activities of the provisional bureau is to prove to the people, and above all to persuade party members, that the party organization did not perish as a result of the resignation of the discredited functionaries.

The provisional bureau managed to ensure that the delegates to the current party conference were elected on the spot in primary party organizations in the most democratic manner possible—directly and in a secret ballot. This democratic procedure revealed straightaway who stands for what. Is it an accident, perhaps, that seven rayon first secretaries, whose attendance would have been traditional in the past, did not attend the oblast party conference? And of the former obkom members only one-third were reelected.

The delegates were least of all concerned with raking over the past. They resolutely assessed the work of the former obkom as "unsatisfactory" and passed on to building the future. Everyone understands that the times of a cozy existence and unaccountable rule by party organs are over. But what next? How can a repetition of past mistakes be avoided? And who is capable of ensuring this?

This is all the more necessary since right now there are more than 30 political or politicized groups in Volgograd Oblast, and each has its own leaders and a platform, at the very least. So that the vanguard role in society is not something that falls into your lap automatically. It has to be won in a fierce struggle. In my opinion, V. Losev, secretary of the Volzhskiy agromechanical plant party committee, expressed this concern very correctly when the new obkom was formed:

"It is necessary to depart from the bureaucratic principle, but at the same time we must avoid falling into the other extreme, that is, trying to make the bureau into a social cross-section of the oblast party organization with a set number of workers, engineers, teachers, and medics represented at the conference. People capable of accepting responsibility must be chosen as bureau members above all. The backbone of the bureau must be composed of professionals, theoreticians, as well as party politicians with practical experience.

What sort of solutions can there be? There are as many opinions as there are people, but there is only one party and it can follow only one path. And therefore, after three days of arguing, the deputies accepted with a certain amount of relief the proposal of V. Yermakov, first secretary of the Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] obkom, who said:

We must set up a commission for the transfer of power to the soviets which will at the same time draw up the tactics for the perestroyka of the oblast party organization and review the structure of the obkom itself.

And this is how the discord was resolved. Almost unanimously it was decided that the newly elected obkom bureau should work out a new structure of party organs in keeping with the demands of the times, and that the second round of the conference in June should approve it. At that conference the results of the elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress to be held in districts will also be summed up. In accordance with a special conference resolution the same delegates will also take part in the constituent conference which will establish an RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party within the CPSU.

One of the delegates described Volgograd Oblast as one of the most politicized oblasts in Russia. Nowhere else have so many rallies been held, nowhere else did the power crisis in the party drag on for so long. However, there is another side to this coin: Volgograd Oblast also occupies the first place in the country as regards the number of railroad freight cars to be unloaded. The situation as regards housing, culture, and medical care is poor. The crime rate is rising. While most of the delegates constructed their speeches around the principle "Down with former methods of work!" the most sensible among them pinned their hopes on electing an oblast first secretary capable of submitting a creative program. They expected the constructive program of renewal which everyone is waiting for and for the sake of which they had gathered to be put forward there and then.

It was no accident that one of the three days of the conference passed in discussing the candidacies for this post. And there were... 28 of them!

Finally, three candidates remained—A. Anipkin, first secretary of the Volgograd party gorkom [city committee], a man who had never, not even during the years when stagnation was at its worst, "read from someone else's script."

And also I. Rybkin, first secretary of the Volgograd Sovetskiy CPSU Raykom [Rayon Committee], and V. Kochetov, chief of an obkom department. People listened to them, argued with them, and consulted them. On virtually everything—the structure of the new obkom, methods of choosing and electing secretaries of raykoms and primary party organizations, relations between the party and the soviets, communists' influence on economic activities.

The 49-year-old Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Anipkin was on the rostrum longest. There were so many questions. Like the others, he had 15 minutes to present his program under the standing orders. However, when people take someone seriously, they tend to forget about the standing orders. And this is what happened here, too.

A. Anipkin believes that, in addition to the Volgograd Higher Party School, a professional service for the study of public opinion should be set up at the CPSU Obkom. It is impossible to manage without this, because otherwise we might again get caught unawares. Within the obkom structure provision must be made for a wage fund to be able to enlist the services of scientists as scientific consultants. There are other points. So far we have either flirted with the "informals," or we have been afraid of them. The only acceptable approach is engaging them in serious dialogue, measuring our arguments against each other, and if necessary, waging an ideological-political struggle.

I am citing A. Anipkin's program only in broad outline, realizing that it loses a great deal in this way. However, I would like to draw attention to the following detail. A. Anipkin, first secretary of the CPSU Gorkom, has been seen at all the rallies, where he almost always fearlessly entered into polemics with any audience. Therefore, the following remark of his did not look like an empty phrase:

We must not oversimplify the situation. In the city and the oblast there are forces which are trying to crush the existing order and to seize power in the literal sense of the word. People frequently give their votes to those who expose, who shout louder than others, and who engage in defamation instead of constructive criticism.

Therefore it is very important to overcome our fear of demands made at rallies and to implement our policy confidently and with persistence. The task of the new obkom consists of teaching people to distinguish the false tones of criticism for the sake of destruction from criticism for the sake of the cause.

In a secret ballot Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Anipkin won twice as many votes as his closest rival. And so he was elected first secretary of the Volgograd CPSU Obkom. The conference proceedings took place before the eyes of thousands of television viewers—they were relayed live from the conference hall. Clearly, this helped the new first secretary to win yet another victory: On Sunday a runoff was held and A. Anipkin was elected RSFSR people's deputy.

Western Republics

Belorussian Communist Party Budget Published

LD0803153190 Moscow World Service in Russian 1030 GMT 8 Mar 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature in the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] The newspapers of Belorussia have, for the first time, published the budget of the republican Communist Party. It has in its ranks 678,000 people. Their subscriptions, the party's main source of income, came to R55.7 million over the last year. More than R31 million went on the maintenance of party committees and secretaries of primary organizations released from their duties. The apparatus of the republican Communist Party Central Committee cost R1.3 million last year. For the first time, the primary party organizations were left 3 percent of their monthly subscriptions, but many consider that these funds are insufficient for their work.

Moldavian Party First Secretary Interviewed

90US0662A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 10, Mar 90 p 4

[Interview with P.K. Luchinskiy, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, conducted by special correspondents Yu. Kornev and V. Shloma: "Justifying the Credit of Trust"]

[Text] Kishinev—Our times are times of heated debate. But one of the keenest, perhaps, was at the CPSU Central Committee February plenum. And this is natural. After all, all of us—communists and nonparty people—are excited and worried today by the same questions: in what direction and by what path to proceed further? What is holding back perestroyka? What place in these processes should be occupied by a party in renewal? Difficult questions. We shall seek answers to them in an interview with P.K. Luchinskiy, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, conducted by our special correspondents.

[Correspondents] Petr Kirillovich, we would like initially, of course, to learn from you the particular features of the present political and social and economic situation in Moldavia. It is no secret that the entire country has been lending an attentive ear to the reports coming in recent months from the republic.

[Luchinskiy] The situation is complex and contradictory. It has imbibed many of the negative problems which were not solved but which accumulated over the years. As you recall, the republic was literally being shaken by mass meetings, strikes, and unrest even. Members of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee self-critically accurately diagnosed a political reason for this. The restructuring processes made practically no impression on the former party leadership of the republic. It was exercised, as before, by command and directive methods, in an atmosphere of indifference and self-satisfaction. An in-depth collective analysis of the processes which were occurring was missing, and no scrupulous political evaluation of the growing destabilization was made. Many decisions and documents of importance to the republic were adopted in secret, without in-depth study and without the enlistment of party activists at large. In other instances, on the other hand, the solution of a number of acute problems was unjustifiably dragged out. This was the case, for example, with the preparation of the Language Act, which raised the social and political temperature in the republic to crisis point.

[Correspondents] And to take a deeper course connected with the economy? For what you have cited is extremely important, but secondary, rather.

[Luchinskiy] Yes, what I have said referred to the form of manifestation, but the content consisted largely of socioeconomic problems.

Some of them are of a nature common to the country. To take housing, for example. It would seem that we are building a great deal. The pace in the current five-year-plan has risen 28 percent. But changes are there none. The waiting list for apartments not only has not shrunk but has increased by one-fourth even. And in the republic today this means almost 200,000 families. And there is another problem which, it would seem, a republic such as ours should not have. I am speaking of the production of food products. Consumption in terms of certain types thereof is growing only slowly, but in terms of others, altogether declining. And this at a time when the latent possibilities of Moldavia's agro-industrial production are being utilized only 75 percent. No more than 90 percent of capacity in the industrial stockbreeding complexes has been assimilated.

One further important question, which is now being discussed in the work force, at mass meetings and gatherings and in each home, is the problem of consumer goods. Measures for its solution have been and are being adopted, but once again it should be a question of fundamental changes providing for complete satisfaction of people's requirements. Is it normal that one out of every six enterprises in the republic is failing to produce consumer goods?

There has been a pronounced deterioration with us in problems of the environment. General opinion and the population are focusing on them increasingly. Moldavia is among the "leaders" in soil contamination and erosion and in third place in level of river pollution and water shortage. Behind this lie illnesses, loss of health and disability.

And, finally, concerning a problem specific to Moldavia, which I have to mention. The so-called non-employment of the able-bodied population, which it is simpler to call unemployment. The transition to new forms of management has caused an absolute decline in those employed in material production. We are squarely faced with the problem of a shortage of new jobs. Almost 100,000 persons have been released in the republic's economy in less than 2 years. One-fourth of those who have applied to the employment bodies have not found jobs, and considerable numbers of these are young people, what is more. In the republic's capital alone approximately 35,000 persons are not permanently engaged in socially useful labor. Is this not a serious cause of tension?!

The informal public movements, which have in a short space of time become political opponents of the republic party organization, have actively taken advantage of the negative processes in the social sphere and the economy.

And I have here to repeat once more the critical evaluation leveled at the Central Committee at a recent Moldavian Communist Party plenum. Too much time and effort has been spent on discussing that which disunites communists and the public movements and various national groups of the population and on mutual recrimination. All this, of course, has led nowhere. The "not one step back" principle has predominated more often than not in party-political work. Is is any wonder that, instead of the necessary mutual understanding, estrangement has grown in the republic.

[Correspondents] At the CPSU Central Committee plenum which has just been held there was a multilevel keen discussion of the party's draft platform for its 28th Congress. Has discussion of this document begun in the primary party organizations? Are reference points in work for the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee and the republic's communists now more precise?

[Luchinskiy] This, it seems to me, is the first serious attempt to move decisively forward, an attempt to forecast. Many propositions on the platform show to both communists and nonparty people that the party is emphatically abandoning dogmatism and becoming more mobile, flexible and realistic. Recognition of the possibility of a multiparty system is not simply an affirmation of the new political structures which are taking shape, in our republic specifically. It is rather a signal for the awakening of the party masses, for mobilization.

After all, it is owing to the sluggishness and passiveness of the party committees and the lower organizations that the vanguard has ended up in a crisis situation. When the plenum openly declared that the party would henceforward operate on a par with other public and political movements, this created a qualitatively new situation in communists' activity. It is time to recall political struggle as the main form of work. It is essential that both the Central Committee and the communist rank and file rid themselves of stereotypes as quickly as possible. And they are tenacious. "Where is the Central Committee, why is it is not making a proper appreciation of the situation?" This is heard constantly. A mass meeting, for example, has been held. Many communists want the next day to open the party newspaper and learn whether the Central Committee Bureau approves of this or not. The whole party must work. We must not have generals and soldiers awaiting orders. The communist—figure of culture, well-known economist, youth leader—needs to voice his position and mold public opinion.

The effectiveness of such work may be confirmed by quite a recent example. The construction of a personal computer plant had become a new point of tension at the end of last year. The peremptory demand for a halt to construction was heard frequently at mass meetings of the People's Front and the "Greens," and emotions spilled over onto the streets. Various arguments were employed: it would take up land and increase migration. How did we act in this case? We invited in scientists from the Academy of Sciences, specialists and ecologists. They met with people and explained that the plant would not only provide new jobs but would bring us to the forward boundaries of modern electronics. They spoke with people in point of substance and disclosed the whole truth, and the latter came to understand the need for the construction of such a plant. But such discussion gave us a chance to take account of people's many observations.

[Correspondents] But you were speaking about political struggle....

[Luchinskiy] Just so. Language problems, a computer plant, election battles—all this is political work. Take the following point: We were for many years accustomed to obtaining a deputy's seat as an indispensable adjunct to office or per the schedule of allocations. But the situation now is entirely different: It is necessary to defend the right to be elected in heated political debate.

[Correspondents] And what are the central features of the republic party organization's election program? Has it taken into consideration and in respect of which main points the demands of the public movements? What conclusions have the republic's communists drawn from the course of the election struggle?

[Luchinskiy] I shall not be exaggerating if I say that our platform has imbibed many rational demands of the Moldavian People's Front, the "Unity" Intermovement, the "Gagauz Khalky" and "Revival" national organizations, the Moldavian Workers Union, the Union of Peasants and others. But, as distinct from our political rivals, we are putting forward practicable paths of solution also and creating the necessary mechanisms for this.

Let us take, for example, that same non-employment. What do we see as the way out of this situation? First, we need to take more boldly the path of location of the productive forces in small cities and rayon centers, build small facilities there and develop a network of enterprise affiliates in rural localities. The creation of small-scale processing industry in the countryside will be a serious direction.

Or the housing problem. Here we distinguish an intermediate stage—up to 1995. We intend in this period specifically telling each person on the waiting list when he personally will receive an apartment and what is being done for this in the city, rayon and workforce. Of course, the organization of work on the implementation of such programs is political struggle also. And the party will hereby be able to consolidate around itself representatives of all strata of society.

[Correspondents] Petr Kirillovich, a referendum was held recently in Tiraspol on the initiative of the Moldavian Workers Union on the creation of a so-called Dnestr Autonomous Republic. The Gagauz have also put forward a plan for an autonomous region. There are forces in the People's Front which understand sovereignty as Moldavia's inevitable secession from the USSR for the purpose of affiliation with Romania. How are the republic's communists taking account of these demands in their political work with the population?

[Luchinskiy] Concerning a Dnestr autonomous region and the referendum, these constitute an extreme position, although their roots are understandable. The basis thereof is, as I have already said, our maladroit work at the time of enactment of the Language Act.

Or the Gagauz demands for autonomy. At the root of this tension are language problems and national-cultural, economic and social problems also. The essence mainly is that, on account of the dire shortage of processing capacity, a substantial amount of agricultural products is being exported unprocessed from the southern areas of the republic, where the Gagauz and Bulgarians live. And this means considerable economic losses for the region. The optimum location and well-conceived development of the productive forces here needs to be buttressed by the stable supply of water and gas, the construction of supply lines and roads and the comprehensive buildup of the villages and towns. And, of course, by the creation of guarantees for the satisfaction of national-cultural interests.

And all these problems may be solved without withdrawing under a national roof. Thus Russian, Ukrainian, Bulgarian villages and towns could demand autonomy in Moldavia. But we should be talking about something else—an economically independent republic within the framework of a renewed federation would afford the local soviets real independence. They could resolve all these problems on the spot.

[Correspondents] Proposals pertaining to the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee were heard in your speech at the February plenum. You also evaluated the proposals of other participants in the plenum. What new forms and methods are the republic's communists currently adopting?

[Luchinskiy] Before speaking of new methods, I would like to emphasize once again the need for the development of the independence of the republic party organization top to bottom. The platform speaks in some detail about this aspect of the party's renewal. No one any longer doubts that rigid centralization is a dead weight on the party organism. Why, in fact, should the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee machinery repeat the structure of the CPSU Central Committee machinery with numerous departments, instructors, consultants, department heads, chiefs and their "deps" and so forth? It is not difficult for any bright idea to lose its way on the path "upward" in this bureaucratic hierarchy. And the most annoying thing is that these ossified party and administrative mechanisms automatically extend to the managerial structures in the economy, causing considerable losses.

But why not have in the Central Committee a group of secretaries pertaining to the strategic directions of party work with their own consultants, temporary creative teams and public commissions?

A group for the prompt response to and forecasting of the social and political situation, which provides the Secretariat with a systematic analysis, was set up recently in the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee machinery. In addition, the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Party History Institute has been converted into the Social and Political Research Institute. This is not just a change of signboard. If we wish to retain the role of vanguard party under the conditions of today's pluralism, it is essential that we have scientific forecasting, an analysis of our successes and miscalculations and a study of the long term. Groups of scientists, specialists and representatives of the artistic intelligentsia and public movements, which will render scientific assistance in the preparation and elaboration of strategic matters, are being formed under the auspices of Central Committee departments. But none of this, of course, substitutes for the most important thing—the need to work in the thick of the masses and constantly be among people. It is there, after all, that large-scale policy is made.

[Correspondents] You have emphasized repeatedly during the interview that the main criterion of the party's renewal is its capacity for prognostication and political anticipation of the processes maturing in society. Let us attempt to peer into the few months remaining until our party's 28th congress.

[Luchinskiy] It should be understood that discussion of the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the congress is worth little without specific practical action. This applies primarily to the party organizations themselves. A search for new forms of work has begun in them. A cardinal reorganization of the structure of the apparatus is under way in some of our raykoms. We are encouraging this quest and are ourselves thinking about the future of the party's elective authorities. We are together with the communists preparing our proposals for the congress. I hope that a stabilizing role will be played by the adoption at the next session of the republic Supreme Soviet of a concept of the economic independence of the Moldavian SSR. Real work on the formation of a republic economy is beginning, and specific answers to many of the acute questions being heard today at the mass meetings will be given.

I am also counting on the good sense of the new republic parliament, where, together with the party, all the main public movements will be represented. I believe that this will reduce tension to a large extent and make it possible by parliamentary methods and within the framework of the law to conduct a dialogue and seek paths of social and national consolidation based on constructive and prudent compromise.

And, what is most important, people must see for themselves that it is the party organizations and the political vanguard of society as a whole which serve as the guarantor of the realization of their aspirations and hopes and the need for perestroyka. And the communists—members of what is currently the governing party—need to remember that the trust of the masses has to be justified constantly.

14 Stage Hunger Strike in Kishinev

LD2103163290 Moscow TASS in English 1250 GMT 21 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Lazar]

[Text] Kishinev March 21 TASS—Fourteen people from different parts of Moldavia have gone on hunger strike in a central Kishinev public garden, protesting against administrative decisions infringing upon their interests.

Some of the people fasting at the foot of the monument to Moldavia's national hero Stefan the Great demand reinstatement in their jobs after being fired on what they see as illegal grounds, others want housing and still others, punishment for officials they allege have abused their office.

The largest banner fluttering in the wind above mattresses strewn over park benches says in Moldavian "Down with the Bureaucrats."

The Moldavian Government ordered a special commission to be formed to study the reasons for the hunger strike and the fasters' demands.

Similar protests were staged in central Kishinev last year. One, for example was by a local woman with her children, demanding decent housing, and another, by several young people protesting against the arrest of marchers taking part in unauthorised processions.

Construction of Radar Station in Ukraine Halted

LD0404155490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Text] The governmental commission headed by Academician Velikhov, people's deputy of the USSR, has come to the conclusion that it is not expedient to continue the construction of the radar station near the Transcarpathian village of (Pistryalevo). This project will be handed over for utilization by the national economy. In actual fact the public of Transcarpathia had well founded fears that the station, in the course of its operation, would subject the surrounding area to powerful electromagnetic radiation and would use a large quantity of water. This might also be detrimental to the more than 300 deposits of medicinal mineral waters in the oblast as well.

Composition of Ukraine Supreme Soviet Discussed

LD2203134290 Kiev in Ukrainian to Europe 1800 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] Our Correspondent, Andriy Zelenko, met today with Valentyn Ternenko, member of the central electoral commission, who said:

[Begin recording] By now, 442 deputies to the Ukraine SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet have been elected. In six constituencies an investigation and second counting of votes are in progress. It seems that these two will also need repeat elections.

The initial analysis shows that the elected deputies represent various strata of the population. Among them are managers of enterprises, organizations and scientific establishments; and there are quite a few medical workers. Regrettably, there are only 12 women. As compared with the composition of the previous Supreme Soviet, the number of workers has fallen, with only 30 of them in this parliament. [end recording]

And now we pass the microphone to Serhiy Odarych, one of the leaders of Rukh [Ukraine Peoples Movement for Perestroyka], an organization which unites 43 public associations and formations. We ask him how Rukh will be represented in this Parliament.

[Odarych] To date, we have information only from 13 oblasts. In all, 88 candidates sponsored by Rukh have been elected deputies of the Supreme Soviet in the first and second round.

Decree on Combatting Speculation Put Into Force

LD1103093790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0500 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Text] In the Ukraine a decree by the Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet on increasing liability for breach of the rules governing trade and for speculation has come into force. The decree, which takes into account the suggestions made by citizens and public organizations, considerably increases administrative and criminal culpability for such breaches. For example, repeated or large scale speculation, and group conspiracy, is punishable by deprivation of liberty from three to seven years, and for particularly large-scale offences by up to 10 years with confiscation of property. The appropriate alterations have been made to the republic's administrative and criminal codes.

Religious Agitation Made Public in Ukraine

Commission Begins Work

LD0803100190 Moscow TASS in English 2127 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Kiev March 8 TASS—A call upon believers in the western Ukrainian regions to abstain from actions capable of complicating the situation, especially violent actions, was made on Wednesday by the joint quadrilateral Orthodox-Catholic commission which began work here.

The commission was set up as a result of agreement reached by delegations from the Roman Catholic and the Russian Orthodox Church in January this year with the aim to peacefully settle interreligious disputes that flared up in some regions of the Ukrainian Republic.

The Holy See is represented on the commission by Archbishop Miroslav Stefan Marusin, secretary of the Congregation of Eastern Churches, and Metropolitan Stefan Sulik of Philadelphia. The Moscow patriarchate is represented by Metropolitan Methodius of Voronezh and Lipetsk and Archbishop Feodosius of Kmelnitsy and Kamenets-Podolsky.

Orthodox believers of the Ukraine's western regions are represented by archbishop Iriney of Lvov and Drogobych and Archpriest Aleksandr Shvets. Catholics of eastern rites are represented by Archbishop Vladimir Sternyuk and Bishop Sofran Dmiterko.

The commission will begin work in the western regions of the Ukraine on March 8. It calls upon believers of both churches to ensure peaceful and quiet conditions, abstain from organising rallies and demonstrations and any pressure, which can hamper normal activity.

Members of the commission were unanimous in recognising the need to settle the situation in the temples occupied by Catholics of eastern rites without the consent of religious communities. This settlement must be reached in accordance with laws prior to the registration of Catholic communities.

The appeal contains the call on non-church organisations not to interfere in the church affairs. Believers and the clergy are called upon not to intervene in political affairs, and to abstain from pronouncements which can insult representatives of one or another faith and engender enmity and confusion.

It contains an appeal to the local authorities to create local conditions for the normal work of the commission.

The commission believes that the issues of temples must be resolved on the basis of bilateral agreements, proceeding from the actual numbers of Orthodox believers and Catholics in each specific district.

Rukh Becoming 'Clerical Party'

LD1403094490 Moscow World Service in English 0900 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Text] A correspondent of the independent news agency INTERFAX reports from Lvov in the Ukraine that supporters of the Greco Catholic Church are picketing the residence of the Orthodox bishop Yeremey. Earlier a crowd blockaded the residence of the archbishop of Ivano-Frankovsk, Makariy, for six hours. These actions have been staged by both believers and informal associations, such as the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, the Memorial Society, and the Ukrainian popular movement in support of perestroyka, Rukh. In that connection the clergy and laymen of Kiev, and the Kiev and Lvov regions have issued an appeal to the followers of the Russian Orthodox Church. It says that Rukh has been turning into a clerical party with a heavy Greco Catholic bias. Meanwhile, Orthodox priests have been saying that religious refugees have appeared. Some priests have been asking the exarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church for permission to leave their parishes and go east.

Orthodox Churches Seized

LD1403212690 Kiev in Ukrainain to Europe 1800 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] A protest appeal to Rukh [Ukrainian people's Movement for Perestroyka] from Ukrainians of the Orthodox faith has been made public today. My colleague Natalya Didenko gives the details:

[Begin recording] [Didenko] The appeal notes that some representatives of Rukh have rushed, like doctors of theology, into resolving the fate of religion among our people. With the encouragement of representatives of the Lviv section of Rukh, notes the appeal, extremist Eastern-rite Catholics are illegally seizing Orthodox churches. The document contains an appeal to Ukrainian writers, public figures, deputies, and members of the Rukh requesting that they raise their voices against the violence of religous extremists and protect Orthodox Ukrainians in Galicia and their churches.

Today I talked on the telephone with father Yaroslav, a Greek-Catholic priest from Lviv. Here, in particular, is what he said: [Yarslav] What is happening now in our region is simply natural. The time has come; the time of restructuring has come, and the time has somehow also come for the restructuring of internal life, spiritual life; and the people who were in agony up to now, feeling themselves to be Greek-Catholics, and who have started work to revive the church, in no way do they require any kind of encouraging whispers. They do not heed some kind of agitation. At this moment in time in our region, in West Ukraine, the matter is proceeding simply naturally. As to whether Rukh is getting involved or whether the Committee for the Defense of the Ukrainian Catholic Church is getting involved, then certainly, only when it is a matter of legality, when it is a matter of where a just cause was won, it is possible that there is indeed support on their part for us. [sentence as heard] [end recording]

New Committee Founded

LD2103174690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0500 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] A committee for the defense of believers' rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has been formed at its founding conference in Kiev. It was noted that the creation of such an organization is based on the need to resist the seizure of churches, the persecution of clergymen and persons of the Orthodox faith by religious extremists of the Greek-Catholic Church [uniate]—especially in West Ukraine. Statutes of the committee have been adopted. Representatives of the clergy, of believers, of public organizations, and a number of scholars have been elected to the committee.

Caucasus

Spring Draft Problems in Caucasus Viewed

PM3003093390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General V. Samsonov, chief of staff of the Transcaucasus Military District, by correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Kaushanskiy, under the rubric "Military Reform: Problems, Proposals"; date and place unspecified; first paragraph is editorial introduction: "I Want To Be Optimistic"]

[Text] The spring draft is almost upon us. And the voices campaigning for it to be boycotted, for the introduction of "home" [svoikh] barracks based on amateur plans for national military formations, are being aired more and more persistently and vocally. But the motherland needs to be defended, and nobody will replace quotas established by military commissariats—at least not today. And you start to realize more and more acutely that the draft and military service system is becoming an acute facet of the military reform. This was the subject of a discussion between KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's correspondent and Lieutenant General V. Samsonov, chief of staff of the Transcaucasus Military District.

[Kaushanskiy] Viktor Nikolayevich, some two or so years ago the military draft situation here in the Transcaucasus was like a festivity, a party for the people. I can still remember young men being sent off to the Armed Forces from the Kakhetian town of Gurdzhaani. There were the famed Georgian choirs, the behests from old veterans at the world-famous "Soldier's Father" monument, the oath of loyalty to the motherland....

[Samsonov] Did you wonder why this happened? The draft was carried out, so to speak, by everyone, with the most effective participation of party and soviet organs, the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], and veterans. But nowadays some gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] representatives and party raykom [rayon committee] secretaries bluntly state that the draft is allegedly a matter for the military. Military-patriotic education and patronage are being neglected. The other day Georgian TV ended the program "Guarding the Southern Borders" for Soviet Army servicemen. This program had, among other things, propagandized the successes of Georgia's envoys in the military field.

In short, one military commissariat after another has found itself facing numerous problems. What is there to celebrate if during the last draft we encountered pickets at draft centers, threats, and attacks on military commissariats and their staffers?...

[Kaushanskiy] Is this situation deadlocked? If we try to project onto it everything that was discussed at the recent Moscow conference of the leaders of mobilization organs at military districts and oblast, kray, and republic military commissariats, what conclusions can be drawn?

[Samsonov] I do not consider the situation deadlocked. I am confident that many military commissariats will cope with their tasks this spring. The Moscow conference convinced me yet again that military reform cannot do without legislative recognition of the abiding fact that the defense of the Fatherland is a matter for the entire people. The links in this great chain are the schools, the family, enterprises, party and state institutions, and the DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy]. The Army is our common child. And the draft to it should be implemented by the USSR Supreme Soviet, in my view. Incidentally, this has repeatedly been mentioned in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and other press organs.

[Kaushanskiy] What kind of effect on the situation will be produced, in your opinion, by the 20-25 percent reform in the quota for young people in the Transcaucasian republics giving them the right to serve in their native area—a reform which has given rise to a great deal of wrong interpretations?

[Samsonov] You have touched on a very painful problem. Practice convinces us that in the atmosphere of rabid anti-Army feelings in the Transcaucasus—there is really no other way of putting it—such quotas have just aggravated an already complex interethnic situation. Here are some specific examples for you. We have allowed Armenian youths to serve at home and to help out in the earthquake clear-up. This was a humanitarian step. But what happened? Discipline fell sharply, deserters started to emerge, and, under the influence of informals, there were more and more cases of officers' orders being sabotaged.

Or take another fact. Shortly before last year's fall draft I received a telephone call from one of the leaders of Adzharia. He asked us not to take some 200 draftees to the assembly point in Tbilisi but to leave them to do their service in Batumi. Why make any extra fuss, he claimed, when sons could be handed over from parents to commanders? And with their mothers' farewells ringing in their ears. That is what we did. But once again things went wrong. All of these "defenders" spent six weeks holding rallies in the city center and had no intention of donning military uniform.

We had no less trouble in Azerbaijan. Last fall we had difficulty dispatching a large group of draftees from Baku Airport because pickets stopped the flight taking off for a long time.

All these facts are to hand, so to speak. I could continue the list. But something else is worrying. We have repeatedly seen for ourselves that privileges for certain groups are less than appreciated by those who do not enjoy them. These people ask: Why are we worse off? Incidentally, not everybody restricts themselves to just asking. There have been cases of certain draftees from Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia registering a protest by going AWOL from their units. Those are the fruits of social inequality. Now judge for yourself: Can we continue with this practice?

[Kaushanskiy] What about those who have just had a baby or, for instance, are the only breadwinner in the family?

[Samsonov] What happens to each draftee should be decided individually. If there are enough arguments we will of course meet them halfway and give people most-favored status—including allowing them to do their service in their own republic. But this question, I repeat, should be decided in each specific instance. Just as, incidentally, all work with draftees should be specific, from when young men are registered until they set off on their military service. We still miss out on a lot through not noticing specific individuals with all their pluses and minuses in the overall mass of the draft contingent.

[Kaushanskiy] This probably also makes it harder to pick out potential refuseniks, so to speak.

[Samsonov] It is hard to spot them anyway. Although, of course, knowledge of people helps to predict such a situation. But, since we are talking about refuseniks, what is striking is the liberal attitude of local law-enforcement organs. Not a single criminal prosecution for draft dodging has been instituted in this area. Even though there have been hundreds of known cases. Is this not another argument for making changes to the military draft procedure?

[Kaushanskiy] Let us set aside the spring draft problems and move on. In particular, let us move on to the basic principles of manpower acquisition in the Armed Forces. Should we drag kicking and screaming into the Army those people who, metaphorically speaking, are allergic to the very concept of "military service" and whose intellectual and physical qualities will clearly be of no benefit to our regiments and ships?

[Samsonov] Thinking about ways of reforming things, I have reached the conclusion that the idea of a professional army should not be rejected out of hand. It is important to make clear just what this concept includes. Service in the Armed Forces is a question of people's personal convictions. If we are now finding that many officers are tendering their resignations, it means that their convictions are not steadfast. And we have to find out why. After all, it is no secret that the Army's prestige is also falling because its image is sometimes distorted beyond recognition by smart journalists. I recall that not so long ago more than 10 people competed for every place in certain military colleges. It was really possible to pick the creme de la creme. That was how we formed our superb corps of officers who religiously defended such concepts as honor, valor, patriotism, and self-sacrifice for the sake of the motherland. But now students' shoulder boards are often donned by so-called failures or mediocre students who do not care where they go as long as they get into a VUZ [higher educational establishment]. Such people are hardly worried about Army and Navy ideals. They tender their resignation at the first hint of any difficulty.

The Army is being sharply cut back. And this should be used to benefit those who remain in it and those who are only thinking about making it their career. Nor should we be afraid of servicemen earning a lot. The Army may become smaller, but officers and men will have no concern other than combat training. Nothing else! A serviceman's every thought should be focused on service. All its social problems are the concern of the state and the government. Or what happens is that officers who have, say, 10 years still to serve start rushing around looking for a place in the sun, since they know that nobody will take any account of them later. I have seen plenty of local party and soviet organs brushing aside men who have been discharged from the Army. Incidentally, even those in Army service often encounter such "concern."

My conclusion is that the reform should resolve Army and Navy problems along state lines—currently these problems are being resolved along narrowly departmental lines, by the Defense Ministry. That is why on such staffing matters we are going from one dead end to another.

[Kaushanskiy] Are you thinking of the release of VUZ students from service?

[Samsonov] That too. Reform of the Armed Forces will hardly be effective if we do not restore the status quo on that matter. After all, we have dealt a blow with our own hands against the Army elite, so to speak, by releasing the leading specialists who operated the most expensive equipment. And was that all? It turned out that we had split young people into "black" and "white." Serving the motherland, you see, is no longer considered an intellectual pursuit. But have all the discharged students returned to their VUZ's? I have figures showing that around 500 of them have taken another path, including filling the ranks of so-called national military formations.

[Kaushanskiy] Since you have touched on this distasteful matter, I would like to pursue the subject. The other day Tbilisi TV featured a leader of the republic's DOSAAF, who stated that his department was allegedly prepared to provide specialists for a "people's army" with its own insignia, uniforms....

[Samsonov] You will note that this has again been said on the threshold of the spring draft. Such talk can currently be heard in Armenia and Azerbaijan. And surely people realize that setting up national military formations today constitutes sheer adventurism. People in no way need their "own" armies for protection against external enemies. At a time of interethnic friction in the Transcaucasus it is an "argument" for solving territorial disputes. Such armies provide additional "muscle" in domestic conflicts. And that means people's blood. All the rest is evil.

[Kaushanskiy] I recently talked to a group of mothers in Baku who categorically stated that they would not send their sons to the Army since... it is killing Azeris....

[Samsonov] The sad and regrettable cases of servicemen being killed have nothing to do with ethnic origins. And these things happen by no means because somebody hates Georgians, Armenians, or Azeris. Injuries, accidents, and negligence in handling weapons are the main scourge, which it is very comfortable to put down to "bullying" of ethnic groups. I have repeatedly invited representatives of the press, radio, and TV in the Transcaucasian republics to openly investigate each tragic occurrence. However, they're in no hurry to cover it.

[Kaushanskiy] That is not a very happy note to close our discussion on....

[Samsonov] Indeed not. Let us not lose hope that military reform will move rapidly from plans to results. Let us have faith that the results themselves will enshrine the state's overall responsibility for the people who have been entrusted with the most sacred task of defending the motherland. We are also made more optimistic by the fact that the resolution of a large range of difficult issues connected with the implementation of the military reform will be, as M.S. Gorbachev stressed in his speech at the extraordinary Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies, one of the most important concerns for the president and the Presidential Council.

Armenia Introduces Special Situation on Rail Sector

NC0604092490 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0600 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Text] During its regular meeting, the Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium decided to introduce a special situation on the Azerbaijan railways' Megrinskiy sector in the Armenian Republic, in order to facilitate the normal functioning of railway transportation. It instructed the Armenian Republic's Internal Affairs Ministry to ensure the implementation of this decree.

Armenian Blames Moscow for Village Evictions

NC0903130590 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1900 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Statement issued by the Armenian Supreme Soviet Presidium; date not given]

[Text] As is already known, the Armenian inhabitants of Azat, Kamo, Martunashen, and Getashen villages dealt a severe counter blow to the bandit attacks in November 1988 and January 1990 as a result of their organized self-defense and thus successfully defended their right to live on their native land.

The deportation of the residents of these villages began only after Soviet Army and Internal Affairs Ministry troops were deployed there. Therefore, it is obvious that the deportations are being encouraged or even directed by the central authorities. All this indicates that the troops went to northern Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] not to ensure security for the Armenian population, but rather to disrupt normal life there.

Proceeding from this fact and strongly condemning the inhuman policy directed against the Armenian people, the Armenian Supreme Soviet Presidium places full responsibility for the forced deportation of the Armenian population of Getashen subrayon and the unforseeable consequences this may entail on the central authorities, and demands the immediate withdrawal of troops from northern Artsakh.

Yerevan Garrison Statement on 'Regional Tension'

NC1203122990 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Statement issued by the Yerevan garrison command; date not given—read by announcer]

[Text] Dear comrades: Becaue of regional tension Soviet Army contigents stationed in the republic continue to safeguard (?order), important buildings, the residents, the normal rhythm of the residents' [word indistinct], and agro-economic activities. In general, the republic's residents are supporting the Soviet Army and giving it all kinds of (?assistance). All types of [word indistinct] steps have been taken for leadership organizations, workers' unions, and residents. However under (?such circumstances), the irresponsible acts by various extremist groups which are perpetrating anti-[words indistinct] acts.

On March 9 at 1640, Armenians with automatic rifles attacked the contingent safeguarding [word indistinct] in (?Kalininskiy's) [name indistinct] region. As a result of this violent act, one soldier was wounded and arms were stolen.

The command considers this an instigation aimed at exacerbating the situation in the republic and harming relations with the Army. This act is considered a criminal act (?which should be punished).

We appeal to the residents to help the (?Army) [words indistinct] and to return arms [words indistinct]. [passage indistinct] The command (?points out) that all appeals to return arms should be heeded according to the law.
[Signed] The Yerevan Garrison [word indistinct] Command

Armenia-Azerbaijan Border Meetings Held

NC1803092190 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1900 GMT 17 Mar 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] ARMENPRES reported two days ago that another step has been taken to stabilize the situation on the border between Armenia's Gorisskiy Rayon and Azerbaijan's Lachinskiy Rayon.

The representatives of the two republics met at the border. Grigoryan, Armenia's deputy minister of internal affairs and a participant in that meeting, told reporters that in addition to the commandants in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] and in the other state-of-emergency districts, personnel from law enforcement organizations, soviets, and economic organizations from both republics participated in the meeting.

Fifty-three rural Armenian enterprises border Azerbaijanian territory. Under the present conditions, there is a need for a joint effort to ensure the security of the animal breeders and to prevent animal theft.

The meeting also discussed the Goris-Lachin-Stepanakert road, recognizing that a meeting at the government level will soon take place between the two republics during which this issue will be discussed. Plans were also made for a new road to NKAO through Kazakhstan.

Further on Border Talks

NC1803190790 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 17 Mar 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The newspapers report that the deputy internal affairs ministers of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] and the Armenian SSR met in the [name indistinct] location of Gorisskiy Rayon on 15 March to normalize interethnic relations in the two republics' border rayons, establish the needed social order in the farming settlements, and provide for keeping state and privately owned cattle. The meeting was attended by Major General Sofonov, commandant of the state of emergency region; representatives of Armenia's state committee for the agroindustrial complex and Gorisskiy Rayon party committee; chiefs of the internal affairs organs of Azerbaijan SSR's Lachinskiy, Dzhabrailskiy, Kelbadzharskiy, Zangelanskiy, and Kubatlinskiy Rayons and Armenia's Gorriskiy, [two names indistinct], Kafan, and Megrinsky Rayons; and other officials.

The meeting adopted a decision which called on the internal affairs ministries of the Azerbaijan and Armenian SSR's to draw up joint plans to have the required work carried out in the farming settlements. The security of those who live in state and collective farms in the border regions was also discussed when the meeting participants examined agricultural problems.

Armenian Operational Staff Reviews Situation

NC2203190390 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 22 Mar 90

[Text] During its 21 March meeting, the Operational Staff reviewed the situation prevailing in Armenia's border regions. The situation is somewhat stable, but an incident took place near the village of Nuvady. The Azerbaijani raiders have opened automatic fire intending to provoke clashes, but there were no casualties.

The meeting's participants were briefed on the agreement between the internal affairs ministries of our republic and of the Azerbaijani Republic. This agreement enables a truck convoy of more than 100 trucks loaded with freight from Gorisskiy Rayon to travel to Stepanakert. According to the republic's internal affairs ministry's records, crime continues to create a tense situation. The criminals have become a bit active.

The participants noted that a reliable air link is being maintained with Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. It was indicated that the inhabitants of the oblast and of Armenian villages in Azerbaijan are using the air transport services with no problems.

The importance of rendering timely technical and seeding assistance to the rural economies for spring field work was also noted. The Operational Staff paid particular attention to resolving (?mutual conflicts) on the border regions and to preventing provocations and self-motivated acts which could exacerbate the situation in the region.

Armenian Pannational Officials on Elections

NC1703134290 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 16 Mar 90

[Interview with Ambardzum Galustyan, member of the administrative board of the Armenian Pannational Movement, and Ashot Manucharyan, member of the administrative board of the Armenian Pannational Movement and deputy at the Armenian Supreme Soviet, by unidentified correspondent, at the Armenian Pannational Movement headquarters in Yerevan; no date given—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] What will be the composition of the newly elected parliament of Armenia? Certainly it will be a democratized body really elected by the people [words indistinct]. Will the democratic forces be able to triumph over chaos and attain real sucess? We will touch upon these issues during this interview. The fierce struggle waged by our people for the last two years under the banner of the Karabakh movement has also brought forth many other problems. One of the primary objectives is democratization, and the means to attain it is not through the smashing of the doors and windows of the government buildings or the destruction of the state borders, but through elections, the most correct constitutional method.

The nomination of candidate deputies has already commenced [words indistinct]. The initial incoming information in this regard is not very encouraging. Out of the 21 candidates nominated, 16 are chairmen of collective enterprises, chief directors of production units, chairmen of rayon soviets, and first secretaries of rayon party committees. To what extent will the continued nomination of such candidates assist the attainment of the desired objective?

[Galustyan] When I was in France recently, the Sovietologists said that there are only two republics in the Soviet Union which could create a really free parliament functioning independently of Moscow: Lithuania and Armenia. Expectations abroad are greater than they are at home. So far, the Armenian Pannational Movement is badly, very badly, prepared for the elections. As you know, the [word indistinct] next parliament will no longer be a passive parliament; it will now be a very strong parliament—it will either be left or right. This is because there will be no more quotas for workers or this and that group, and if we cannot win seats in the parliament the so-called best and worthy members of the nomenklatura will control it. Now, the Armenian Pannational Movement has set up its own election staff which will start public activity within the next few days. No candidate will be nominated anywhere without a struggle. We will use all our resources in this connection. The result of the elections must be a kind of referendum on our two-year struggle. It has to show what we have achieved. By we, I do not have in mind the Armenian Pannational Movement, rather the democratic bloc. That is, I have in mind those people for whom the supreme interest is the people's interest.

[Correspondent] Who should be nominated candidate deputy? Now, the leaders suddenly appear as very democratic in their speeches. (?But, in fact no democracy exists.) No one can deny that there are individuals among these leaders who are genuinely dedicated to the people. Then, how to differentiate the genuine from the false?

[Manucharyan] It is simple; you should always bear in mind who it was who for years pillaged, took bribes from, and sucked the blood of the people. When you find answers to this then you will find out who is a patriot and who is not. As regards the extent of active participation of the movement in the elections, I can say that we are actively engaged in it and are cooperating with the other organizations and parties. In most cases we are cooperating with the National Self-determination Association and the Armenian National Independence Party.

[Correspondent] Have there been violations of election laws during the preelection period?

[Manucharyan] There are violations. First, the so-called "secretary's okrugs" are being formed. What are these? Some okrugs are not unitary entities and therefore you see cases when two villages from the edge of one region are included in an okrug made up of two other villages on the other edge of that same region. That is, villages where the party secretary could easily gain majority votes are brought together into a "secretary's okrug." Such an okrug has been formed in Masisskiy Rayon and there is another one in Artashatskiy Rayon.

Now, about another violation. Today I submitted my official protest to the central electoral committee on the violation of the election law. In remote regions, where people are relatively submissive and party secretaries stronger, the ordinary people have found it difficult to advance their own candidates. No nomination meetings are being held because a given collective fears the director of the enterprise, whether in the villages or towns, and some persons which could have had the courage to challenge the party secretary had no opportunity to be nominated in these regions. To circumvent this, we could use a democratic principle: People could put forward candidates by signing their names. However, to prevent this and to place the election procedure under the party apparatus, the central election committee has decreed that if a (?would-be candidate) goes around to collect signatures then a member of the okrug election committee must accompany him. What is wrong with that? The fact is that usually the election committees are made up of people loyal to the party secretary.

Even if someone attempted to sign for a candidate he would come under pressure from the representative of the okrug committee.

[Corespondent] The incorrect and biased decisions of the center for the last two years have instilled pessimism among certain sectors of our people, including the mass media.

[Manucharyan] As regards the radio, television, and press I want to state that these are enormous factors that should be utilized to help people to overcome this situation. That is, I want to say that we face a complex and grave situation and it is ridiculous the way no one understands us. This is an unacceptable state of affairs. Let's open the radio and television to everyone so that everyone can put forward his own reconstruction project and invite debate. Let's engage in criticism and propose new projects.

[Correspondent] To return to the issue of nomination of candidates: Our struggle for the last two years has brought out noble and capable men who are genuinely concerned with the people's concerns.

[Manucharyan] [words indistinct] I have a serious concern. I see that, in Russia, where the popular movements are active, people have emerged who are engaged in high rhetoric but put forward no constructive proposals. Now the danger exists in Russia that such people might become the dominant power in the local soviets and supreme soviets and might replace the old nomenklatura which was providing something to the people, albeit badly. Now the wheels have come to a halt. This danger, though less pronounced, also exists for Armenia: that those who are engaged in high rhetoric might get elected to the parliament. The people must be made to realize that each nominee must be judged not by his ability to criticize but his ability to act in a balanced and logical manner, by his sense of responsibility, and by his positive proposals.

Yerevan Comments on Upcoming Elections

NC2003131390 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1900 GMT 18 Mar 90

[Ghazaros Govakimyan commentary]

[Excerpts] Elections for the republic's people's deputies are to take place in two months time, on 20 May to be exact. [passage omitted]

The upcoming elections will be radically different from all previous elections. Why? During last November's joint session of the Armenian Supreme Soviet and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] National Council, the issue of the unity of the NKAO with the motherland Armenia was brought up, and when electoral okrugs were formed, the Armenian Supreme Soviet Presidium deemed it necessary to form similar okrugs in the NKAO and to elect Armenian deputies from Artsakh [NKAO] as well. As is known, that decision was regarded among the country's higher echelons as unconstitutional. The issue has not been solved. However, the Artsakh people decisively declare that they will not participate in the election of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet deputies and that they will cast their votes for the Armenian deputies.

The election campaign is only just starting, but all the interested parties have already begun their preparations and are taking into consideration the mistakes and shortcomings of past elections. This was proved by the outcome of several polls carried out in Yerevan. A few figures speak of the voters' feelings. In answer to a question on whether they will participate in the upcoming elections, 28 to 30 percent of the people stated that they will not participate. Another 30 percent of the people questioned answered that they had not yet decided. It is interesting to note the answers to the following question: What does the voter want of his future deputy? The majority—67 percent—stated that a deputy today should support radical reforms. Asked about the qualifications of a deputy, 67 percent of those questioned answered that the deputy should be between 35-50 years old and have higher education. Furthermore, 42 percent of the people stated that a deputy should be married, while 55 percent said that the deputy should be a resident of the republic. Of those questioned, 35 percent stated that the deputy should be male, while the remaining 65 percent said that sex did not make a difference. Asked which deputy has the best chance of winning, 28 percent replied that it is the deputy who supports the party apparatus, while 18 percent believed that the deputies with the best chance are the founders of the Armenian Pannational Movement and the representatives of other unofficial movements.

As to who is right, and what the new form of the Armenian parliament will be, this is something which will be clarified in two or three months time. [passage omitted]

Armenian Party Committee Discusses Party Platform

NC2103114390 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0600 GMT 21 Mar 90

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] The Armenian Communist Party Central Committee's committee for socioeconomic development has held its regular meeting. The committee discussed the Central Committee's draft platform for the 29th Congress of the Armenian Communist Party as regards the main direction of the socioeconomic policy within the framework of revamping social relations as a whole.

After hearing a report by Grigoryan, first deputy head of the Socioeconomic Department of the Armenian Communist Party, the committee noted that the draft plan primarily springs from the necessity of ensuring a sharp turn in the republic's economy so as to satisfy the people's requirements and demands, to (?consolidate) principles of real social justice, and to ensure an improved standard of living.

The following addressed the meeting: Saakyan, first deputy chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers; Khodzhamiryan, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers; Mkrtchyan, deputy chaiman of the Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Planning Committee; Chanoyan, the republic's finance minister; Zurabyan, minister of local industry; Melkumyan, minister of road construction and maintenance; Stepanyan, director of the economics institute of the republic's Academy of Sciences; Avakyan, director of the affairs of the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium; Dadayan, chairman of the Armenian republican bank branch of the USSR Industrial Construction Bank; and (?Akopdzhanyan), chief director of the Armenian electricity authority.

Based on the result of the discussion, the committee (?made) a number of suggestions concerning the Central Committee's draft platform for the 29th congress of the republic's Communist Party.

The meeting was chaired by Serobyan, chairman of the committee and secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee.

An ARMENPRES report on the meeting has been published in the paper.

Arutyunyan Attends Yerevan Meeting on Restoration

NC2403115490 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0600 GMT 24 Mar 90

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] A consultative meeting held in Yerevan yesterday discussed [words indistinct] issues related to the speedy restoration of cities, villages, and enterprises damaged during the Armenian earthquake. Leading officials of the USSR ministries and departments, deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers of the union republics engaged in restoration work in the republic, heads of the construction and other departments, and other leading workers of the republic took part in the meeting.

(?Doguzhiyev), deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Council of Ministers' state committee on special situations, opened the session. Suren Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee and a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo commission on eliminating the consequences of the earthquake in Armenia, delivered a report. [Name indistinct], deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Minister's state committee on special situations, briefed the meeting about the course of the restoration work.

Afterwards, views were expressed. (?Doguzhiyev), deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Council of Ministers' state committee for special situations, summed up the meeting's results. (?Views were exchanged on speeding up the restoration and construction work in the disaster zone), and concrete measures were (?agreed upon) to [words indistinct] bring about a sharp turn in implementing the plans. Some of the issues discussed during the meeting will be brought to the attention of the USSR Council of Ministers [passage indistinct].

Gorbachev Blamed for Armenian Deputy's Detention

NC0504135990 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1530 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Text] AVANGARD youth paper has published an interview with Sergey Belosevtsev, USSR people's deputy and a member of the Interregional Group, who is actively trying to secure the release of Armenian Supreme Soviet Deputy Arkadiy Manucharov from detention. Belosevtsev said: Though the president swore and declared that he will faithfully serve and uphold law and constitutional order, the fact that our colleague Arkadiy Manucharov is still being detained is enough to give one an idea about the sense of justice of that authority.

If you are following the developments, you will be convinced that Gorbachev does not sponser investigations of corruption involving high-level officials and is not permitting a settling of accounts with the party mafia. As a result, he is leaving the fate of Deputies Gdlyan and Ivanov in question. We must fight for the future and not expect charity. Let us gradually take over the developments and work, said the deputy.

Armenian Passenger Helicopter Crashes in Azerbaijan

NC2903095990 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Because of mechanical problems, a passenger helicopter belonging to the Armenian Republic's Civil Aviation Department crashed while landing in Shaumyanovsk in the Azerbaijan Republic around 1200 on 28 March. There were casualties. A commission has gone to the site to investigate the cause of the accident.

Contamination of the Caspian Sea Criticized

NC0504144590 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 4 Apr 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] VYSHKA published a report on 18 February criticizing Azerneft for contaminating the Caspian Sea. It pointed out that Azerneft's leading officials are responsible for the destruction of thousands of birds and many valuable fish varieties in the [word indistinct] sector of the Caspian Sea. VYSHKA referred to the same problem again today. It published an article by Zekiyev entitled: "Who is Responsible?"

You can read the article on page 2.

Azerbaijan Party Bureau Meeting Detailed

NC1203084190 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Text] The Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Bureau met today to examine the republic's social and political life. The bureau recommended to the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium to consider declaring Nowruz [Iranian and Afghan New Year beginning 21 March] a holiday.

The bureau also examined honoring those who perished in Baku on 20 January. With this in mind, the Bureau instructed the Baku City People's Deputies Soviet Executive Committee to have one of the streets in Baku named 20 January. Someone recommended erecting a memorial where those who perished have been buried, and organizing the entire park for this should be considered. Considering those who perished have been buried in the park, which has been named Kirov, someone recommended restoring the park's former name, (?Daghishchi) Park. Furthermore, serious deficiencies in the work of the republic's party, soviet, economic, and law enforcement agencies, which have resulted in a political crisis and economic instability, were also examined. The details of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Bureau's decision on this will be published in the press.

Azerbaijan Council of Ministers Reviews Work

NC1403113990 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 14 Mar 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers has examined the work of the republic's establishments and organizations related to abiding by the plan and contract discipline [as heard] in 1989.

Gasan Gasanov, chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers Presidium, opened the meeting. Effectively implementing and successfully applying new economic methods, and adopting economic measures and a self-management system by the establishments have created an opportunity to improve the collectives' work, upgrade (?indexes), and use the material and work resources more successfully. However, a [word indistinct] unity has not been created in the social productivity domain. There are many mistakes, shortcomings, and unused resources. Work continued to be interrupted in the work collectives in 1989. The plan and contract discipline is not at the required level.

Views were exchanged during the meeting on what is causing this state of affairs and on how to eliminate it.

Armenian Appeal to USSR Supreme Soviet Detailed

NC1603092990 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 15 Mar 90

[Text] The Yerevan KOMMUNIST has published an appeal by the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. The appeal is written in an emotional way. It mainly deals with the situation of the Armenian villages of Azat and Kamo in the Azerbaijan SSR's Khanlarskiy Rayon and says that the residents of these two villages have been subjected to open blackmail and acts of violence for a long time.

Regrettably, the appeal openly distorts the reasons for the situation of the villages. It claims that the military units of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry are directly helping Armenian families to emigrate and that the residents are being forced to sell their houses and move away from the lands of their forefathers. The appeal also claims that the military units are provoking passions.

All this is a bitter and unjustified rebuke which has been hurled at those who have been providing security for the Armenian and the Azerbaijani peoples during the past two years.

Colonel (?Zakovich), who is the representative of the political directorate of the internal forces, has been in Khanlarskiy Rayon for more an a month now. According to what he has said, the military units, in addition to providing security for the Armenian villages, have also made an effort to contribute toward the arrangement of relations between the villages and the Khanlarskiy Rayon Soviet Executive Committee at the request of the residents of the villages. However, the military servicemen did not attend the meeting in which matters related to the future of the Armenian villages, including the question of the sale of Armenian houses, were discussed. The decision adopted during the meeting of the residents of the villages indicate that they decided what they wanted to do. The military units did not interfere. The decision advised all the residents of Azat and Kamo to sell their privately owned houses together with the [word indistinct] and fruit trees and move to their new and permanent places of residence.

In accordance with the instructions of the USSR internal affairs minister, Colonel General Shatalin, chief of the internal affairs troops, held a meeting with the internal affairs ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Azat on 7 March. The discussions they had have been fully recorded. General Shatalin was not authorized to interfere in the destiny of the Armenian villages, and he informed the participants in the meeting accordingly. The task of the military units is different. Their duty is to obstruct bloodshed and loss of life. As regards the question of adopting decisions on the illegal sale of houses and acts of intimidation and blackmail, this is the task of the local organs and republican soviet and law enforcement organs.

Baku Reports Agayev Heads City Party Committee

*NC2903063090 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
0440 GMT 28 Mar 90*

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The first secretary of the Baku City Party Committee [gorkom] has been the focus of attention of the capital's workers and residents. This is the second month that (Nuzhet) Agaogu Agayev has been heading the Baku gorkom. An Azerinform correspondent has interviewed Agayev, and the text of the interview was published in today's papers.

Iranian New Year Decreed Holiday in Azerbaijan

*NC1303185590 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
1700 GMT 13 Mar 90*

[Text] The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium has adopted the following decision: The Nowruz [Iranian new year] festival, which is the national tradition of the people of Azerbaijan, will be marked, and 21 March will be declared a holiday every year.

[Signed] El'mira Kafarova, chairwoman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and Refige Kaziyeva, secretary of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.
[Dated] Baku City, 13 March 1990.

Azerbaijan Party Chief Issues New Year Message

*NC2103144590 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
0440 GMT 21 Mar 90*

[From the republican press review]

[Text] Today's newspapers published a message issued by Ayaz Mutalibov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, to the people of Azerbaijan on the occasion of the New Year festival. The message said:

Dear fellow countrymen, on the eve of this festive occasion, I pray that the pain and suffering of our people are left behind. On behalf of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee and the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers, allow me to congratulate you, our honest, aware, and toiling people, on the occasion of the New Year festival.

The people are justified in expecting productive work by the newly elected leaders of the republic. However, a proverb says that a single hand cannot make a sound. Even the most successful general relies on his army. We, too, rely on you—the workers, the peasants, and the intellectuals. We rely on your zealous commitment to unity in purpose and work.

Spring is a period of hope. I wish to convey to you my hopes. I wish all our hopes to [word indistinct] in spring. Let there be no problem in your hearts at all.

I congratulate you on your festive occasion. Dear fellow countrymen, may your New Year festival be auspicious.

Azerbaijanis Urged To Surrender Arms, Explosives

*NC2203203090 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
1700 GMT 22 Mar 90*

[Appeal by the Azerbaijan Procuracy, Azerbaijan Committee for State Security, and Azerbaijan Internal Affairs Ministry; date not given—read by announcer]

[Text] Fellow countrymen, our republic is experiencing a complicated stage. Stabilizing the situation in the region and completely and quickly restoring security in our relations greatly depend on every Azerbaijani citizen.

The USSR Supreme Soviet's decision, which is related to the situation in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] and the Armenian SSR and to the measures needed to normalize the situation in this region, definitely creates a legal basis for establishing public law and order and security for every citizen of the republic. However the disruptive forces, like the irresponsible and extremist individuals, are provoking individual citizens for their own selfish and greedy aspirations. Engaging in lawless activities, including crimes like illegally hiding, acquiring, or selling arms, military equipment, and explosives, conflicts with our people's wishes.

Considering the present situation, many of the conscientious residents of Azerbaijan, acting in accordance with their feeling of patriotism, high sense of duty as citizens, concept of national pride, and feeling of glorification, have been helping the law enforcement organs to normalize the situation and establish public law and order. Nevertheless, the republic's procuracy, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Committee for State Security have been receiving reports that a number of people possess acquired or manufactured arms, military equipment, and explosives to safeguard the republic's territorial integrity. The law enforcement organs have been taking the necessary measures in accordance with the laws.

We appeal to you for the sake of your children's happiness and for the [word indistinct] of our mothers, sisters, and women to hand over the firearms, military equipment, and explosives to the militia organs or to the military command headquarters to prevent new tragic incidents. In accordance with Article 220 of the Azerbaijan SSR criminal code, those who voluntarily hand them over will not be held responsible.

The law enforcement organs appeal to the republic's people to call on them to establish unity and mutual agreement and halt violence, such as the methods for the political struggle, which only serve those who oppose normalizing the situation in Azerbaijan. They express the hope that restoring law and order, working conditions, and the people's happiness will be possible within a short period of time through a joint effort. Undoubtedly, this will quicken the decision to lift the state of emergency in the republic and establish security in our land.

Azerbaijan's Polyanichko at Baku Party School

NC2303193590 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
1700 GMT 23 Mar 90

[Text] Viktor Polyanichko met with course participants, professors, and lecturers of the higher party school in Baku. He briefed his audience on the March 1990 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the work of the extraordinary congress of the USSR people's deputies, and the Azerbaijani representatives' participation in the plenum and the conference. He also replied to questions on establishing a presidential system in the Soviet Union, the draft of the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress and the draft of the CPSU Central Committee's rules and regulations, holding the party's accounting and election campaign, strengthening party influence, the party's mutual relations with other unions [birlesmeler], strengthening the party apparatus, congress' decision on the situation in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, and other matters.

The individual speeches of the participants of the plenum and the people's deputies were noted. The following matters were explained in detail: the existing situation in the republic and complying with the republic's sovereign rights, the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee's relations with informal organizations, and the activity of the republic's organization committee, which is concerned with the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. These matters were explained in replies given to the questions.

Abidinov, chief of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Organizational Party Work and Cadre Affairs Department, participated in the meeting.

Baku Reports Tauzskiy Rayon Towns Fired On

NC0404190590 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
1730 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Text] Our correspondent reported from Tauzskiy Rayon a short while ago that the situation in the rayon is tense. Armenian bandit groups were observed near the towns of Mundzhukly, (?Kushchukaralar), and (?Kosha) at around 0500 today. Fire was directed against these towns.

Militia units were dispatched to the towns from the Tauzskiy Rayon center.

Gendzha Gorkom Sends Appeal to Gorbachev

NC0504140290 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
0440 GMT 4 Apr 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The newspapers have published a report on the plenum held by the Gendzha City Party Committee [gorkom]. The plenum examined the question of further deepening economic reforms and the tasks of the gorkom related to the question of democratization through reforms. The plenum also adopted an appeal to President Gorbachev, who is also the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The appeal demanded that the banditry activities by the Armenian extremists against Azerbaijan's rayons bordering Armenia be halted.

Azerbaijan Situation Returning to 'Normal'

LD0504215590 Moscow TASS in English 1557 GMT
5 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Natan Barskiy]

[Text] Baku April 5 TASS—The life and work of residents of Baku and other cities and reigons of Azerbaijan is coming back to normal slowly, but steadily after the tragic developments early this year. Movie theatres, resaturants and cafes opened after a two-month break. All industrial enterprises of this Transcaucasian republic are functioning. People are trying to make up for a slump in industry, construction, transport and agriculture, caused by strikes, with the help of a dramatic growth in labour productivity and overtime work.

Local newspapers published today a decree of the republican government which recalls that the worsening of Azerbaijani-Armenian relations early this year forced many Azerbaijanis to leave the Nagorno-Karabakh region with predominantly Armenian population. Those people were settled in other parts of Azerbaijan. Those, who remained in Nagorno-Karabakh, cannot work normally because the region's economy has long been disorganized.

The Azerbaijani Council of Minsters decided to pay those who were forced to leave Nagorno-Karabakh the same one-time allowance as to the Azerbiajanians who previously had left their homes in Armenia. Those who remained in Nagorno-Karabakh, but who could not work because of strikes, will receive wages for a whole period of a forced work stoppage in 1988-1989.

A resolution was also adopted on the impermissibilty of creating on territory of the sovergin Transcaucasianu republic constituencies and polling stations for elections to people's deputies of another union republic. The document is a response to the attempts to create constituencies for elections to the Armenian Supreme Soviet in Nagorno-Karabakh, which is part of Azerbaijan. These actions run counter to the Soviet Constitution, the resolution stressed.

'Tension Persists' Throughout Nagorno-Karabakh

NC2503100890 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 24 Mar 90

[Text] According to reports from Stepanakert, tension persists throughout the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. Mass strikes are continuing in the industrial enterprises.

According to informal organizations, the prolonged strikes are not having any political effect on the central authorities. Only the oblast's national economy is suffering from the strikes, and the living conditions of the citizens are deteriorating.

At the request of the refugee committee in Artsakh, work at the construction sites in Stepanakert resumed on (?21) March. Extensive construction work is going on in the communal and individual house building sector. The increased pace of housing construction will help increase the Armenian population of Artsakh, thus ensuring the development and existence of the Armenian autonomous oblast.

In line with the decision of the parents committee of public schools in Stepanakert, classes have resumed. The Stepanakert branch of the Kirovakan Pedagogical Institute is also holding classes. The kindergartens have also resumed operations. However, so far the road transportation links with Armenia have not been restored.

Further on 'Tense' Situation

NC0404133190 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Yerevan, 3 Apr (ARMENPRES)—The situation is very tense and unpredictable in the Armenian villages of Shushinskiy Rayon in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. As was reported a few days ago by the correspondent of the Russian-language KOMMUNIST, the gas station on the Stepanakert-Berdadzor road two km from Shusha was blown up. The culprits have not yet been identified, but everything is being done to blame this provocative act on the Armenian population. This was the implication of reports on the incident, especially that provided by "Vremya" on Sunday, 25 March. Everyone knows that the gas station is adjacent to a Shusha cooperative and that no persons from Stepanakert, let alone from Berdadzor, could have approached that site.

It is possible to surmise, the correspondent concludes, that after Shusha leaders paid many visits to Berdadzor in a vain attempt to impose themselves on the people there, Baku politicians, secure in the knowledge that they always succeed in this, have decided to rouse the Azerbaijani population and instigate them to act against the inhabitants of a number of Armenian villages. This apprehension of the Armenians is confirmed by the fact that Berdadzor has been under surveillence from the high hills of Lachin. It is also confirmed by the instigatory AZERINFORM reports broadcast by the local television.

Road communication with Stepanakert has been cut. The inhabitants of the Armenian villages have had to become almost entirely self-sufficient. This is because Berdadzor is not receiving foodstuffs from Shusha and bringing supplies from Stepanakert is extremely difficult.

Are there soldiers in Berdadzor?

A guard post was set up near Kirov village just before the traditional Azerbaijani spring festival. The post was set up on the pretext that the inhabitants of Lachin feared an attack from Berdadzor during the festival. The festival is now over but the guard post remains. Now they claim that its presence is required to supervise the passport regulations. The people of Berdadzor would like to believe that the soldiers would check any attempt to attack Berdadzor. However, they wonder if the history of Azat and Kamo villages, which were emptied of Armenians and settled by Azerbaijanis in the presence of soldiers and despite the promises of the USSR internal affairs minister, will be repeated. If this trend continues, it will soon be easy to hold a plebiscite on the fate of the NKAO.

Attack on Bus in Nagorno-Karabakh Reported

NC2803125090 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 27 Mar 90

[Text] A report from Stepanakert says that peace may be disrupted in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] once again. According to the information given to a TASS correspondent by the state of emergency command headquarters of the NKAO and its adjacent rayons, a bus travelling between Mirbeshir and Kel'badzhar was fired upon near Drmbon town in NKAO's Mardakertskiy Rayon on 26 March. Azerbaijanis were travelling in the bus.

According to the first reports, one passenger was killed and four others wounded. The operations group, which arrived at the place where the incident took place, discovered cartridges from automatic arms and carbines. The militia workers are taking measures with the help of the internal affairs units to identify and arrest the criminals. According to Colonel Bogokhudov, chief of the political department of the military commant's office, the extremists' move to resume their activities when the necessary ground has been created to gradually normalize the NKAO situation has caused justified indignation. These actions not only slow down positive changes, but they also harm the Azerbaijanis and Armenians. They delay the auspicious progress that is being made through normalizing the situation in NKAO.

Stepanakert Officials Claim No 'Martyred' Soldiers

NC1503155590 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Text] Yerevan, 11 Mar (ARMENPRES)—The Stepanakert City Party Committee of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO], the Executive Committee of the city Soviet of the People's Deputies, and the Stepanakert Council of Labor and Armed Forces Veterans of the USSR Armed Forces have appealed to the units of the Soviet Army and to the Internal Affairs Ministry personnel currently serving in the NKAO. The appeal specifically says: "In these days of crisis in our region, the fighters of the Soviet Army and those of the Internal Affairs Ministry are honorably discharging their noble mission to defend the security of the peaceful population. The memory of the martyred soldiers will always remain in the hearts of the Armenian people. Let all understand that no soldier has been martyred by Armenian hands."

Georgian Planning Committee Official Views Plenum

90US0630B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 1 Feb 90 p 1

[Interview with Bakuri Gulua, first deputy chairman of Georgia's State Planning Committee, by ZARYA VOSTOKA correspondent Galina Petriashvili on 31 January: "Pluralism—In the Party's Interests"]

[Text] A plenum of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee was held yesterday. In a break between sessions our correspondent requested an interview with a participant in the plenum, Bakuri Gulua, first deputy chairman of the republic State Planning Committee.

[Petriashvili] The first question: Is this plenum in any respect different from previous ones?

[Gulua] Undoubtedly; primarily because, it would seem to me, these differences are dictated by the very social and political situation which has taken shape in the republic, an exceptional situation. It was analyzed in depth and in detail in the report delivered by G.G. Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee. I had not previously heard at a plenum such a noncliched speech free of the prejudices which were customary even recently and from prescribed formulas. Of course, this report did not provide—nor could it—all the answers to all the questions, but it formulated clearly and honestly the priorities for our republic's party organization. The report evoked a lively response from the participants, critical included. It evoked, I would say, a chain reaction of thought; although, to be fair, it should be observed that the speaker's report did not satisfy everyone. In fact, this is not to be wondered at. Everyone has his own opinion.

[Petriashvili] What are the priorities you mentioned?

[Gulua] The main one is consolidating political stability in the republic, evaluating the most important events of the recent period, formulating the positions of the republic Communist Party on the issue of political pluralism, replacing executive personnel in the party, adopting a decision on the question of the status of the republic Communist Party and its rules and program, and so forth. The speaker proposed that a congress of the Georgian Communist Party be convened not in the fall but this April.

[Petriashvili] What is your personal attitude, Bakuri Davidovich, toward this proposal?

[Gulua] Entirely positive. And for this reason, I believe that this will accelerate the processes which have been mapped out. The congress will obviously be preceded by city and rayon conferences, at which we will agree on how delegates should be elected. This will bring about a renewal—more precisely, recovery—of the situation in our party organization. The communists will express an opinion on, specifically, the status of the republic Communist Party, with which the delegates will assemble for the congress. The question of the need for a referendum in the party organizations in connection with status was raised at the plenum, incidentally. The opinion that it is necessary to recognize the other political parties which exist in Georgia was heard at the plenum also.

[Petriashvili] Who raised this matter?

[Gulua] As I have already said, the idea of the need for real political pluralism was contained in the report, and it was extended by several of those who spoke in the debate. The question was posed unequivocally: Various political parties are a reality, and we have to come to terms with it. There was the following opinion also: Nonrecognition, if you will, of these parties and political organizations on the part of the republic Communist Party would put primarily us communists in a disadvantageous position. After all, as long as an organization is illegal, we say, it is not practically responsible. However, when all political organizations have the same status as the Communist Party, they will be responsible for their actions on an equal basis. Society, on the other hand, will have the choice of whom to follow.

[Petriashvili] Do you share this opinion?

[Gulua] I believe that a multiparty system is the sole method of democratization not only of the party but of society as a whole. And the party itself primarily, proceeding from the strictest demands made on it, has an interest in this.

[Petriashvili] The question of the status of the republic Communist Party is one of the relations of the CPSU and the Georgian Communist Party....

[Gulua] The question of whether the CPSU Central Committee should be converted into a central committee of the communist parties of the Soviet Union was raised at the plenum.

[Petriashvili] That is, the "Lithuanian version"?

[Gulua] Yes. Whether we like it or not, we are approaching just such a structure.

[Petriashvili] In other words, the division of the CPSU into 15 individual communist parties?

[Gulua] This could hardly be called unequivocally a division. There are, after all, the traditions of the Communist International.

[Petriashvili] And, briefly, how did the discussion of the concept of Georgia's national development go?

[Gulua] It was noted that the version which had been published earlier had undergone big changes in connection with the mass of proposals which had been received. It was announced that the concept would be published once more—with regard for these changes.

[Petriashvili] Once more as a draft?

[Gulua] As a draft for discussion at the congress, which, obviously, will adopt the final version.

Georgian Front Prepares for Elections

90US0649C Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian No 5, 2 Feb 90 p 5

[Report on interview with the chairman of the Election Commission of the People's Front of Georgia, Robert Petriashvili, by MOLODEZH GRUZII correspondent Ye. Aleksandriya; date and place not specified: "From the People, or?..."]

[Text] "We are to blame ourselves...."—this is how we bitterly reproached ourselves during the sharpest, "peak" moments of TV broadcasts from the First and Second Congresses of USSR People's Deputies and sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet when our delegates paid no attention to sound proposals or "drowned out by applause" those to whom they should have listened attentively.

"We are to blame ourselves...."—this is what we acknowledged reading in the central press the drafts of clearly belated and still amorphous and half-hearted laws.

Of course, we are to blame. Were we not the ones to actually "sleep through" and "miss" slightly less than a year ago the elections of USSR people's deputies as a result of which we got the present composition of the parliament and the congress which safeguard the interests of the apparatus rather than defend you and me, rank-and-file but (ideally) fully emancipated citizens of our country.

Will we, the voters, repeat the mistakes of the previous campaign which have largely become fatal during this period of nominating candidate people's deputies of the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet as well? This was the question with which a conversation began between our correspondent and the chairman of the Election Commission of the People's Front of Georgia, Robert Petriashvili.

I am a realist, R. Petriashvili said. Perhaps, it would be naive to expect that the voters in their entire tremendous mass have grasped equally well that the outcome of the elections and thus the composition of the future parliament of Georgia depend on them completely and fully, depend on the position they take and the candidate they prefer. Unfortunately there are indifferent and passive people among the voters. They will do as told. If told "you must," they will vote at a candidate nomination meeting for the very bureaucrat who is to blame for the failure to solve their social and housing problems for many years and for the shortages of goods and services which are a daily necessity that develop every now and then. If they approach this apparently procedural aspect in an independent and responsible manner, a worthy deputy will subsequently take the seat in the parliament.

[Aleksandriya] Judging by the crowd which I observe on a daily basis in your election commission, one may come to the conclusion that there is still hope for the better, and a realistic one at that.

[Petriashvili] Undoubtedly. Along with the representatives of regional organizations of the People's Front of Georgia who are registering their candidates, those from the Rustaveli Society and some informal associations come to us. You may judge the qualitative composition of the candidates nominated for yourself. Nodar Natadze, Akakiy Bakradze, Roman Gotsiridze, Georgiy Mardzanishvili, Guram Skhirtladze, Lana Gogoberidze, Merab Aleksidze, Zaza Aleksidze, Eldar Shengelaya, Solomon Khutsishvili, Zurab Zhvaniya, Eldar Mamistvalashvili, Georgiy Masalkin, Vakhushti Kotetishvili, Mukhran Machavariani, Guram Petriashvili.... Need I go on?

[Aleksandriya] If any of the leaders of the national-liberation movement, cultural figures and scientists well-known in Georgia, true intellectuals, are running in my district I will give them my vote without any hesitation. Of course, these people have gained our confidence due to their great civic involvement, adherence to principles, and courage.

[Petriashvili] To my mind, this is how any sensible person should reason, all the more so because many representatives of the official authorities have completely lost the trust of the people which is confirmed by the very progress of candidate nomination. For example, many candidates of the People's Front of Georgia were eagerly nominated by several labor collectives from different cities and rayons of the republic at the same time. This was the case with the candidates of a number of parties and informal organizations actually existing in Georgia.

[Aleksandriya] However, thus far ranking party and soviet functionaries and economic managers, in a word, "top brass" have clearly dominated the candidate lists regularly published in the press.

[Petriashvili] Undoubtedly the pre-election struggle is going to be acute. The apparatus is displaying heightened activity. If we look at the lists of the already nominated candidates it becomes clear that officialdom (both the apparatus and the managers) intends to create a new governing alliance in order to retain its privileges: As of 24 January, 456 out of the 644 candidates were party, soviet, and economic functionaries.

[Aleksandriya] Actually the struggle has already begun despite the fact that supposedly the elections are still far away. What are the specific manifestations of this struggle? Have there already been cases when the apparatus pressured the voters?

[Petriashvili] I will give you just one fact but a very typical one. This is how a conference nominating candidate people's deputies was "prepared" and held at the Rustavi Production Association "Nitrogen." Pursuant to the Law on Elections, delegates to this conference should be elected ahead of time in brigades, shops, departments, and other lower units. However, such elections were not held at all at "Nitrogen." What was the result? Putting it mildly, arbitrarily selected persons were present at the conference, and their registration proceeded on the basis of some strange lists which allegedly "are not on file," despite this being a requirement under the Law on Elections. I will say more: No chairman, secretariat, or counting commission was elected at the conference. However, the chairman of the appropriate district electoral commission...acted as the chairman appointed by persons unknown!

[Aleksandriya] The results of such a "nomination" are easy to predict.

[Petriashvili] You bet! Here they are: General director of the Production Association "Nitrogen" "won" by one (!) vote, which was announced by the chairman of the conference. However, this "victory" turned out to be invalid when verified: After all, it is necessary to get one-half of the votes of those present in order to be nominated a candidate rather than just a majority, as was the case at "Nitrogen."

[Aleksandriya] However, the chairman perhaps "failed to notice" that a mistake had crept into the "calculations."

[Petriashvili] Let us consider that this is exactly what happened—that they "failed to notice" the mistake. However, such violations, on the one hand, indicate that the voters are absolutely incompetent and, on the other, that the apparatus continues to employ its old, proven methods without even bothering to change its tactics, at least in order to achieve its own goals.

[Aleksandriya] Speaking of tactics, this phrase has been coming up recently: A number of informal organizations are boycotting the elections. At the same time, it is not specified which specific parties and associations out of the 30 actually existing in Georgia participate in the elections and which ones do not although it would seem that the times of abstract, unattributed criticism are behind us.

[Petriashvili] Indeed, the charge of boycotting elections is leveled against the radical parties and organizations, and actually against the national-liberation movement as a whole, as a kind of rebuke. Generally, boycotting elections is one quite usual political device out of many possible ones. Every party structures its tactics on the basis of its strategy. Incidentally, at present an active reevaluation of these tactical scenarios of actions is underway. By now, an obvious shift in the direction of participation in the elections has occurred.

[Aleksandriya] As far as I know, most parties have agreed to participate.

[Petriashvili] Yes. However, we may also understand in a way those who continue to insist on the boycott. At this point, we are electing an optimal administration for handling current business which, hopefully, will be able to provide a constitutional framework for the actually emerging political situation in Georgia and determine its further development.

[Aleksandriya] Nominating candidates is only the first stage of a quite protracted and strenuous "marathon." The final stage, that of counting votes, may immediately render all of the efforts made futile if, of course, our votes will be counted by using old methods. For example, on the day USSR people's deputies were elected I encountered a curious phenomenon in my election precinct, which is quite far from the center of the city; it is situated in a school. The people in our microrayon are mostly passive; workers account for the bulk of them. In an effort to perhaps make the voting procedure "easier" for the voters, the agitator-teachers prompted obligingly and unobtrusively: "Please, cross out this line, and keep that line." What do you think: Who were we asked to cross out and who we were asked to keep?

[Petriashvili] I can guess! You were to keep an apparatus functionary.

[Aleksandriya] Absolutely correct! To be sure, I crossed out exactly the one I should have. What about others, those for whom the Law on Elections remains something transcendental and unworthy of close attention to this day? Do you plan to respond to situations of this nature? Will you attempt to prevent them?

[Petriashvili] Definitely. First of all, on election day the representatives of all candidates will be present in every, I repeat, every election precinct. Besides, under the Law on Elections which is already in effect certain penalties are envisaged for violating procedures both in the course of the election campaign and the counting of votes. Incidentally these measures can already be used against a number of persons who have violated the law in the process of holding meetings and conferences for nominating candidate deputies. However, the election commission of the People's Front of Georgia has refrained, and continues to refrain, from this.

[Aleksandriya] Why?

[Petriashvili] We believe that the situation which has emerged in the country should sober up those who blindly support the functionaries and act on their orders, if not the functionaries themselves. However, in the event of similar violations in the future the People's Front of Georgia will unfortunately be forced to act in keeping with this provision of the Law on Elections as well.

[Aleksandriya] Certainly, I would like to wish that you would never have to resort to this, and that the elections would be held as an honest struggle of equals. However, have we not had enough phony "elections" on instructions "from above," under "the quota system?"

[Petriashvili] I would very much like all voters to grasp this. Advise them to read attentively the Law on Elections in Georgia again and again before it is too late, and to prevent being cheated yet again. After all, the consequences of such a mistake this time may be even more serious than before.

Georgian Komsomol Congress Ends in Tbilisi

LD2203042190 Moscow TASS in English 1713 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] Tbilisi March 21 TASS—By TASS correspondent Zurab Grdzelishvili:

An extraordinary congress of the Georgian Young Communist League [YCL], which ended here today, furnished no answer to the question of whether or not this largest youth organisation of the republic, rallying in its ranks 650,000 young people, will continue to exist and in what form.

The congress resolution says the league, established seventy years ago, first had the status of a branch of the Russian league, and then of the All-Union Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] organisation. Today, when Georgia is trying to restore its independence, the congress passed a decision to overcome past errors and determine the league's structure. This means the formation of new organisations on its basis, which will have the right to freely secede from it.

"The congress set up a commission to draw up a mechanism for self-determination. Youth organisations, formed according to the legislation in force, will be fully-fledged heirs of the league's property during the process. The basic funds of the league were declared untouchable during the transition period," 27-year old leader of the Georgian Komsomol Sesili Gogiberidze told TASS.

According to Gogiberidze, the congress asked the republican government to provide jobs to Komsomol functionaries released in the process of the Georgian YCL's self-determination.

The congress expressed support to the process of deideologisation of Georgian public education as a precondition for the formation of a democratic and humane society. The delegates acknowledged at the same time the expediency of setting up children's public organisations at schools.

After the congress a group of its delegates moved to set up a new public organisation—the Free Youth Movement of Georgia.

Georgian Constitutional Amendments Detailed

PM2203113790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

[PRAVDA correspondent G. Lebanidze report: "Election Dates Postponed"]

[Text] Tbilisi, 21 Mar—An extraordinary session of the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet was held here to consider the questions of the draft Law on Amendments to the Georgian SSR Constitution and of postponing elections of Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet deputies and deputies to the republic's local soviets of people's deputies.

G. Gumbaridze, chairman of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, delivered a report on both questions.

It was decided to amend Articles 6, 7, and 49 of the republic's constitution.

In particular, Articles 6 and 7 are to read as follows:

Article 6. The Georgian Communist Party and other political parties, along with trade union, youth, and other social organizations and mass movements, participate in state policymaking and in managing state and public affairs on equal terms via their representatives elected to the soviets of people's deputies and in other forms.

Article 7. All political parties, social organizations, and mass movements performing functions envisaged by their programs and statutes operate within the framework of the Georgian SSR Constitution and laws.

The creation and activity of parties, organizations, and movements aiming to forcibly change the republic's constitutional system and integrity, undermine its security, and kindle national and religious strife are not permitted.

The resolution on the second question notes that the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet and Presidium received proposals from deputies and candidate deputies to the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet, party rayon and city committees, public organizations, labor collectives, scientific institutions, and educational establishments regarding the elections of Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet deputies scheduled for 25 March 1990 and the elections of deputies to the republic's local soviets of people's deputies scheduled for 17 June. The opinion was expressed that it is inadvisable to hold the elections at the aforementioned times since a new election law needs to be elaborated, given the multiparty system that is taking shape.

The Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet accordingly resolved to postpone the elections to the Supreme Soviet and local soviets until October-November 1990.

Georgian Communist Party Congress 15 May

LD2203203.90 Moscow TASS in English 1901 GMT 22 Mar 90

[Text] Tbilisi March 22 TASS—The 28th Congress of the Georgian Communist Party will be held in Tbilisi on May 15. This was decided at a plenary meeting of the party's Central Committee here today.

The plenum formed a commission to prepare proposals on the party's status and to work out theses of a programme and draft rules of the party, and endorsed the composition of the commission.

Georgian Party Rejects Draft CPSU Platform

90US0710A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 4 Mar 90 p 2

[Letter from Georgiy Korganashvili, member of the Georgian Constitutional Democratic Party: "Relations—on an Interstate Level"]

[Text] We have familiarized ourselves with the wording of the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress and have formulated our common opinion in this letter. The draft evokes in us frank disagreement. Its wording, approved by the CPSU Central Committee February plenum, under the title "Toward Humane, Democratic Socialism," is astonishing in its very title, and the content of this document dots all the "i's."

We shall dwell in more detail, for example, on the propositions of Chapter V of the draft. We consider utterances of the following kinds to be a manifestation of a cynical attitude toward history: "...We emphatically reject attempts to cancel out that which was great and meritorious contributed by October to the life of our country—the consolidation and acquisition of statehood by many of the peoples which were in a position of colonial outlying areas of the Russian Empire, the surmounting of their backwardness, the new values of interethnic intercourse, and the sense of equal affiliation to a great world power."

Has any of this anything to do with Georgia? Acquisition of statehood, sense of affiliation to a great power! We should, it transpires, be grateful for everything, proud even of the sense of affiliation to a state.

Further, any self-determination is necessarily seen from the standpoints of the platform exclusively within the framework of a renewed Soviet federation. The CPSU Central Committee advocates the enactment of a law on the mechanism of secession?! Such tricks, we assure you, are not for us! The right to free, we emphasize, free secession from the USSR has not yet been removed from the USSR Constitution (or from the union republic constitutions either). So a law on a secession mechanism is being proposed, of course, as a mechanism for impeding secession.

Here follow in addition deterrents of the type: "...We are convinced that a weakening and, even more, severance of mutually diverse and interpenetrating relations would entail barely predictable negative consequences for all peoples, not to mention people's fate." What is heard essentially is a threat to "close vitally important arteries" to refractory peoples, and the pharisaical "barely predictable" conceals "frightful." And, finally: "...We are emphatically opposed to separatist slogans and movements leading to the destruction of a great multinational democratic state."

Since when has the USSR been a democratic state? If the CPSU does in fact sincerely put this country in the democratic ranks, in this case the platform's title does truly and entirely sincerely seem to us utterly inappropriate. In addition, not having investigated the heart of the matter, calling national liberation movements separatist means standing firmly on great-power, chauvinist positions.

Not even a trace of what is called perestroyka can be seen in the opinions of the draft CPSU platform concerning the "new federation." Every permissible and, at times, impermissible method is employed to canvass to the glory of the federation. What could be meant by, for example, such a phrase as "...The modern economy cannot cope without a center operating at the macro level?" It is difficult not to see it as a most commonplace manifestation of imperial "economic" thinking.

It is our profound conviction that the possibility of Georgia's participation in some federation or, if you will, confederation must unfailingly be ruled out, at this stage, in any event. Only economic, cultural, and political relations are preserved at the interstate level. Any other type of Georgia's relations with the USSR we consider impermissible. We are sure that the Georgian people will not voluntarily "transfer" any state functions to anyone, and let this not be suggested.

The CPSU's Georgian party organization showed itself to be a good match with the former when, at its plenum, it proclaimed that if the Georgian Communist Party wished to retain the political initiative and maintain its political authority, it should adopt (read, appropriate) national and social ideals and interests. No comment, as they say, like father, like son (like the CPSU Central Committee Platform, like the position of the Georgian party organization).

[Signed] Georgiy Korganashvili, member of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Georgia

Kutaisi Gorkom Elects New First Secretary

PM0404100190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Mar 90 Second Edition p 4

[Correspondent G. Lebanidze report: "Elected By the Whole City"]

[Text] Tbilisi—Things like this do not often happen in party life. G. Abzianidze, first secretary of the Kutaisi party gorkom [city committee] asked to be relieved of his post on health grounds. The bureau gorkom discussed his request and granted it and immediately recommended that the plenum appoint T. Shashiashvili, chairman of the Kutaisi City Soviet Executive Committee, as first secretary. However, the plenum categorically rejected such a "traditional" form of "cadre selection" and demanded that the examination of his candidacy not be confined solely to the bureau and plenum. "Let the city's communists and nonparty people have their say," it stated.

Open meetings were held at Kutaisi's primary party organizations. Thousands of communists and nonparty people took part. There were sessions of higher educational institutions' academic councils and meetings of representatives of the city's creative intelligentsia. The majority of them nominated T. Shashiashvili. There were 20 other candidates, too. But by secret ballot the gorkom plenum elected T. Shashiashvili first secretary of the party gorkom.

Personnel Changes in Adzhar ASSR Reported

90US0724B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 8 Mar 90 p 1

[GRUZINFORM report: "The Plenum of the Adzhar Party Obkom"]

[Text] A plenum of the Adzhar obkom of the Georgian Communist Party which considered an organizational issue took place.

The plenum released from his duties as first secretary and bureau member of the Adzhar party obkom G.Kh. Emiridze, in connection with his transfer to other work.

Before the start of the plenum, meetings took place with Georgian CP Central Committee First Secretary G.G. Gumbaridze and members of the Adzhar party obkom bureau, a group of secretaries from the primary party organizations, representatives of the intelligentsia, public organizations, and first secretaries of the Batumi party gorkom and raykom of the Adzhar ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], at which the possible candidates for the post of first secretary of the Adzhar party obkom were discussed.

As a result of secret balloting, T.S. Khakhva, who had previously worked as secretary of the Adzhar obkom, and was recently a senior official in the CPSU Central Committee apparatus, was elected first secretary and bureau member of the Adzhar obkom of the Georgian CP.

G.G. Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee, addressed the plenum.

N.R. Sadzhaya, department head of the Georgian CP Central Committee department of party organization and cadre work, participated in the work of the plenum.

Lenin Monuments Taken Down in Georgian Towns

PM1303094190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Mar 90 First Edition p 6

[Unattributed "Correction"]

[Text] Through the fault of an editorial office employee, a report headed "Vandalism" published 8 March this year mistakenly said that a monument to V.I. Lenin was taken down [snesen] on a Tbilisi square 6 March. In fact, this act of vandalism was committed in the city of Gori. The same fate befell a monument to V.I. Lenin in the city of Rustavi.

Staff Blamed for Georgian Prison Breakouts

PM2103143390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent B. Urigashvili report under the rubric "Fact...": "Prison Breakout—by Chance?"]

[Text] Just after 0200 on 9 March 17 people escaped from the investigative prison in the city of Zugdidi. At the Georgian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Political Department our own correspondent B. Urigashvili was told that an official investigation into the circumstances of the breakout has begun.

According to preliminary data, the following picture is becoming apparent. Prisoners staged a fight in a cell and then asked for one of them to be given medical assistance. Having thereby lured guards into the cell, they tied them up and locked them in. (However, it is not clear why no one was backing up the controllers in the corridor. Because this is laid down in the instructions....).

The minister of internal affairs declared in the republic press that it was already possible to maintain that what happened was either blatant thoughtlessness or treachery.

Let us elaborate: This was not the first breakout from Zugdidi Investigative Prison. Last summer, at the very height of the events in Abkhazia, more than 100 (!) prisoners escaped from it—including people being held on suspicion of murder. Two of the escapees that time managed to reach their home settlement and killed a militia officer there. For revenge, so it turned out. Twelve people are still on the run....

It is an interesting fact that both then and now the chief of Zugdidi Investigative Prison was Lengo Beriya. He was severely reprimanded after the summer incident, but the officer kept his post. The MVD leadership explained this by saying that he is an experienced worker.

According to the minister, after the summer breakout measures were taken to fit the prison with additional technical equipment, and many of the establishment's staffers were replaced. It is clear now that the reasons for what happened are more deeply rooted.

I will add that two of the escapees have been captured and returned to the investigative prison. The other 15 are still at large....

Georgian Metal Workers Strike For More Pay

LD0404103490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2027 GMT 3 Apr 90

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Excerpt] Everyone knows the state of the country's economy. One would wish and hope that strikes will not exacerbate the situation in the coming months. Will these hopes be fulfilled? A vast number of still unresolved social and economic problems do not give grounds for particular optimism.

A sit-down strike has been going on at the administrtive block of the Rustavi metallurgical works for over a week. It is being conducted by members of the free union of metalworkers of Georgia. The workers are demanding a rise in wages, departure from all-union subordination, the dissolution of special departments, the elimination of the Council of the Labor Collectives and the disbanding of the existing trade union. [passage omitted]

Central Asia

Kazakh Resolution on Draft Party Platform Viewed

90US0617A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Feb 90 p 2

[Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee 19th plenum resolution "The CPSU Central Committee Draft Platform for the 28th Party Congress and Priority Measures Pertaining to the Preparation and Occurrence of the 17th Kazakh Communist Party Congress and the Report and Election Campaign in the Republic Party Organization"]

[Text] The Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee plenum notes that the CPSU Central Committee Draft platform "Toward Humane, Democratic Socialism" contains a program of radical measures pertaining to a way out of the critical situation in the party and the country and provides a new concept of socialism and profound transformations in the political system.

The plenum proceeds from the fact that the CPSU will pursue its policy and struggle to preserve its position as governing party within the framework of the democratic process, seeking the trust of the people through the provision for each individual of fitting living and work conditions and political rights and liberties, establishing social justice.

The CPSU's renunciation of the monopoly of power and severance with the authoritarian-bureaucratic system and dogmatized ideology, a strengthening of the party's consolidating role in society and a readiness for political dialogue with other currents and groups are coming to be the main directions of the party's contemporary policy.

An urgent task of a recovery of the economic situation is the realization of a system of measures to stabilize the consumer market and the implementation of radical economic reform based on a diversity of forms of ownership and the development of commodity-money relations.

Supporting the policy formulated by the CPSU Central Committee February (1990) plenum, the participants in the plenum advocate the need for decisive political action pertaining to a reforming of the style and methods of work of the party committees, a reduction in and improvement of the structure of their apparatus, and the democratization of intra-party relations.

The bringing forward of the date of the convening of the 17th Kazakh Communist Party Congress, the upcoming report and election campaign in the primary, rayon, city and oblast party organizations, and extensive discussion of the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress are called on to play an important part in this process.

The plenum supports the communists' proposals concerning the election of delegates and members of elective bodies on a broad democratic basis with the decisive participation of the primary party organizations by way of direct, secret, and multiple-choice elections.

The plenum views as an appreciable step forward in the democratization of intraparty life the direct elections of party committee secretaries at meetings, conferences and the congress. While supporting a broadening of the independence of the union republic communist parties on the platform of the country's multinational party, the plenum considers it necessary to secure for them representation in the central executive bodies of the CPSU and self-determination in the formulation of program documents, the solution of organizational, personnel, and financial questions and the development of interparty relations.

The Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee resolves:

1. To consider that the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress "Toward Humane, Democratic Socialism," which was approved by the February plenum, is the political reference point under the conditions of the transitional period and a

sound basis for pre-congress debate and the organization of the report and election campaign in the republic party organization.

That the obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms [oblast, city, and rayon party committees] and primary party organizations will initiate extensive discussion and explanation of the ideas of the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee in the work force and among the population, making effective use to this end of the mass media.

Members of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee and other elective party bodies, ideology activists, and all communists of the republic will participate actively in propaganda of the draft platform.

To collate the results of the discussion at party conferences and the 17th Kazakh Communist Party Congress.

2. The plenum deems it expedient to instruct the Bureau and commissions of the Central Committee to draw up and submit for discussion by the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee Enlarged 20th plenum the draft political platform of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee for the 17th Congress of the republic Communist Party. To interpret in this document on the basis of scientific analysis the progress and evaluate the prospects of the restructuring processes in the republic with regard for national-historical, social, cultural, and economic singularities and the pace of renovation in various regions of Kazakhstan. To determine the basic directions of the reforming of the activity of the party organizations.

3. In accordance with the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee February (1990) plenum and in alteration of the resolution of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee 17th plenum of 13 November 1989, to convene the 17th Kazakh Communist Party Congress on 7 June 1990.

With regard for the proposals of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee Organizational-Party and Cadre Work Commission:

—to establish the representation quota for the 17th Congress; one delegate per 545 CPSU members;

—to hold report and election meetings in shop and primary party organizations with more than 15 CPSU members in February-March; rayon and city party conferences, in March-April; oblast party conferences, in April-May 1990;

—to determine that questions concerning the procedure of the election of conference and congress delegates be decided by the oblast party organizations themselves.

It is essential here to provide for competition, multiple choice, and an objective evaluation of the candidates' political and moral attributes. It is important that these be authoritative party members and worthy representatives of the working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia who have given a positive account of themselves in the course of perestroyka and who sincerely wish to participate in the formulation and realization of party policy.

4. That the Central Committee Bureau, the obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms and the primary party organizations consistently implement measures pertaining to the profound democratization of party life, regarding as a priority task an utmost increase in the assertiveness of the communists, the enlistment of each party member in actual participation in the life and affairs of his party organization and the creation of conditions for their participation in the formation and evaluation of the activity of the elective party bodies and their apparatus, the implementation of personnel policy and the strengthening of the party ranks.

5. That the Central Committee Bureau, in conjunction with the republic's obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms, will from the viewpoint of what is set forth in the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee study the comprehension by the communists and nonparty people of the role and place of the governing party in the democratic process and their opinion concerning an improvement in the organizational structure of the Kazakh Communist Party and its elective bodies and apparatus and the optimization of their numbers with regard for the particular features of the work of each party organization and also the material possibilities at the party's disposal.

Cater for the transition to the self-administration and independence of all party components and emphatically oppose their petty tutelage.

6. That the obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms and primary party organizations will actively master methods of political leadership and resolutely rid themselves of functions outside of their province and direct interference in the activity of the soviet, state, and economic authorities and public organizations. Concentrate efforts on the formulation of action programs, the performance of organizing, ideological, educational and personnel work, the winning of authority and a strengthening of party influence on the life and affairs of the collectives and a stabilization of the situation locally.

7. To make it incumbent upon the Central Committee Bureau, the obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms and the primary party organizations to persistently implement the demands of the political reform, enlist representatives of all social groups of the population in management more extensively and promote the establishment locally of the sovereignty of the soviets of people's deputies and their implementation of a set of measures for the republic's transition to the principles of independence and self-financing, its economic recovery, development of the social sphere and a rise in people's living standard.

To struggle actively for their candidates for people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], the worthy representation in the body of deputies of workers, peasants, the youth, women and the nationalities residing in the republic and the formation of a government from the most active supporters of perestroyka and radical transformations.

To require of members of the CPSU working in the soviet, state and economic authorities of the republic that they have done with manifestations of slowness and indecisiveness and use all measures provided for by the law to maintain stability in society and prevent lawlessness and infringements of the citizens' rights.

To increase exactingness toward the communist executives of ministries, departments, enterprises, associations and organizations and each member of the party for the realization of the socioeconomic programs advanced by the CPSU, fulfillment of contractual commitments and production quotas, a strengthening of labor and production discipline and an acceleration of radical economic reform and the growth rate of productivity and S&T progress.

8. The Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee plenum calls the attention of the republic's communists to the continuing strain in the economy and social life, the nihilistic attitude of some people toward state and labor discipline, the growth of crime and other negative phenomena. Under these conditions the party committees are obliged to operate decisively, support the healthy restructuring forces, extend the dialogue and cooperation with various public and political movements sharing the socialist choice, vigorously repulse all demagogues and defeatism and liquidationist sentiments and gear ideological work to the inculcation of political culture, patriotism and internationalism.

The plenum calls on the republic's communists to join actively in the preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 17th Kazakh Communist Party Congress and to use the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee as a basis for the renewal of the party and the winning of the people's trust.